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ABSTRACT 
 
Seaport Vulnerability to Criminal Networks: A Mixed Method Approach to Measuring 
Criminological Vulnerability in the Top 30 U.S. Container Ports  
by 
Leonid Lantsman 
 
 
Advisor: Michael Maxfield 
 
Seaports form a unique space for criminological examination. As the locus points for the 
majority of international and domestic trade criminal network access to a port can provide 
outsized benefits. While ports are physical spaces they are underlined by complex systems 
incorporating public and private agencies, companies and small entities. Underlying the 
administrative and logistical activity at the port is a jurisdictional web of public and private 
security regulatory agencies. The complexity of the environment creates vulnerabilities that 
criminal networks can use to gain access to ports. This dissertation developed a Seaport 
Vulnerability Framework (SVF), developed from the rational choice and situational crime 
prevention literature with a multi-disciplinary focus that allows security stakeholders to identify 
whether a port is at risk of utilization by criminal networks.  The SVF is used to measure and 
analyze criminological vulnerability in the top 30 U.S. container seaports and in-depth in a case 
study at the Port of New York and New Jersey.  Finally, I examine the implications of the SVF 
for port and maritime security policy and port security assessments in the U.S. and worldwide. 
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Chapter Outline 
This dissertation is divided into nine chapters.  
- Chapter 1 describes the structure of the maritime transportation system, the shipping 
process for a container transit, and the limitations of the current approach to port security. 
- Chapter 2 explores the theoretical perspectives that inform the Seaport Vulnerability 
Framework (SVF).  These include how seaports are prime locations of CRAVED 
products and services; how seaports can act as crime places, including crime generators 
and crime attractors; how the concepts of defensible space can be adapted to seaports; 
and supply chain security research and best practices.  The chapter describes how the 
multiple theories are combined to form an integrated theoretical approach to developing 
the SVF. 
- Chapter 3 introduces and details the SVF, developed from a two-year pilot study at the 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, and informed by the literature on seaport 
administration and criminal networks and publicly available cases of criminal network 
seaport use.   
- Chapter 4 presents the primary research question and research propositions. 
- Chapter 5 describes the methodological approach of this project, data sources, and 
methodology used in developing the Seaport Vulnerability Framework to examine 
comparative vulnerability in the top 30 U.S. container seaports and in the case study of 
the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ).  This chapter lays out how the 
vulnerabilities are operationalized, describes the data sources used to measure them, and 
the primary data limitations.   
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- Chapter 6 analyzes the top 30 U.S. container ports using the Seaport Vulnerability 
Framework.  
- Chapter 7 is a case study of the PNYNJ, examining the port through the Seaport 
Vulnerability Framework using a mixed methods approach through interviews, public 
sources, and primary source documentation to develop a criminological vulnerability 
model of the port. 
- Chapter 8 examines the policy implications and recommendations of the Seaport 
Vulnerability Framework for U.S. maritime and port policy and seaport vulnerability 
assessments.   
- Chapter 9 addresses the study limitations, focusing on data sources and measurement 
issues, and details future directions for research.
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement 
Seaports provide a unique space for criminological examination.  As the spatial loci for 
the majority of international and domestic trade, access to a port can yield significant financial 
benefits for a criminal network (Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2000; 
Organization of American States 2013).  While ports are physical spaces, they are also spaces 
defined by complex systems marked by intersecting stakeholder roles, including administrative 
agencies, private companies, and regulatory entities.  Underlying the administrative and 
logistical activity that is a seaport’s primary function are the jurisdictional responsibilities of 
numerous public and private security regulatory agencies.  The complexity created by a seaport’s 
simultaneous existence as a physical space and as a theoretical space, characterized by contesting 
legal, administrative, and market claims, results in gaps or vulnerabilities that criminal networks 
can exploit to gain access to ports. 
Criminal networks use the maritime transportation system to move narcotics, stolen 
vehicles, people, and illicit goods around the world to access new markets, supply existing ones, 
and generate greater proceeds for their activities.  The amount of harm generated by illicit 
criminal activity and dark markets can be measured in the billions of dollars, as illicit goods, 
such as small arms and narcotics, proliferate throughout the world (Buchanan and Chavarria 
2015).  Understanding the vulnerabilities created at the points transited by these illicit goods, 
such as seaports, and understanding how criminal networks access those points addresses a 
significant gap in the efforts to curb such illicit flows.  Today, seaport security in the U.S. and 
abroad is determined by port and cargo security assessments performed by federal agencies such 
as the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection that do not currently 
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incorporate a criminological approach, instead focusing on efforts to prevent infrastructure and 
human losses due to terrorist attacks.  Using a criminological lens to identify and understand 
seaports provides policymakers with an additional assessment methodology to assist in securing 
seaports against criminal networks. 
This dissertation employs a mixed method approach to identify and examine 
vulnerabilities at seaports through a seaport vulnerability analysis of the top 30 container ports in 
the U.S. and a case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ). 
1.2 Definitions 
To remain consistent with previous research on crime at U.S. seaports, I use the 
definitions in the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports (2000).  
 Seaports refer to “harbors for seagoing vessels with facilities to lade and unlade cargo 
and/or passengers and with easy access to the sea (from the 24 nautical mile contiguous zone to 
the terminal).”  “Ports” also refers to the port authorities that operate the cargo handling 
facilities.  In this dissertation, the term ports is used to refer to the places where marine cargo 
handling operations occur and which may have other services located in the area such as 
warehousing or trucking.  Both ports and seaports are used interchangeably in this document. 
Criminal networks: Instead of the term “organized crime,” I use the term “criminal 
networks.”  Organized crime implies levels of organization not found in most criminal groups 
(Van Duyne 2005).  In addition, the term “criminal networks” acknowledges that much of the 
criminal activity that occurs at seaports is a result of criminal actors exploiting market forces that 
enable them to engage in illicit forms of arbitrage (UNODC 2012).  The term “criminal 
networks” captures the notion that groups engaging in criminal activities either at companies 
operating a seaport, or using the services at a port, are likely not to be organized in a hierarchical 
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manner.  However, in some seaports, such as the PNYNJ, “organized crime” is the most 
commonly used term and I use that term when examining activity at the PNYNJ. 
1.3 Maritime transportation system 
The international transportation supply chain has been described as a system of systems 
(DHS 2005; Mansouri et al 2009; MARAD 2009).  The facets of the maritime transportation 
system (MTS), rather than operating as a closed system, are interconnected with feedback loops 
occurring at every point.  Seaports are themselves a system within the MTS where vessels, 
intermodal connections, waterways, users, and ports form the key components of the system.  
This foundational perspective of the MTS underscores the fact that security initiatives in any 
sub-system are compromised by vulnerabilities in others.  Therefore, while shipping in the U.S. 
is governed by numerous security protocols (U.S. General Accounting Office 2010) and 
waterways are governed by numerous public regulatory initiatives, security at seaports is subject 
to a variety of inputs and pressures from the systems within the MTS. 
Policymakers have attempted to address  regulatory or security gaps through a variety of 
international and domestic security programs with a focus on the primary vector of maritime 
transport, the shipping container (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005; Martinosi, Ortiz, and Willis 
2006: 219; Kruk and Donner 2008).   The transit of a container, when viewed within the context 
of the system of systems, displays how vulnerabilities exist at all points along the supply chain 
(Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005; Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009). 
1.4 Shipping container transit 
Container shipping represents the primary method of movement for the vast majority of 
cargo worldwide and remains the primary method of cargo import and export to and from the 
U.S. (MARAD 2009; USDOT 2011; UNCTAD 2012).  In 2010, one in every 11 containers was 
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either bound for or originated in the U.S., equating to roughly nine percent of total global trade 
(USDOT 2011).  Typically, a container shipped from an overseas destination to the U.S. is 
packed on order with goods from a single factory.  Goods may also be sent to consolidated 
freight stations where a container is filled with cargo from multiple consignees.  The container is 
then moved by road or rail to an embarkation seaport.  The container may be inspected by both 
the origin country’s customs service and, in some seaports, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) through U.S. agents stationed at overseas ports through the Container Security Initiative 
(U.S. CBP 2009)1.  The container is loaded onto an ocean-going vessel, itself subject to a 
security framework, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code (International 
Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities 2004).  Depending on the routes available from 
the embarkation seaport, some containers may be shipped to a transshipment seaport, such as 
Gioia Tauro, Sicily or Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates, where they are loaded onto another 
vessel for transfer to its final destination seaport (Vis and DeKoster 2003). 
After reaching a U.S. destination port, the container is offloaded at a shipping terminal, 
either port authority-owned or privately owned and operating on port authority-leased land.  The 
various facilities at the port that handle maritime cargo are governed by the Maritime Transport 
Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA 2002), which states in Sec. 70102 that “the Secretary shall conduct a 
detailed vulnerability assessment of the facilities and vessels that may be involved in a 
transportation security incident.”  This is the base legislation that enables the U.S. Coast Guard 
to identify critical facilities and conduct assessments of vulnerability based on the conditions set 
by the MTSA for what constitutes a critical transportation security incident, defined as “a 
security incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation 
                                                            
1 See Appendix A for further information on overseas inspections. 
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system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area” (MTSA 2002; Sec. 70101).  The 
U.S. Coast Guard conducts these vulnerability assessments using the Maritime Security Risk 
Analysis Matrix, or MSRAM, and has done so for over 30,000 individual facilities (Keating, 
Howard, and Arimoto 2014). Therefore the container moves through a U.S. port which has a 
core underlying assessment framework focused on disruptive incidents.  After the container 
arrives at a U.S. port, not only are the facilities it passes through subject to vulnerability analysis, 
the container and its contents are as well (Congressional Budget Office 2016).  Some containers 
will at the point of entry be identified for inspection by CBP through the cargo security risk 
analysis system called the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that incorporates data from 
multiple systems to develop a risk summary for inbound and outboard cargo (Importer Security 
Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements).  If the cargo is identified for further inspection it 
may be taken to a Centralized Examination Station, which may be located on or off the terminal 
site (19 CFR 118.2).   Containers not singled out for inspection move to a holding area on the 
terminal until a drayage (or short haul) truck picks up the container or it is taken to a rail yard for 
transportation to an inland distribution point.  If picked up by a drayage truck, the container is 
taken to its final destination (Bensman and Bromberg 2009) or to a warehouse for onward 
distribution, generally no greater than 75 miles from the port. 
1.5 Port security initiatives 
The transit scenario described above illustrates the interconnected sub-systems involved 
in shipping.  At both the embarkation and debarkation points, the seaport plays an integral role as 
a space where security can be concentrated to prevent the transit of illicit cargo.  Since 2001, 
with the aim of addressing security at seaports, particularly the use of containers by terrorist 
groups, policymakers have implemented numerous seaport and shipping security initiatives with 
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varying degrees of success (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005; Martinosi, Ortiz, and Willis 
2006; Kruk and Donner 2008).  While this dissertation addresses vulnerabilities beyond 
container security, the container security regime serves as the foundation of U.S. and 
international seaport security. 
The regime is primarily implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which 
before September 2001, inspected between two and four percent of the containers that entered 
American ports (Marine Link 2004; McClure 2007).  After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, 
and following simulations detailing an attack on a U.S. port (Los Angeles/Long Beach) using a 
container (Meade and Molander 2006), the public and Congress pressured U.S. regulatory 
agencies to implement more stringent screening regulations (U.S. General Accounting Office 
2008; U.S. General Accounting Office 2008a).2  Currently, several maritime security initiatives 
are enforced at U.S. seaports and form the core security framework addressing illicit use of the 
supply chain.3  The primary focus of these initiatives is to push inspection of containers away 
from U.S. seaports and back to overseas embarkation points (U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 2009; U.S. General Accounting Office 2012).   
The other aspect of the port security regime is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard which 
oversees port security regulations under the federal mandate of the Maritime Transportation 
Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA 2002) and the SAFE Ports Act of 2006 which provided the U.S. 
Coast Guard with an increased responsibility to ensure port security in the 36 primary Coast 
Guard sectors.  This includes assessing port vulnerability with a primary focus on risk that 
                                                            
2 In fiscal year 2009, 4.9% of containers were scanned through passive non-intrusive inspection systems (GAO 
2009). 
3 For a detailed examination of the security framework currently in force at U.S. seaports, see Appendix A. 
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heavily weighs loss of life in attacks on facilities (GAO 2011; Keating, Howard, and Arimoto 
2011). 
1.6 Limitations of current approach 
The regulations that comprise the container and port security framework in the U.S. 
primarily focus on preventing terrorist use of maritime transportation and addressing threats to 
maritime infrastructure through a screening of containers and identifying vulnerable targets at 
U.S. seaports (Carluer et al. 2008; European Commission 2010). The core underlying condition 
for assessment in the MTSA is that the assessed facility is primarily assessed as to the effect on 
damage or loss of life as a result of an incident (MTSA 2002; Sec. 70102).   This pushes 
regulatory attention away from the daily use of ports by criminal networks focused on illicit 
trade, which do not seek to disrupt the flow of maritime cargo or cause loss of life (Naim 2005).   
Concurrent with the underlying focus away from criminal networks in the existing port 
security vulnerability assessment framework, the intensive focus on container screening is often 
based on a scenario in which terrorists transport and penetrate U.S. borders with nuclear 
materials (Carafano 2006; GAO 2009; CBO 2016).  This has underpinned the congressional 
demand for 100% screening in ports outside of the U.S. (SCAN Act), but the disproportionate 
focus on the nuclear terrorism scenario diverts financial and regulatory investments away from 
threats which may be of greater and more realistic concern such as preventing criminal network 
intrusion in port labor or ancillary services providers (Carafano 2006).  Furthermore, the U.S. 
focus on screening initiatives has increased concern in Europe for the financial and trade 
implications due to the significant financial burden – 100% screening would cost the European 
Union roughly €430 million for screening and detection equipment and infrastructure investment 
(European Commission 2010; Papa 2013).  
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The increased focus on intensive container screening based on a perceived threat of 
nuclear terrorism belies the myriad of illicit activities criminal networks have used ports for in 
the past: transporting small arms bound for conflict zones or fragile states leading to increased 
arms capabilities for armed factions in civil war areas (Amnesty International 2006); transporting 
narcotics and stolen vehicles that provide a source of hard currency used to fuel other activities 
(Farah 2010; Clarke and Brown 2003; Lantsman 2013); and counterfeit or stolen goods (UNICRI 
2007).  The continued use of seaports by criminal networks to transport illicit cargo has been 
addressed at a macro-level, examining illicit flows as an economic issue (Naim 2005; UNODC 
2011; Luna 2012).  However, except for certain types of criminal activity, such as illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014), a criminological 
approach has yet to be used to identify the specific contextual and situational factors that make 
the maritime transportation system in general and, certain seaports in particular, more attractive 
to criminal networks. 
This dissertation lays out the underlying criminological framework for an integrated 
theoretical approach that builds a Seaport Vulnerability Framework enabling port security 
stakeholders to begin to understand how and why criminal networks use certain seaports to 
transport illicit cargo. 
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Chapter 2- Theoretical framework 
The core of this dissertation, the Seaport Vulnerability Framework (SVF), is framed 
through a set of criminological theories including crime pattern, defensible space, and 
CRAVED4, informed by research into the formation and structure of criminal networks and in 
the area of supply chain security.  Seaports are large complex physical and administrative entities 
and to make sense of vulnerability, multiple criminological theories are used to identify 
vulnerabilities in three primary categories: (1) physical; (2) administrative; and (3) logistical.  
This chapter examines the broad theoretical perspectives that inform the SVF.   
The primary assumption underlying the theories that inform the SVF is that certain 
seaports function as crime places.  All other theoretical insights from research on supply chain 
security and criminal networks fit within the supposition that ports function as crime places, 
much like certain neighborhoods or micro-locations (Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).  
However, it is important to note that the standard interpretation of a crime place, as one where 
repeat victimization occurs and which accounts for a greater portion of crime than in similar 
places, is not entirely relevant within the context of seaports (Eck and Weisburd 1995).  Rather, 
seaports as crime places can be defined as those ports which are more likely to be utilized by 
criminal networks, whether they are the site of greater victimization or attract greater amounts of 
illicit traffic.   
2.1 Seaports as crime places  
Crime pattern theory, informed by assumptions about routine activities and rational 
choice, posits that for a crime to occur three factors must be present: (1) a suitable target; (2) a 
motivated offender; and (3) the absence of persons in a position to intervene, directly or 
                                                            
4 Products or services that are Concealable Removable Available Valuable Enjoyable Disposable. 
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indirectly, with a criminal event (Cohen and Felson 1979; Clarke and Eck 2005).  It provides a 
theoretical foundation for a layered understanding of how certain seaports and geographical or 
economic areas within ports may be more likely to be used by criminal networks (Brantingham 
and Brantingham 2009).  Furthermore, in the maritime and port security literature, the multi-
stakeholder environment and nodal character of seaports create numerous vulnerabilities that 
criminal networks can use or exploit (Brooks and Pelot 2008).   
Research on place has generally attempted to address crime vis-à-vis the distinctions 
between the place in question and the surrounding environment (Eck and Weisburd 1995).  The 
focus has been on micro-locations with criminogenic properties (Roncek and Maier 1990).  
However, the consensus among researchers in the environmental crime paradigm is that crime 
clusters at many levels of analysis (Sherman 1989; Brantingham and Brantingham 1999; 
Weisburd et al. 2004).  The key finding, one supported by longitudinal studies, is that a small 
percentage of the units of analysis are responsible for a majority or plurality of criminal 
activities, generally following some permutation of the 80:20 rule or the Pareto Principle 
(Sherman et al. 1989; Roncek 2000; Weisburd et al. 2004, Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).5  
However, it is important to disaggregate crime at different levels of spatial analysis, especially 
when it is within larger units (Weisburd, Bernasco, and Bruisma 2009; Weisburd, Groff, and 
Yang 2012).   
More recently, Weisburd, Groff, and Yang (2012) examined crime at micro-locations in 
Seattle to create a theory of the criminology of place, which has implications for this dissertation.  
The five suppositions of the authors provide a basic framework and guiding principles for the 
                                                            
5 That is, some variation on the stipulation that 80% of crime(s) is caused by 20% of offenders.  This has also been 
applied to specific areas or locations, in that some version of 80:20 rule applies to locations where a small 
percentage of locations are the site of most crime(s) (Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012). 
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understanding of not only the physical conditions that increase vulnerability but also support the 
importance of disaggregating vulnerability at seaports into discrete categories. 
First, the authors propose that crime is tightly concentrated in hot spots, building on 
research going back decades but which is strongly informed by their longitudinal approach.  
Second, hot spots are stable over time, again informed by the longitudinal method.  Third, crime 
places should be examined at the lowest and most suitable unit of analysis because aggregating 
units into higher orders masks significant variability within the unit.  This is the approach taken 
by this dissertation which aims to understand the vulnerability of seaports by disaggregating the 
concept of “vulnerability” into categories of vulnerability and then individual vulnerabilities, not 
all of which examine the same unit.  Fourth, not only does crime vary within units and the micro-
unit, in which the authors focused on the block vice the neighborhood, but also within each unit 
and micro-unit’s various social and cultural contexts.  While this is a difficult concept to unpack 
without field research, the case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey in Chapter 7 
discusses this concept through the examination of the kinds of labor and economic entities with 
employees who are more likely to participate in criminal ventures. Finally, crime at places is 
predictable, and therefore, it is possible to create effective crime prevention strategies. 
With the seaport as the place of analysis, crime pattern theory offers two ways to 
understand seaport vulnerability: (1) ports as crime generators; and (2) ports as crime attractors 
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1999: 2009).  Crime generators are places that become hot spots 
of criminal activity because they have legitimate activities or facilities that criminals seek out.  
Crime attractors are particular places, areas, neighborhoods, or districts that have a larger than 
proportional amount of criminal opportunities. 
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2.2 Seaports as crime generators 
While the theory of crime place provides the underlying support for focusing on 
identifying ports more likely to be targeted by criminal networks, criminological theory provides 
further support for ports as different types of crime places.  For example, many seaports contain 
an abundance of CRAVED goods, which present attractive targets for cargo thieves (Interagency 
Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2002; Gooch 2011; Burges 2012; FreightWatch 2013).  
In China, for example, cargo was most reported stolen from ports or facilities at ports as opposed 
to other types of cargo storage facilities (FreightWatch 2013).  The presence of a large amount of 
desirable goods may, in and of themselves, create the conditions for specific types of criminal 
activity much like the presence of targets in a neighborhood or within a spatial environment 
generates crime (Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).  These crime generator ports may also occur 
where there are particular intersections of transport, offering particular access or utility to 
criminal networks, for specific types of products or services (Brantingham and Brantingham 
1993). 
2.3 Seaports as crime attractors 
At a macro level, some seaports may develop reputations for criminal network activity 
and drive out legitimate companies and, in the process, attract more illicit criminal networks.  At 
a meso-level of analysis, certain economic sectors in a seaport, such as freight forwarders, 
drayage, longshoremen, and facility maintenance, may increase its attractiveness to criminal 
networks.  Exploitation of already vulnerable sectors can make a seaport a crime attractor, as 
criminal networks are drawn to ports through positive reinforcement.  The concept of “port 
shopping” identified by Shane (2010) in the context of auto theft networks is particularly 
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relevant here.  For instance, export-orientated theft networks are more likely to consider using 
known porous ports over others (Lantsman 2013).   
At a micro-level of analysis, specific companies within sectors may be crime attractors as 
well.  As an example, multiple physical and administrative vulnerabilities may combine to make 
a specific terminal operator or janitorial services provider a crime attractor, resulting in increased 
criminal network use.  When a single, already-compromised entity (such as a shipping line, 
terminal operator, or even freight forwarder) commands a large market share of a particular 
sector at a port, this may be sufficient to drive legitimate entities away and attract more criminal 
networks by reputation.  This concept, therefore, informs the vulnerability focused on identifying 
the size of a particular sector, since a compromised entity in a sector with few entities can have 
an outsized impact on the vulnerability of the port. 
The administrative and economic factors that can lead ports or sectors to be crime 
generators or attractors need to be considered within environmental and spatial characteristics as 
well, which can be further examined through the perspective of defensible space. 
2.4 Defensible space at seaports 
The concept of defensible space (Newman 1972; 1976; 1983) has been applied to 
describe the architectural and environmental factors that lead certain types of facilities and areas 
to experience higher levels of victimization.  
Most seaports are large, physically enclosed or fenced in spaces with specific 
organizational and administrative cultures, set in the physical environment.  Defensible space 
explains how the seaport’s physical environment can lead to greater or lesser use by criminal 
networks.  Just victimization differs within a neighborhood – i.e. burglary rates or individual 
sexual assaults – specific companies or vulnerabilities may be targeted based on the individual 
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spatial and environmental characteristics of different seaports as well.  For example, drug 
smuggling networks may repeatedly utilize specific companies or agencies to facilitate transfers 
(Zaitch 2002); this would likely have a repeated environmental dimension as well, depending on 
the company’s primary operational area.  For an example of actual victimization, consider the 
repeated theft of luxury vehicles from the Port of NY/NJ (Lantsman 2013).  Offenders were 
successful in the cases highlighted because the physical environment lacked situational crime 
prevention techniques (Clarke and Eck 2003; Zahm 2004), such as good lighting and place 
managers.   
Later research in the defensible space field highlighted the concept of offensible space 
(Atlas 1991; Felson 2006; Edward and Levi 2008), where criminals may utilize the principles of 
crime prevention through environmental design to create safe spaces for their own activities 
Felson (2006: 91) describes a theoretical type offensible space where offenders gain control over 
an area and law-abiding citizens or companies are discouraged from intervention.  In the port 
environment this concept explains how in certain ports around the world law enforcement 
agencies have difficulty gaining entry both the administrative structures operating at the port, and 
in which leads to a lack of de facto physical access.  Edward and Levi (2008) conclude that fear 
of retaliation, weak agency oversight, and links between legitimate interests and criminal 
networks all can create spaces where networks operate with impunity.  Through the complicity 
of legitimate entities, in other words, physical or administrative spaces may be appropriated by 
criminal groups.  In the field of study which examines the intersection of legitimate and 
illegitimate business, Tilley and Hopkin’s (2008) survey of small business owners in three high 
crime areas within British cities, found that small businesses were often approached to cooperate 
with criminal networks.  Similarly, a crime attractor seaport may support businesses that are 
repeatedly approached to cooperate with criminal networks.  Cooperation in these cases may 
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depend, in part, on whether these criminal networks have been able to develop an offensible 
space at the port. 
At the Port of NY/NJ, a protracted history of criminal network associations led to 
offensible spaces where criminal networks could operate without fear of enforcement (Block 
1982; President’s Commission on Organized Crime 1986; WCNYH 2010; WCNYH 2011; 
WCNYH 2012; WCNYH 2013).  Criminal network exploitation of a seaport’s administrative 
vulnerabilities can give rise to a culture of secrecy and fear among employees who are less likely 
to report activity to higher authorities, contributing to the social dimension of offensible space. 
Finally, the concept of indefensible space can also illuminate the challenges of physical 
and administrative security at seaports (Cozens et al. 2002).  At the macro level, Paoli (2002) 
studied the disorganized spaces where criminal networks operate in the heroin trade and found that 
criminal networks are capable of taking root where there is lax enforcement and may take over 
entire physical areas.  At seaports, this macro concept may be understood conceptually as the 
physical or administrative space where there is lax defense by place managers or target guardians.  
In this situation, circumstances may call for the creation of agencies to manage those places, such 
as the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor at the Port of NY/NJ. 
2.5 Seaports as “Risky Facilities” 
Building on research on crime places, the risky facilities framework developed by Eck, 
Clarke, and Guerette (2007) provides an additional framework for identifying facilities’ 
characteristics that cause some to be more crime-prone than others.  The authors focus on 
facilities or places that share similar characteristics (e.g., taverns, schools, railway stations, 
parking lots).  Comparison of other variables among environmentally similar places may provide 
insight into why some places have greater concentrations of crime.  They define facilities as 
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large buildings or areas of land with common use characteristics, which encompass even smaller 
facilities such as convenience stores, betting shops, or even Social Security offices.  The central 
premise of risky facilities is that a small proportion of facilities will account for the majority of 
criminal activity within a bounded geographic area.  The theoretical literature examined by Eck, 
Clarke, and Guerette (2007) offers five reasons for differing crime levels among facilities, which 
assist in understanding seaport vulnerability to criminal networks. 
First, they examine the proposition that some facilities are riskier than others due to 
random variation.  They note, however, that when studies incorporate temporal variation in 
measurement, random variation does not stand up to scrutiny (Clarke and Martin 1975). 
Second, differential reporting processes could account for significant differences in a 
facility’s riskiness.  This is particularly relevant to facilities where physical operations are 
embedded within opaque administrative, regulatory, or even sub-cultural characteristics; seaports 
area prime example here.  Seaports’ differential reporting processes, or even reporting that is not 
coordinated across or within agencies, can and does create perceptions of vulnerability or 
riskiness.  This can lead one port to having a higher perception of risk, even while nearby ports 
with the same underlying characteristics and risk profiles avoid developing a similar reputation.  
Closer examination of the jurisdictional structure underlying a facility (e.g., is the facility subject 
to any specific enforcement procedures, regulations, or laws), the administrative structure (how 
many entities operate at the facility, what are the hiring practices of those entities), and whether 
any specific sub-cultures exist among employees or individuals who frequent the facility (do the 
specific characteristics of facility employees engender specific behaviors or activities that others 
do not participate in, outside of the differences in work) can assist in creating the risk profile of 
seaport.  These specific characteristics do lead seaports to behave differently from other 
categories of risky facilities.   
  
19 
 
Third, the authors focus on the number and quality of targets at the facility itself.  
Discounting the fact that the number of targets present at a facility is a function of the size of the 
facility, they note that the quality of the targets present at the facility may be an indication of 
riskiness as well.  The Seaport Vulnerability Framework incorporates this insight to account for 
both the quantity of traffic at the port, the value of cargo (or CRAVED cargo) present at the port, 
and the spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo to build the port’s vulnerability profile. 
Fourth, the number of offenders and the proximity to offenders may lead to greater 
riskiness.  Since seaports are conduit points for significant levels of cargo from areas often 
outside the local vicinity of the port, understanding the seaport’s cargo profile may provide a 
better indication of the types of networks that seek to use the port for illicit trafficking.  At some 
seaports, the majority of cargo is consumed within the surrounding regions.  For example, the 
surrounding communities of the Port of NY/NJ consume the vast majority of cargo that passes 
through the port (Rodrigue and Guan 2008). 
Lastly, the different administrative characteristics of places or “place management” 
provides a final plausible explanation for differential crime activity.  At the micro-level, this can 
be understood along simple differences, such as closing times at bars and how drinks are 
dispensed, among other factors.  At a conceptual level, these comprise the different 
administrative rules or procedures that may act as crime enablers (Clarke and Eck 2003).  
Seaports in the U.S. are subject to a unified overlying set of macro-national level security 
procedures through the U.S. Coast Guard and through the application of standard security 
procedures outlined in the 2002 MTSA and the 2006 Safe Port Act.  It is at the meso-level, 
however, that seaports differ.  At that level, seaport differences emerge among local law 
enforcement structures and whether they employ specialized situational crime prevention 
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techniques.  This provides a port-specific examination of differential place management 
characteristics.   
Recently, researchers have used this risky facilities framework to examine the differential 
characteristics of seaports identified as recipient ports for illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014).  The authors grouped ports based on 
whether they received vessels identified as IUU-participatory and then focused on categories of 
data built from the risky facility literature to identify the characteristics of ports with more than 
four visits by IUU-infringing identified vessels.  They discovered that the harbor size and the 
number of overall vessel calls provided the ability to predict where IUU vessels deposited their ill-
gotten catch.  In addition, vessels were more likely to visit ports with weak security procedures.  
However, the study does not differentiate ports within countries and overlooks underlying 
characteristics of the seaports themselves that may lead groups to choose to deposit IUU catches 
at certain ports in the first place: whether, for example there are criminal network activities 
occurring at the port or the flag state composition of the vessels calling at the port.  Administrative 
structures of seaports (and of component entities operating at ports), the composition and 
supervision of labor at seaports, and seaports’ relation to nearby ports (vis-à-vis fishing traffic) are 
additional place management characteristics which may bolster the explanatory power for the IUU 
model developed in their research. 
An analogy can be drawn between ports and bus/subway stations, where both are located 
on arterial pathways.  As noted in the research, crime concentrates along arterial roads for the fact 
that there are greater numbers of targets that move along these pathways (Weisburd, Groff, and 
Yang 2012) and previous research has demonstrated that crime often concentrates at the locus or 
terminus passenger points (Pearlstein and Wachs 1982; Loukaitou-Sideris 1999; Block and Block 
2000; Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 2002; Newton 2009; Ceccato et al. 2013).  If the maritime supply 
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chain functions as the arterial road and ports are the bus/train stations along that artery, then certain 
ports are more likely to have greater levels of crime and attract more criminal entities. 
This insight provides a useful analogy for several types of seaport vulnerabilities.  For 
example, research has found that theft at transit stops is concentrated during times of greater traffic 
and crowding (Levine et. al. 1986; Clarke et al. 1996; Burrell 2007), similar to findings about 
criminal exploitation of ports which focus on ports with higher volume and container throughput 
(Zaitch 2002; Lantsman 2013).  Furthermore research on transit crime supports the contention that 
offenders will not travel far to commit crime (Smith and Clarke 2000), analogous to focusing on 
the identifying the presence of illicit import/export markets within port regions. 
However, research has also shown that the presence of a transit stop, much like a seaport, 
will not necessarily attract crime (LaVigne 1996; Bernasco and Block 2011)  and that there are a 
number of spatial and contextual characteristics which lead one transit stop to have greater levels 
of crime than others (Robinson and Giordano 2011).   This dissertation builds on previous research 
to focus on understanding those spatial and contextual characteristics at seaports which make them 
more prone to criminal network use, through the Seaport Vulnerability Framework introduced in 
the following chapter. 
2.6. CRAVED products and services 
 
Seaports are important locations of concealable, removable, available, valuable, 
enjoyable, or disposable (CRAVED) products and services (Clarke 1999), though certain aspects 
of CRAVED are made less enticing to criminal groups through physical and administrative 
security procedures (Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2002; Gooch 2011; 
Burges 2012; FreightWatch 2013).  Clarke and Newman (2002) note that the risk of crime 
depends on the nature of the product or service that is targeted.  This framework primarily 
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applies to armed theft or burglary and explains, in part, the types of cargo that is targeted for 
theft at seaports or in port areas.  Recent work has expanded the CRAVED framework to focus 
on identifying the choice structuring properties of transnational trafficking operations (Natarajan 
2012) or to focus on specific types of products such as illegally harvested wildlife (Moreto and 
Lemieux 2015).  Choice structuring properties focus attention on the decision making processes 
of transnational trafficking networks, or those groups most likely to use seaports.  Parallel to this 
insight, this study focuses on identifying the properties among seaports that make certain 
seaports more attractive for a criminal network.  At seaports, for example, concealability and 
removability are the most salient factors of analysis, as containers have made goods less easy to 
conceal but easier to remove should the right access be available.  Pires and Clarke (2012) adapt 
the “a” in CRAVED to “accessibility.”  This adaptation is relevant to seaports as well where the 
accessibility of economic and administrative services informs their supposed value to a 
trafficking network (Vander Beken and Van Daele 2008) or whether there are goods which are 
CRAVED such as frozen shrimp (Zambito 2006) 6.   
In a port without CRAVED cargo, the impetus for criminal networks to target those 
sectors involved in the transit of CRAVED cargo is absent, and the port has a lower level of 
vulnerability.  These kinds of ports are those which primarily are the transit points for bulk 
cargo, where cargo values are determined by mass and not unit.  The CRAVED framework 
assists in explaining why certain ports would have facilities more likely to be targeted by 
                                                            
6 Frozen shrimp are a CRAVED product (Zambito 2006).  They are easy to transport, perishable such that evidence 
after sale is disposed of quickly, and can be easily sold, with a constant demand from restaurants.  Ports that receive 
frozen shrimp might therefore become a target for criminal networks that can learn shipping schedules for delivery of 
frozen shrimp, target drayage truck drivers who move the refrigerated containers from the port, and the port or local 
warehouses where frozen shrimp are stored for subsequent distribution.  The port functions as the locus point for 
facilities, administrative access points, and companies involved in the pre-distribution process.  This increases their 
attraction to criminal networks that seek to steal this kind of CRAVED cargo.   
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criminal networks for theft, thereby increasing the overall vulnerability of the port.  To protect 
against theft and administrative intrusions, in the past two decades, supply chain security 
procedures have been strengthened around the world through both regulatory frameworks and 
private sector innovations.  Insights from supply chain security research inform the vulnerability 
focused on identifying the lack of physical and administrative security procedures at U.S. 
seaports. 
2.7 Supply chain security procedures 
Since 2001, ports in the U.S. and around the world have been subject to increased 
scrutiny for supply chain security.  In the U.S., seaports have mandated physical and 
administrative security requirements through the MTSA and the Safe Ports Act, which mandate 
security procedures such as improved lighting, access control, and perimeter fencing that are 
reflective of physical techniques identified in the situational crime prevention literature.  Ports 
and cargo are subject to federally mandated security procedures but private companies will often 
take extra steps to ensure supply chain security through the use of CCTV and formal surveillance 
systems. 
The primary focus of recent supply chain security efforts is on the container as the unit of 
securitization.  At some seaports, security focuses on protecting maritime infrastructure while 
maximizing the easy flow of cargo (Martonosi, et al. 2006; Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009).  
Cargo screening technologies enable this efficiency/security trade off, and particularly non-
intrusive tools aim to mitigate the use of the maritime transportation system by criminal 
networks and terrorist groups.  These measures can generally be incorporated into Clarke SCP 
prevention framework as increasing the perceived effort and increasing perceived risks (Clarke 
1997).  However, as Von Lampe (2011) has detailed in his examination of applying SCP to 
  
24 
 
organized crime, organized offenders or criminal networks are often more resourceful and less 
easily deterred by general physical or administrative security techniques: 
- Container seals: Container seals lock in cargo and increase liability protection for 
shippers.  Seals, however, have been identified as easy to forge and replace (Dahlman et 
al. 2005).  While training of customs officers can mitigate some concerns, criminal 
networks have developed manufacturing processes to produce false seals of identical 
shape and quality.  Smart seals do exist, but are prohibitively expensive except for high 
value container shipping.  Because of their relationship to cargo value, smart seals can be, 
in and of themselves, an attraction for theft groups (Lechner 2009). 
- Radio frequency identification (RFID): RFID technology can wirelessly track container 
shipments and monitor container seals for tampering (Michael and McCathie 2005; 
Tsilingiris et al. 2007). 
- Non-intrusive inspection (NII): NII at seaports often takes the form of stationary or 
mobile gamma radiation scanners, such as SAIC’s Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System 
(VACIS), capable of producing an orthographic image of a container (Orphan et al. 
2004). 
In connection with currently applied screening technologies, Pate et al. (2008) examined 
seaport security best practices through case studies of 17 U.S. seaports.  Similarly, Grillot et al. 
(2009) developed a security framework to assess supply chain security and port security 
preparedness at seaports worldwide by focusing on institutional, administrative, and physical 
measures identified through case studies at 17 seaports worldwide, including the Port of New 
York and New Jersey.  Both sets of researchers find that institutional measures at large 
international seaports have created robust physical and logistical security while focusing on the 
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continued need for inter-agency cooperation and implementation of existing initiatives.  Grillot 
et al. (2009) do further note that while national regulations set the overlying securitization 
regime, implementation remains the responsibility of port authorities and localities, and in this 
area, there is space for corruption in public and private seaport economic and labor sectors. 
2.8 Complicity with criminal networks  
Companies and employees in key seaport economic and labor sectors have been 
portrayed in some accounts as victims of organized crime and criminal networks (Waterfront 
Commission 2009; 2010; 2011).  However, the same employees or companies that are perceived 
as having been “victimized,” through thefts of goods or services, may be complicit actors in 
criminal network activities (Vander Beken et al. 2005). 
Some criminal networks prefer to lower their risk of detection by increasing investment 
into their operations through placement or recruitment of complicit employees or business 
entities at a seaport (U.S. Customs Service 1997; Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. 
Seaports 2000; Presidia Security Consulting Inc. 2011).  This allows a network to act under the 
guise of a bona fide trade or business activity, as opposed to more traditional theft or fraud.  The 
use of legitimate maritime industry channels toward illicit ends necessarily implicates the 
cooperation of complicit employees in shipping entities, freight forwarding operations, the land-
side labor force, or public agencies such as a customs or law enforcement (Gounev and Bezlov 
2010).  The vulnerability of a particular economic or labor sector can, therefore, be understood in 
terms of the vulnerability of certain companies, individual employees within those companies, 
and their susceptibility to compromise or recruitment by criminal networks.  Because of the high 
level of regulatory security at ports in the U.S., access to the maritime transportation system 
through a complicit company or employee is highly sought (Zaitch 2002; Lantsman 2013). 
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2.9 Criminal networks and seaport vulnerabilities 
At seaports, illicit cargo movements require a flexible order not present in a rigid 
hierarchical administration (Sparrow 1991; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009).  Criminal networks 
have been portrayed as local in nature (Reuter 1985; Hobbs 1998) and are heavily dependent on 
local environments that allow them to operate unimpeded.  A criminal network structure also 
allows for the quick incorporation of participants with specialized knowledge and subsequent 
speedy network dissolution after the particular goal has been achieved (Sarrica 2005; Bjelopera 
and Finklea 2012).  Criminal networks are able to exploit opportunities in other locales that more 
traditional organized crime groups may be unable to exploit due to hierarchical structures 
informed by the local environment.  As a result, criminal networks mirror legitimate businesses 
that utilize partners in multiple locations to work within the “just in time” strategy that 
minimizes production and inventory stock and enables the quick identification of market 
openings and procurement services to meet the identified demand (Schonberger 1984).  Criminal 
networks therefore form multi-nodal structures that are an illicit mirror of legitimate business 
structures (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004). 
These networks also function as entrepreneurial groups working together for a common 
remunerative cause (Van Duyne 2005; Walterbach 2007) and thrive in the transnational spaces 
created by modern supply chain movements (Kleemans and van der Blunt 2008; UNODC 2010; 
Bjelopera and Finklea 2012).  Within the licit flow of commerce, networks that traffic in illicit 
goods across transnational borders seek out entry points of least resistance to destinations that 
promise the most reward (Levitsky 2003; Kleemans and van der Blunt 2008; Shane 2010; 
Bjelopera and Finklea 2012).  Those entry points may not be geographical; rather, entry points 
may often take the form of willing accomplices - companies or individuals in the licit trade 
sector.  Kleemans and van der Blunt’s (2008) examination of Dutch organized crime case files 
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focuses heavily on the licit occupations that support transit crimes: dockworkers, cargo handlers, 
and cargo management firms.  Seaports employ a significant proportion and diversity of transit 
workers, among which vulnerability may spread.  Through this embedded vulnerability, coupled 
with the cross-border movement of cargo, a criminal network is also able to practice 
jurisdictional arbitrage by taking advantage of low levels of local or regional regulation to insert 
or extract illicit cargo from the maritime transportation system (Williams 2001). 
Criminal networks speculate on and benefit from similar supply and demand pressures as 
legitimate importers and exporters.  Identifying vulnerabilities that enable or allow a network to 
gain access to the maritime transportation system may lead to decreased illicit flows by 
identifying focusing on the “entry” points for a network.  Law enforcement may then take more 
appropriate action either through increasing regulatory oversight or actual operational changes.  
Despite previous identification of the institutional and administrative security structures at 
certain seaports (Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005; Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009), 
vulnerabilities continue to exist that allow criminal networks to (a) insert illicit cargo into the 
maritime transportation system and (b) transfer cargo safely in spite of significant security and 
customs enforcement procedures.  From an economic development perspective, a significant 
presence of organized crime, measured at the macro- level, may exert downward pressure on port 
efficiency, leading to increased transportation costs (Clarke et al. 2004) and have an outsize 
impact on the regular citizen, not factoring in the harm caused by narcotics (National Drug 
Intelligence Center 2011f) and counterfeit products (Philips 2005).   
Furthermore, recent research focused on strengthening SCP techniques to disrupt 
organized crime groups notes that it is the preventative approaches that require careful analysis 
and law enforcement coordination, which may be the most successful in addressing organized 
crime threats, but which law enforcement organizations are the most averse to (Kirby and Snow 
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2016).  As Von Lampe (2011) demonstrated in his study examining the application of SCP 
techniques organized offenders are more resourceful and less dependent on any given opportunity 
structure defined in time and space and more likely to create or modify the exiting opportunity 
structures, or otherwise “shop” for those structures with greater opportunity for exploitation 
(Shane 2010).  This has direct relevance to the interagency coordination required in the port 
security environment.  At ports where interagency coordination is lacking, there can be 
significant adverse effects in terms of successful law enforcement approaches to address 
organized crime and criminal network threats. 
Criminal networks conduct port shopping, targeting particular seaports based on the 
ports’ particular vulnerabilities (Shane 2010; Natarajan 2011), and researchers note that focusing 
on the business processes of criminal groups can provide a method to understand the types of 
routes traffickers use (Spapens 2010).  As ports are locus points for cargo along a finite number 
of possible routes, this simplies the task for law enforcement to focus resources.  If a known 
amount of traffic moves through the maritime transportation system and all of it passes through a 
finite number of points, understanding what makes one point more vulnerable for criminal 
network exploitation, or victimization, allows law enforcement groups to target their limited 
resources to those spaces.  Vulnerabilities can be structural in that a port may be situated in a 
region rife with criminal network activity or with a high demand for illicit products and goods.  
They can be internal, inhabiting the administrative spaces of the agencies operating at the port.  
Or they can be physical, taking the form of poor physical and/or facility security.  In each of 
these cases, transnational trafficking networks (as opposed to organized crime groups) may be 
better positioned to benefit from seaport weaknesses because of the structural flexibility inherent 
to criminal networks.  Recent research has however focused on the “stickiness” of organized 
crime operations within specifics areas and economic spheres.  Spapens (2010: 215) terms this 
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criminal macro networks and notes that these are “relatively stable over time.”  As a result, 
disruptive operations by law enforcement which do not focus on the criminal macro network will 
be less successful than those that do. 
2.10 Integrated theoretical approach to address seaport vulnerability 
The underlying theoretical structure of the Seaport Vulnerability Framework consists of 
an inter-disciplinary approach, weaving together aspects of crime pattern theory, defensible 
space, CRAVED, research on criminal networks, and supply chain security.  Much like Bernard 
and Snipes’ (1996) idea that an integrated theoretical approach is required to make sense of 
overlapping, empirically defensible theoretical perspectives, understanding seaport vulnerability 
requires an integrated theoretical approach.  Examples of integrated approaches exist in recent 
research including the approach to integrate crime place theory with social disorganization to 
focus on understanding longitudinal persistence of crime in micro places (Weisburd, Groff, and 
Yang 2012) or the approach focused on integrating functional, economic, and social network 
theories of criminal network formation to develop an integrated theory of organized crime 
creating the new concept of a criminal macro networks (Spapens 2010).  This last approach has 
direct relevance to the Port of New York and New Jersey where organized crime has been a 
longstanding, if latent, presence in some aspects of port operations.  The theoretical framework 
outlined in this chapter is the first step in developing a integrated theoretical approach to 
understand vulnerability at seaports.  
Defensible space, CRAVED, and crime pattern theories inform the set of physical 
vulnerabilities, while research on the formation and structure of criminal networks inform the set 
of vulnerabilities categorized under administrative vulnerability, which focus on the conditions 
of port economic and labor sectors that increase their vulnerability to criminal networks.  Finally, 
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theories of crime place, CRAVED, and criminal network research inform the logistical 
vulnerabilities.  This is because the vulnerability inherent in the logistical movement of cargo is 
both a function of the spatial location of large amounts of cargo creating physical bottlenecks at a 
port and the administrative decisions by regulatory and business entities to inspect, load, and 
offload that cargo at the port. 
This confluence of theoretical perspectives provides a more holistic examination of port 
vulnerability than previous research (Zaitch 2002; Klima 2011; Eski 2011; Petrossian, 
Marteache, and Viollaz 2014; Eski 2016).  As a result the key determination in this chapter is 
that the confluence of vulnerability leads to increased seaport vulnerability and that it is 
impossible for one theoretical perspective to provide a holistic view of vulnerability at a port.  
The theories described in this chapter and how they inform specific vulnerabilities creates the 
integrated theoretical approach outlined in the following chapter’s examination of the Seaport 
Vulnerability Framework.  
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Chapter 3 Seaport Vulnerability Framework 
3.1 Overview 
The Seaport Vulnerability Framework presented in this chapter was developed from a 
pilot study at the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor (Waterfront Commission), a 
literature review of administrative seaport literature, an examination of publicly available 
accounts of criminal network activity at seaports, and informed by the integrated theoretical 
approach described in the previous chapter.  The Seaport Vulnerability Framework has 21 
discrete vulnerabilities organized into port security funding, physical, administrative, and 
logistical categories.   
3.2 Port security funding vulnerability 
Seaports in the U.S. have widely disparate levels of security funding.  Although the 
MTSA and the SAFE Ports Act of 2006 created base level security requirements at U.S. ports, 
investment in port security technologies and equipment varies between ports (Pate et al. 2008).  
Many different factors affect the amount of port security funding invested in any given port or 
even port district7, from levels of container cargo traffic to U.S. Coast Guard regulated facilities.  
Ports with high levels container traffic may not necessarily receive commensurately high levels 
of security funds due to U.S. Coast Guard vulnerability assessments which quantifies risk and 
targets at U.S. seaports (USCG).  U.S. seaports’ primary funding mechanism for increased 
security has, since 2002, been the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), administered by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  PSGP funding for a port district is a better 
                                                            
7 U.S. ports of entry are categorized as “ports” which are aggregated under listings of “districts” (U.S. Census). Port 
districts as categorized under U.S. Census nomenclature refer to a district which may be composed of multiple ports.  
PSGP funds are disbursed across U.S. Coast Guard sectors of which there are 36.  Port districts are the local, or in 
some cases regional areas which fall under the jurisdiction of the port authority that manages the port. 
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indicator of how much funding a port has received to invest in port security (AAPA 2006; DHS 
2007; DHS 2008; DHS 2009; DHS 2011; DHS 2012; DHS 2013).  While the lack of PSGP 
funding is not alone a significant vulnerability, the amount of security funding received per 
container, compared across other U.S. ports, provides a baseline with which to understand how 
much has been invested in port security procedures and technologies.  While SCP techniques are 
often considered to be low cost, in that they rely on disrupting the decision making of criminal 
actors, some techniques can require significant financial expenditures if they are to be instituted 
properly.  For example, proper mast lighting at ports fulfills a SCP technique of natural 
surveillance and is supported through PSGP grants in certain ports.  A dearth of PSGP funds can 
lead ports to forego these crucial SCP practices and lead to increased vulnerability at the port.   
3.3 Physical vulnerabilities 
Seaports are spaces with unique geographic and spatial qualities.  The nature of seaports 
with their “open structures, critical physical locations, ease of accessibility, massive importation 
and exportation of containerized cargo, and large numbers of personnel on the scene,” 
emphasizes their vulnerability to criminal threats (Barnes and Oloruntoba 2005; Blumenthal 
2005: 3).  Physical vulnerabilities are those aspects of the seaport’s physical structure(s) that 
create opportunities for criminal networks to gain access to the seaport.  These include 
vulnerabilities related to cargo removal, as well as introduction of illicit goods into the legitimate 
stream of commerce. 
3.3A Open structure 
The physical environments of seaports are multi-varied and diverse (Tioga Group 2010), 
yet shipping consolidation has led seaports to trend toward larger, sprawling spaces with multiple 
access and entry points.  For example, the structure of the harbor of New York, with 900 miles of 
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waterfront between New York and New Jersey (Blumenthal 2005), may create conditions that 
foster areas of indefensible space (Cozens et al. 2002), as well as areas of offensible space 
(Felson 2006).  Recent changes to the fundamental component of maritime shipping, the 
container ship, have increased the amounts of cargo transported on a single container vessel.8  
U.S. ports on the West Coast have not been able to keep up with the pace of these changes, and 
in late 2014, they experienced severe congestion, with containers stacked high on yard space, 
and queues to unload cargo extending out to sea and causing delays (Mongelluzzo 2014; 2015).  
Although such severe congestion is unusual, it is indicative of the rising volumes of cargo, and 
with more containers held on-site, this increases the number of theft targets and provides cover 
for networks that seek to extract cargo from the port without detection. 
3.3B Spatial concentration of CRAVED products 
Most seaports are recipient and holding areas for CRAVED products (See 3.5D 
CRAVED product imports).  In the United States, most large ports also have Customs and 
Border Patrol (CBP) Central Examination Stations (CES) where cargo from nearby smaller ports 
is stored and examined.  Ports with CES facilities and which are destination points for CRAVED 
goods may be more likely to attract criminal theft networks (Clarke 1999).  For example, 
networks have targeted CRAVED products such as vehicles, perfume, and perishable high value 
food goods (such as shrimp or lobster) (Leeds 1997; Waterfront Commission 2006; Zambito 
2006; Lantsman 2013).  Seaports that receive and hold CRAVED products can also act as crime 
attractors (Brantingham and Brantingham 2009).  The presence of a CES can, in fact, signal to 
criminal networks that high value cargo will be present at the port.  As such, theft of valuable 
cargo products from a seaport or nearby warehouses may be used as a measure to determine 
                                                            
8 The latest class of container vessel, Triple E class, can hold 18,000 Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEU), or 50% 
more than the next largest vessel, New Panamax class, which holds 12,500 TEUs. 
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whether CRAVED products at seaports attract criminal networks.  Furthermore, using CESs as 
the proxy measure for spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo is especially relevant since CBP 
has been identified as having lax security procedures at CES facilities (Department of Homeland 
Security Office of the Inspector General 2012).  In fact, Office of the Inspector General at the 
Department of Homeland Security damningly notes:  
CBP does not have effective management controls to ensure that employees do 
not pose a security risk at bonded facilities.  CBP has not issued national 
requirements for background checks on employees of bonded facilities and does 
not ensure that port directors have management controls over background checks 
at bonded facilities.  As a result, background checks are inconsistent and often 
ineffective (pg. 1). 
3.3C Peripheral seaport companies 
A seaport’s footprint extends past the piers, wharves, and buildings that comprise the 
physical layout.  This broader catchment area houses the companies that provide ancillary 
services, which may not be located directly on the port.  It has been noted that ancillary service 
providers are normally subject to less regulation than primary function providers, such as 
terminal operators (Trujillo and Nombela 1999; Fritelli and Lake 2006).  Because many of these 
ancillary service providers are located off the waterfront and outside the jurisdiction of 
waterfront agencies, these companies may also be less likely to implement proper security 
procedures and regulations (Mayhew 2001), while enjoying privileged access through trade and 
labor relationships. 
Freight forwarders can act as a proxy for peripheral companies at-large in measuring this 
vulnerability, since they are rarely co-located with the port and have already been identified by 
outside research as a vulnerable sector (Zaitch 2002).  Ports with many freight forwarding 
companies can function as crime generator ports, as there will be a greater number of targets for 
exploitation through the theft of goods or the greater opportunity to access valuable services.  
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Smugglers at the Port of Rotterdam (Zaitch 2002) have noted that seaports with many operating 
entities are also desirable places through which to smuggle narcotics amid the suffusion of cargo 
- the multitude of entities present creates layers of administrative complexity that seaport 
stakeholders often have difficulty disaggregating (Hecker 2002). 
3.3D Vehicle traffic 
The number of vehicles and visitors to a seaport is a physical vulnerability as networks 
can use daily traffic to disguise illicit entry or exit.  Under some circumstances, vehicles may 
provide the concealability factor of the CRAVED framework.  In one instance of vehicle theft 
from a terminal at the Port of New York and New Jersey, a stolen vehicle was driven behind a 
common car transport truck, literally using legitimate port traffic as cover for theft (Lantsman 
2013).  Large numbers of daily entry vehicles, such as drayage truck traffic, create conditions of 
indefensible space, especially if authorities do not take appropriate security measures.  
Furthermore, a large amount of vehicles create conditions of vulnerability to cargo thieves, 
which radiates out from the port to what can be theoretically defined as the port’s immediate 
hinterland or roughly the commonly understood distance of short haul drayage, 75 miles 
(Bensman and Bromberg 2009). 
3.3E Small vessels in/near seaport harbor 
Small vessels can be used to break into containers, extricating cargo, and/or inserting 
illicit cargo.  The physical environment around a port acts a “choice structuring property” as drug 
trafficking networks assess and select opportunities to bring drugs into the United States (Decker 
and Chapman 2008: 79).  Drugs can be loaded onto larger ships and then offloaded to smaller 
vessels, such as pleasure boats, when closer to shore.  In the United States, pleasure vessels must 
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report to customs authorities only once they have docked, allowing drugs to enter the country 
before authorities can inspect the vessel (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2011). 
In recent years, Southern California, the Gulf Coast, and the southern Atlantic coast has 
seen a surge in small vessel drug smuggling movements (GAO 2013c).  Termed “pangas,” these 
small outboard motor boats can evade detection by CBP and USCG officials and when 
apprehended, are loaded with significant quantities of illicit cargo, such as marijuana, cocaine, 
narcotics, and in some cases have been used for human smuggling (DHS 2012b; Welsh 2014).9  
While CBP and law enforcement officials use risk management metrics to identify which vessels 
may be carrying illicit cargo, the presence of small vessels in a harbor or in the vicinity of a port 
make it more difficult to differentiate between licit and illicit vessel behavior.  According to the 
Director of Marine Operations in San Diego, “a smuggler posing as a legitimate recreational or 
commercial boater is the proverbial needle in a sea of needles in a place like Southern California 
and Baja Mexico, where boating is a way of life” (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 24 
February 2014). 
In addition to recreational vessels, fishing boats are also known to smuggle narcotics.  
The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime cites numerous examples of this (UNODC 2011).  As 
reported by UNODC, the smell of fish confuses drug sniffing dogs and allows fishing vessels to 
go directly to port and unload narcotics to waiting distributors (UNODC 2011: 131). 
The presence of small vessels in or near the harbor creates indefensible space, whereby 
small vessels can function not only as disguising tactics to insert illicit cargo onto piers but also 
may themselves be moving illicit cargo.  A recent seizure at the Port of Long Beach from a small 
vessel shows how port security agencies may be tasked with the dual purpose of not only 
                                                            
9 Since 2009, CBP has publicly identified at least 79 incidents of smuggling by small vessels, primarily pangas, 
though jet skis have been used as well.  See Appendix B for a list of panga incidents and the closest nearby ports. 
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providing port security services but also identifying suspicious small vessels and increased levels 
of small vessels in or near the port decrease port law enforcement resources devoted to other port 
security tasks (Riviera 2016). 
3.3F Intermodal connections  
Over the past several decades, containerization and larger container vessels have reduced 
the number of active seaports (Levinson 2006; Rodrigue and Guan 2008).  Increasing throughput 
among fewer locations has necessitated the development of strong intermodal connections 
(Fleming and Hayuth 1994).  Intermodal transport is “transport of unitized loads by the 
coordinated use of more than one transport mode, in such a way that comparative advantages of 
various modes are maximized and the transport chain is guided as one unity” (Van Klink and 
Van den Berg 1998: 2).  Intermodal connections enable the seaport to access its hinterland, or the 
regional area that the port services (Notteboom 2008).  The presence of numerous intermodal 
connections can create vulnerabilities attributed to administrative complexity and can therefore 
increase criminal access to the seaport (Albanese 2003; Harrald et al. 2004; Barnes and 
Oloruntoba 2005; Haveman, Shatz, and Vilchis 2005).  Therefore, the quantity and the types of 
intermodal connections at a seaport are an important factor when considering vulnerability.  
Previous research has also employed “access to transportation” as an indicator to predict whether 
criminal groups that traffic illegally caught fish will seek to use a particular port to offload the 
catch (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014).  This translates as a method to measure the 
decision making behavior of criminal groups relative to the existence of enough transportation 
methods to easily move their illicit products to alternative destinations.   
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3.3G Physical/Administrative security procedures  
The level of security at U.S. ports has since 2002 been greatly affected by federal 
mandated physical and administrative security.   The introduction of the Maritime Transportation 
Safety Act (MTSA) in 2002 and the SAFE Port Act in 2006, introduced a wide range of 
obligatory security procedures such as the use of access controls through the Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential, or TWIC card, U.S Coast Guard inspections of port facilities to 
check for fencing, lighting, and other physical impediments to access.   
While these are considered to be standard supply chain security procedures some of these 
have also been conceptualized in the criminological literature as situational crime prevention 
techniques, including the techniques of target hardening, concealing targets, identifying property, 
removing targets, creating access control, and others.  As U.S. ports have to employ the baseline 
procedures mandated through federal regulations they have a commensurate high level of 
physical and administrative security.  The criminological research on SCP provides us with a 
method of conceptualizing other techniques that may be useful to enhance physical and 
administrative security at seaports (Haelterman 2011), though it may not be mandated through 
federal regulations.  This vulnerability therefore measures the level of physical and 
administrative security by focusing on whether SCP techniques are used at a port. 10 
Seaports with an absence of effective, additional SCP techniques are more vulnerable to 
criminal networks.  Mayhew’s (2001) best practices to prevent cargo theft form a primer on 
                                                            
10 Through federal mandates and private sector innovations in supply chain security, U.S. seaports have a baseline 
level of physical and administrative security.  However, for the SVF to function outside of the United States context 
ports should be examined for security procedures that, though mandated in the United States, may not be standard 
overseas.   While it may be useful to look at the specific mandated security procedures under the MTSA and SAFE 
Port Act, for the SVF to be more universally applicable, this vulnerability is conceptualized by measuring ports on 
whether specific SCP techniques, which are theoretically relevant to port security are utilized at the port.  For example, 
well-lit facilities are mandatory under the MTSA (MTSA 2002), but, in practice, some ports have poor quality lighting 
that does not function (Lantsman 2013). 
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effective seaport SCP measures at ports as e applied the SCP framework to logistics facilities and 
port share similar features with the cargo facilities he was examining.11  In addition, Clarke and 
Eck’s (2003) 25 SCP techniques provide an evaluative framework that can be applied to 
seaports, utilizing the first three categories of techniques (increasing the effort, increasing the 
risk, and reducing the reward) which are more applicable to organized offenders than reducing 
provocations or excuses. 
3.3H Illicit import/export markets 
Certain seaports are destination or embarkation points for illicit goods due to several 
factors such as: proximity to a criminal network’s base of operations; proximity to a large 
available market for illicit goods; and/or proximity to a large available supply of illicit goods.  
For networks that move large amounts of cargo, the proximity of the port to a market is an 
important factor in port selection (Blickman 2005; EUROPOL 2011; Presidia Security Services 
201l), as it will affect ease of distribution.  Crime pattern studies have noted that offenders rarely 
travel far from local areas (Van Koppen and Jansen 1998; Wiles and Costello 2000; Smith and 
Clarke 2000). However, recent research has also found that in some instances, the distance 
traveled by offenders is not as low as previously believed (Morselli and Royer 2008; Van Stijle 
and Vander Beken 2012).  These long-distance offenders tend to be less aware of the situational 
and contextual space through which opportunities arise and are instead more likely to actively 
seek out opportunities (Ekblom 2003; Von Lampe 2011). 
                                                            
11 These measures include perimeter fencing, installing heavy doors to prevent ease of entry, tagging loose cargo, 
vehicle barriers, cargo storing cargo in different areas based on origin and contents, placing expensive cargo in high 
security indoors facilities, and installing well placed and functional security cameras. 
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3.4 Administrative vulnerabilities 
3.4A Port divergence  
Differential hinterland access and markets may affect criminal network decision-making 
through the dispersion of container traffic across ports, also referred to in the supply chain 
literature as port divergence (Rodrigue and Guan 2008).  For example, divergence of cargo has 
led maritime traffic to be spread across numerous smaller ports along the U.S. eastern seaboard.  
This divergence has created a situation where “smaller ports are a risky proposition compared 
with large established terminals having access to nearby consumption markets” (Rodrigue and 
Guan 2008: 22). 
In studies of organized crime and legitimate business interactions, finances are an 
important factor in whether companies participate in criminal ventures (Bagelius 2005; Tilley 
2008).  The transportation industry is furthermore highly prone to corrupt activity (PWC 2014) 
and indicators of decreased business in a particular node in the sector (i.e. at a port), are an 
indication that corruption risks are increased.  Combining these two insights from the organized 
crime literature and the supply chain field, port divergence, or a situation where a port loses 
business at the expense of other nearby ports, create financial pressures which may increase 
vulnerability to criminal networks through two vectors: (a) greater incentive to decrease security 
pressure on the remaining throughput or (b) decreased security outlays as throughput decreases.  
For example, the Port of Portland, Oregon, recently lost its primary shipping line and largest 
customer, Hanjin, in a move that will decrease container traffic at the port between 65-80% 
(Conway 2013; Harburger 2015).  This traffic will be moving to the Port of Seattle, less than 50 
miles from the Port of Portland.  Dockworkers, drayage drivers, warehouses, and other 
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employers operating at the Port of Portland will struggle for employment as a result of this loss 
of business.   
3.4B Automation/cyber security vulnerability 
In both the port and maritime sector, automation is an increasing trend with implications 
for maritime and port vulnerability.  While shipping vessels have increasingly been automated 
such that massive container ships now require only small crews (Stewart 2014), only certain 
seaports around the world have fully automated terminal technology.  Some ports, such as the 
Port of Rotterdam have fully automated terminals; others, like nearly all the ports in the United 
States, have either minimal or a small proportion of terminal operations automated (Mongelluzzo 
2015b).  Automation increases vulnerability of computerized terminal movements to cyber-
attacks or hacking (DHS 2016).   However, while terminals may not be fully automated ports and 
vessels do have a large number of systems which have some level of automation including 
systems terminal operating, automated cargo tracking, shore based systems that directly support 
vessel operations and navigations, automated cargo handling equipment, and container cranes in 
some ports (Wallischek 2013).    
There are already several benchmark examples of criminal networks hacking to locate 
containers on yards and of criminals hacking into terminal management systems and exploiting 
physical vulnerabilities to place technology onto port infrastructure (Magal S3).  In 2013 at the 
port of Antwerp, a drug trafficking network hired Belgian hackers who were able to penetrate the 
cargo management system of the port, identify containers, and extricate narcotics hidden in 
banana shipments (Europol 2013).  When the port installed a firewall to block the breach, the 
drug trafficking network broke into the port’s physical facilities, installed wireless bridges into 
computer operating systems, and continued to extract illicit cargo for two years before authorities 
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identified the breach (Caldwell 2014).  While many ports have automated systems for cargo 
management, increasingly automated port and terminal systems will create greater vulnerability 
to hacking and increased cyber security vulnerability (Wallischek 2013; DHS 2016).  As a result 
of this increased vulnerability, in any individual case study of a port, the degree of automation 
and automation trends in the port are integral to understanding new vulnerability vectors (see 
Section 7.11b for a discussion of automation at the Port of New York and New Jersey). 
3.4C Vulnerable labor sectors and sector size 
Particular sectors of seaport labor may be classified as vulnerable labor sectors.  The first 
type of vulnerable labor sector is a sector that is predisposed, through historical associations with 
criminal networks, to employ workers with links to those networks (WCNYH 2010; WCNYH 
2011; WCNYH 2013; WCNYH 2014).  The second type is a sector that is targeted by criminal 
networks because it occupies a central and valuable role at the seaport and may not be subject to 
regulatory authority, creating a jurisdictional vulnerability.  Jurisdictional gaps create spaces 
where corrupt companies or criminal networks can operate without fear of enforcement and 
allow networks to engage in jurisdictional arbitrage by taking advantage of lax or nonexistent 
regulation in one area or region (Williams 2001: Shane 2010).  The literature on jurisdictional 
arbitrage points to a diversity of organizations using this tactic as a way to avoid prosecution for 
criminal activity (Williams 2001b; Kshetri 2010; Leslie 2014).  This tactic has been most heavily 
used by networks seeking to exploit lax intellectual property right laws in order to traffic in 
fraudulent goods, and in committing cyber-crime (Leslie 2014) where actors can perpetrate cyber 
fraud in one country knowing that their acts do no constitute a prosecutable offense in their 
country of residence (Kshetri 2010).  At ports, these gaps are most often a function of a 
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jurisdictional structure that has grown to deal with perceived or real crime threats in the port 
region. 
Gambetta and Reuter (1995) note that traditional labor sectors with a history of organized 
crime, sectors whose activity is connected to the locality, sectors with a relatively high 
proportion of small firms, and sectors with a disproportionate public sector presence will have a 
high level of vulnerability to organized crime.  Lavezzi (2011) further supports this contention 
and adds two characteristics to the profile of a company prone to mafia intrusion:  (1) the 
company is small; and (2) is in a traditional and/or low-tech sector.  To this group, Kleemans and 
van de Bunt (2008) add occupations in the transit industry.  At ports in the United States, two 
primary sectors have these characteristics.   
First are short haul (drayage) truck drivers and their working conditions.  For example, at 
the Port of New York and New Jersey, most drayage drivers are non-unionized and have few 
benefits such as health care (Bensman and Bromberg 2009).  These conditions create a working 
environment which leads them to be more susceptible not only to be exploited by criminal 
networks operating at ports but also to participate in illicit schemes.   
The second sector is freight forwarding (Zaitch 2002; Klima 2011; Lantsman 2013).  
Forwarders or cargo handlers are small companies that ship goods to destinations around the 
world (Kleemans and van de Bunt 2008).  Previous work on shipping agents identified several 
factors that make shipping agents a vulnerable labor sector, and given the similarities, these 
factors also likely to be present in the freight forwarding sector: physical proximity to ports, 
presence of longstanding relationships with customs, propensity to not inspect consigned cargo, 
and a lack of regulatory oversight creates disincentives to report illicit shipments (Klima 2011).  
Access to a forwarder can provide criminal networks with important information on where and 
how to export or import illicit cargo. 
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3.4D Interagency cooperation  
A lack of interagency communication between waterfront security agencies creates a 
further administrative vulnerability (Pate et al. 2008; Grillot et al. 2009), even when agencies are 
not perceived or known to be corrupt such as the Waterfront Commission.  The Waterfront 
Commission’s main institutional partner and the landlord of much of the territory at the PNYNJ 
is the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ).  For up to a decade before 2008, 
these two agencies had a troubled relationship as the Port Authority would refuse to engage or 
work with the Waterfront Commission (Executive director, Waterfront Commission, personal 
communication, November 9, 2011).  This lack of cooperation was the result of what was 
considered to be widespread and entrenched corruption at the Waterfront Commission (Fisch et 
al. 2009).  Much of this corruption occurred between the period of 1990-2008, as research 
previous to that period on the Commission had not noted any specific level of corruption (Block 
1982; Levy 1989).   Also contributing to the lack of cooperation was the PANYNJ’s perception 
that Waterfront Commission was incompetent as a result of organizational drift and internal 
corruption.  The lack of interagency cooperation as a result of perceived/actual corruption is a 
serious hindrance to effective investigation of criminal network use of port facilities, exploitation 
of maritime/port private sector companies, and a sustainable approach to port security. 
  This vulnerability has been noted in other areas, particularly in the context of national 
intelligence failures (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004).  
When agencies do not cooperate or exchange information effectively, knowledge of criminal 
network methods adaptation and tactics is not filtered through to the necessary stakeholders 
(NATO Review 2009; Presidia Security Consulting 2011), creating gaps in information and 
vulnerability. 
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3.4E Historical presence of criminal networks 
Seaports with companies or agencies with historical associations to criminal networks 
will continue to have greater vulnerability to continued use by networks (Albanese 2003).  At 
certain East Coast U.S. seaports and some Canadian seaports such as Halifax, Vancouver, and 
Montreal, the long-standing presence of criminal networks has led to continued illicit use of 
these ports (WCNYH 2008; 2009; 2010; Presidia Security Consulting 2011).  Vulnerabilities at 
these ports are more deeply entrenched, as seaport cultures develop around the knowledge that 
criminal networks control certain aspects of trade or labor.  This phenomenon may also lead to 
entrenchment of offensible spaces (Felson 2006; Presidia Security Consulting 2011). 
Furthermore, historically, U.S. East Coast waterfront labor unions have been implicated 
with criminal networks (Block 1982; President’s Commission on Organized Crime 1986: 36-43; 
Abadinsky 1990: 357-63; United States Attorney’s Office 2004; United States Department of 
Justice 2011; Presidia Security Consulting 2011).  Even though practices at ports have changed, 
through new innovations such as container shipping, connections between labor unions and 
criminal activity remain strong in some ports (Levinson 2006; Jaffee 2010).  
In the United States, waterfront unions are regional:  the International Longshoremen’s 
and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) represents most West Coast waterfront laborers and the 
International Longshoremen Association (ILA) is the primary representative for longshore 
workers at East Coast and Gulf of Mexico ports.  As organized crime groups have retained 
strong ties to waterfront labor unions (Waterfront Commission 2009; 2010; 2011), laborers’ 
collusion in criminal ventures is likely to continue to occur (U.S. Customs Service 1997). 
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Unionized and non-unionized workers may have different reasons for abetting criminal 
networks.12  Workers in unions with particularly strong associations with criminal networks may 
be more likely to cooperate in crime due to the threat of job loss or other types of intimidation or 
retaliation (Edward and Levi 2008).   
3.4F Organizational corruption 
Organizational corruption refers to systemic wrongdoing by employees who violate 
societal norms with the support of their organization’s internal norms (Segal 2002).  Even with 
controls in place, organizations characterized by an entrenched culture of deviance will continue 
to have issues with corruption (Sherman 1978; Maynard-Moody, Stull, and Mitchell 1986; Susan 
Rose-Ackerman 1993; Segal 2002; Friedrichs 2002). 
Stakeholder agencies and/or companies at seaports with a history of organizational 
corruption are considerably more vulnerable to criminal networks.  Localized instances of 
collusion with criminal networks may not last for long periods of time nor provide deep access to 
a port, but a corrupt agency or company can facilitate the use of the seaport for a longer period of 
time and a greater amount of cargo transfers.  Furthermore, corruption within agencies can lead 
to weakened oversight, if the corruption occurs in a regulatory or security agency (Albanese 
2003).  Agency corruption can create an empty space for networks to facilitate the transfer of 
licit goods illegally, such as in hazardous waste (Bisschop 2012), or illicit goods illegally, such 
as drugs (Zaitch 2002).  Compromised investigations or a lack of investigative drive are 
                                                            
12 Unionization does not in and of itself create port security vulnerability, as the ILWU on the West Coast displays 
almost no public evidence of collusion or cooption by criminal networks.  The presence of organized crime associates 
in union locals at East Coast ports is more a function of the historical development of port operations and the locales 
where ports are situated.  This is further detailed in Chapter 7 on the Port of NY/NJ. 
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important limitations in effectively preventing networks from accessing regulated seaport 
economic and labor sectors (Fisch et al. 2009). 
3.4G Employee corruption 
As a sub-type of the vulnerabilities associated with corruption, corrupt employees 
provide criminal networks privileged access to the seaport, though less access than a corrupt 
agency or company.  Through this vulnerability, internal conspiracies are one of the main 
methods by which criminal networks access the functions of the port (Interagency Commission 
on Crime at U.S. Seaports 2000).  For example, longshore labor may cooperate with a drug 
smuggling network (Kleemans and van den Bunk 2008; Dienst and Prokupecz 2011) or a 
company with compromised employees may acquire a contract to work at the port and gain 
access to the facilities.  Corruption in the hiring process allows for individuals sympathetic to a 
network’s illicit aims into a seaport company or agency in order to facilitate the criminal venture 
(Zaitch 2002; Kleemans and van den Bunk 2008).  As illicit trade is in constant flux and security 
regimes adjust to different patterns of illicit activity, access to specific types of economic or 
labor sectors may be of particular importance to certain networks (Brown 2004; Vander Beken et 
al. 2005; Klima 2011; Lantsman 2013).  However, the ease of access to employees in a company 
is dependent on the activity, the density of the sector where network presence is required, and the 
level of regulatory oversight of that sector. 
In some companies, network members may gain access to seaports through complicit 
relationships with criminal groups (Van Duyne 2005; Vander Beken et al. 2005).  Therefore, 
instances of internal hiring corruption have to be viewed through the lens of complicity - whether 
the company or agency hired corrupt employees as the result of a relationship with criminal 
networks or lax internal hiring procedures.  In the United States, some ports have a longstanding 
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history of internally corrupt employees that allow criminal networks access to the port either for 
extracting cargo or inserting illicit cargo (Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 
2000; Waterfront Commission 2008, 2009, 2010; Presidia Security Consulting 2011). 
The utility to criminal networks of corrupt employees is substantial when considered 
from the criminal network’s viewpoint.  Access to corrupt labor allows criminals to import 
substantial quantities of illicit goods without having to establish shipping companies, deal with 
false bills of lading, or pay concealment costs (U.S. Customs 1997: 4; Zaitch 2002; Presidia 
Security Consulting 2011).  As Zaitch (2002: 253) notes, regarding the utility of corrupt contacts 
at the Port of Rotterdam:  “…corruption at destination points is a scarce precious resource.  
Entire operations can be organised around a single contact that guarantees access to the port.”  
With regard to export, corrupt employees in the freight forwarding sector may facilitate a similar 
circumvention of outbound customs controls. 
3.5 Logistical transport vulnerabilities 
The third vulnerability category encompasses logistical transport vulnerabilities.  These 
are vulnerabilities that result from of the flow of trade through a seaport.  At seaports, the flow of 
trade is commonly referred to as “throughput.”  Throughput is the number of containers which 
are imported or exported through a port, and includes containers which are referred to as 
“empties,” or those which are shipped without any cargo. 
3.5A Container throughput 
A recent assessment of organized crime activity at Canadian seaports identified high 
levels of throughput at three principal Canadian seaports, Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, as 
one of the primary reasons why criminal networks used those ports (Presidia Security Consulting 
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2011).  Zaitch (2002: 243) cites Colombian cocaine smugglers who made the same conclusion 
about the Port of Rotterdam in Amsterdam.   
From a logistical perspective, seaports with a high level of throughput will likely have a 
large amount of goods passing through a limited physical space allowing networks to take 
advantage of fluctuating seasonal flows to insert illicit cargo into the transportation stream 
(Chambers 2012).  They may initially exploit physical or administrative vulnerabilities to 
introduce the cargo into the transportation chain but a high level of throughput may more easily 
mask the goods as they continue to move through the transportation chain.  As such, not only 
does port size, conceptualized as container throughput, offer smugglers greater concealment of 
illicit cargo (Zaitch 2002), but it also contributes to more efficient movement of those same 
goods (a function of port divergence) (Rodrigue and Guan 2008).  In essence, criminals co-opt 
the legitimate economy of scale incentive to move goods through a large seaport for criminal 
purposes. 
3.5B Export cargo vulnerability 
At ports in the United States, CBP devotes vastly fewer security resources to export cargo 
than to import cargo (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 2007), with 
the result being that export shipments are often not targeted consistently or inspected by CBP 
officers for illicit cargo.  This is mainly due to established resource allocation policies and is 
supported by interviews with CBP officers (Lantsman 2012).  As a result, for the purposes of this 
analysis, ports in the United States that export more shipments than import will be more 
vulnerable to criminal network use because cargo is less likely to be inspected for illicit 
shipments. 
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3.5C Vessel traffic 
Ports in the United States have differing vessel traffic profiles.  Some ports specialize in 
specific types of traffic such as bulk cargo vessels or ro-ro (vehicle transport) vessels and focus 
less on container cargo.  As such, agencies and port security stakeholders at those ports may 
develop specialized facilities or expertise to handle those types of vessels.  Based on an analysis 
of U.S. Maritime Administration (2013) vessel compositions at the top 30 container ports in the 
U.S., container vessel calls made up only 33% of all vessel calls, see Figure 1.13  Ports which 
handle primarily container vessels will likely have developed specialized knowledge of not only 
the container shipping processes and procedures but also have a better understanding of which 
companies operate in the container shipping sector, such as the trucking companies moving 
cargo to and from the port and the forwarding companies which organize pickups of their 
containers.  Ports in the United States that handle an above-average number of container vessels 
would likely have a more developed understanding of container security procedures and be less 
                                                            
13 Vessels over 1000 gross register tons (GRT).  See Appendix C for a breakdown of container vessel calls at the top 
30 U.S. seaports. 
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vulnerable to criminal network use of the container shipping system. 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Maritime Administration statistics on the types of vessels that called at U.S. seaports in 2013. 
Source: (MARAD 2013) 
3.5D Imports of CRAVED products 
This vulnerability is the other facet of understanding the presence of CRAVED cargo at 
ports.  In section 3.3B I detail the vulnerability of whether CRAVED cargo is spatially 
concentrated at the port.  This vulnerability examines whether CRAVED cargo constitutes a 
majority of the imports at the port. U.S. ports are significant import points for a wide variety of 
cargo but not all ports specialize or import CRAVED products. The specialization of U.S. 
seaports in specific types of cargo (Tomer and Kane 2015) assists in understanding which ports 
will have a greater vulnerability than others.  This vulnerability examines the level of trade at 
U.S. ports to identify if CRAVED cargo constitutes any of the top ten import commodities at the 
port.   
3.6 Theory of seaport vulnerability 
Consistent with the approach described in the previous chapter of using multiple 
theoretical approaches to develop a unified theoretical approach to understand seaport 
Tankers
30%
Containers
33%Gas (LNG/LPG)
2%
Roll-On/Roll-Off
8%
Bulk
16%
General 
Cargo
11%
  
52 
 
vulnerability, the Seaport Vulnerability Framework (SVF) described in this chapter constitutes a 
theory of seaport vulnerability, building in aspects of criminological theory, supply chain 
security, and observations of port activity at the Port of NY/NJ.  By operationalizing 
vulnerabilities in the framework, the SVF then enables the creation of an assessment tool that can 
be used by port security stakeholders to develop a model of port vulnerability to identify where 
their port is most vulnerable to criminal network use.  Table 1 below re-caps the theoretical 
approaches that inform the vulnerabilities in the framework. 
Table 1: Seaport vulnerability framework theoretical overview 
Category/Vulnerability Theoretical Perspective 
Port Security Funding Situational Crime Prevention, Supply Chain 
Security, Defensible Space 
Physical  
Open structure In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space 
Spatial concentration of CRAVED 
products 
CRAVED, Crime Place 
Peripheral seaport companies Defensible space, Crime Place  
Vehicle traffic Defensible space, Crime Place 
Small vessels in/near seaport harbor Defensible space 
Intermodal connections Defensible space 
Physical/Administrative security 
procedures 
Situational Crime Prevention 
Proximity to illicit import/export market Situational Crime Prevention, Opportunity 
theory 
Administrative 
Port divergence In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space, criminal 
network theories 
Automation/cyber security vulnerability Offensible Space 
Interagency cooperation Organizational cooperation 
Vulnerable labor sectors Criminal network theories 
Number of service providers in a sector  Criminal network theories 
Historical criminal network presence Crime Place, Criminal network theories 
Organizational corruption Criminal network theories 
Employee corruption Criminal network theories 
Logistical 
Container throughput In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space, criminal 
network theories, rational choice 
Export cargo vulnerability In/Defensible Space, Offensible Space, criminal 
network theories, rational choice 
Vessel traffic Supply chain management 
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Imports of CRAVED products CRAVED, Crime Place 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The SVF and criminal network activities outlined in this chapter provide the foundation 
for the research propositions outlined in the following chapter.  Seaport vulnerabilities identified 
through the pilot study and subsequent research likely represent a subset of the universe of 
vulnerabilities among different ports outside of the U.S.  Even within the United States, there are 
significant differences in vulnerabilities at certain seaports.  However, by identifying and 
classifying the broad types of vulnerability that can exist at a seaport, this research seeks to move 
towards a better understanding of:  (1) the typology of vulnerability; and (2) how those 
vulnerabilities can be used to provide criminal networks with privileged access to the functions 
of a seaport. 
From a criminological theoretical standpoint, this chapter identifies the three primary 
categories of vulnerability as physical, administrative, and logistical, and disaggregates 21 
vulnerabilities within those categories.  As a result, this provides a means to move towards 
creating an analytical framework that when properly applied to seaports with appropriate data 
should enable the concentration of prevention resources towards the appropriate vulnerability. 
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Chapter 4- Research propositions 
This dissertation is composed of two analyses.  The first analysis is an examination of the 
top 30 U.S. container seaports using the Seaport Vulnerability Framework detailed in the 
preceding chapter.  This analysis uses 15 of 21 vulnerabilities to profile the top 30 seaports in the 
United States to build a weighted vulnerability profile identifying which ports in the U.S. display 
the greater vulnerability to criminal network exploitation.  The second analysis is an in-depth 
case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) of all 21 vulnerabilities to detail 
how vulnerability manifests itself in this port.  Both parts of the dissertation examine 
propositions that focus on the assumed consequences of a seaport’s vulnerability.  The 
propositions are categorized below, measured in Chapter 6, and examined in further detail in 
Chapter 7 at the PNYNJ. 
4.1 Port security funding  
 Funding levels - Ports that receive less security funding relative to other ports in the U.S. 
will be less secure. 
4.2 Physical vulnerability  
 Open structure - Seaports with large open structures are more susceptible to criminal 
network exploitation than seaports with closed structures.  Open structure ports have 
multiple entry/exit points, open air facilities, and open storage areas. 
 Spatial concentration of CRAVED products - A seaport that concentrates CRAVED 
products will be targeted by criminal networks for theft and will have a higher level of 
overall vulnerability. 
 Peripheral seaport companies - Seaports with numerous freight forwarders or cargo 
handlers, relative to the amount of cargo moved on a monthly basis, will be more 
susceptible to criminal network exploitation. 
  
55 
 
 Vehicle traffic - A large quantity of daily truck traffic to the seaport, relative to average 
daily container transits, will allow criminal networks greater ease of access to the port. 
 Small vessels in/near port - Large numbers of fishing or recreational vessels in or near 
the seaport harbor will allow networks to bypass customs procedures for declaring goods 
and can support illicit trade. 
 Intermodal connections - A large number and variety of intermodal connections create 
more opportunities for networks to insert illicit cargo into the legitimate stream of 
commerce. 
 Physical/Administrative security procedures – Ports in the U.S. that have added SCP 
techniques to existing baseline levels of physical and administrative security procedures 
will display decreased vulnerability.  
 Proximity to illicit import/export market - A seaport with a large illicit import/export 
market within range of the port hinterland or an average drayage truck trip will make the 
port more vulnerable to criminal network use. 
4.3 Administrative vulnerability  
 Port divergence - Port divergence creates different types of vulnerability at ports that 
lose traffic and at ports that gain container traffic. 
 Automation/cyber security vulnerability - Cyber security vulnerability increases with 
greater automation in port operations. 
 Interagency cooperation - Ports without adequate procedures for interagency 
cooperation can have jurisdictional gaps that create offensible and vulnerable 
administrative space.  
 Vulnerable labor sectors - Vulnerable licit labor and economic sectors provide networks 
the opportunity to insert illicit goods into the stream of legitimate maritime commerce.   
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o A high number of service providers in a seaport’s labor and economic sectors 
increases the opportunities for access. 
 Historical criminal network presence - Seaports with historical associations with 
criminal networks will be more vulnerable to contemporary criminal network use. 
 Organizational corruption - Seaports with companies that engage in corrupt or criminal 
activity are more vulnerable to criminal networks. 
 Employee corruption - Employee corruption provides networks with access to the 
physical and administrative space of a seaport. 
4.4 Logistical vulnerability  
 Container throughput - High levels of throughput at a seaport create greater opportunity 
for criminal networks to ship illicit cargo.   
 Export cargo vulnerability- If container exports are a sizeable percentage of a port’s 
annual operations, the port has increased overall vulnerability to criminal network use. 
 Vessel traffic - Ports with a below-average level of container vessel calls will have a 
higher level of vulnerability to criminal network use of container shipping.  
 Import of CRAVED products - A seaport that imports large quantities of CRAVED 
products will be targeted by criminal networks for theft and will have a higher level of 
overall vulnerability. 
 
  
57 
 
Chapter 5 Methodology 
The analysis of seaport vulnerability at U.S. ports employs a comparative port 
vulnerability analysis using the Seaport Vulnerability Framework and an in-depth case study 
analysis of the Port of New York and New Jersey. 
5.1 Comparative Seaport Analysis  
The comparative seaport analysis examines the top 30 U.S. cargo seaport through 15 of 
the 21 SVF categories.  These categories were chosen for three primary reasons: 
 They represent a cross-section of the primary vulnerabilities in the SVF and include the 
highest rated vulnerabilities. 
 They can be measured with publicly available data sources or proxy data sources.. 
 They can be used to measure vulnerability at domestic and international seaports and 
provide a scalable framework to identify vulnerability across ports both within the U.S. 
and abroad. 
5.1A Multi-port analysis sample 
The seaports in the comparative analysis are the top 30 U.S. cargo seaports as determined 
by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA).14  The AAPA is the primary 
organization for port authorities in the Western Hemisphere and compiles statistics across its 
member ports, which include all of the major ports in the United States.  This analysis excluded 
land ports and focuses on the top 30 container maritime ports in the United States, including 
territories such as Guam and Puerto Rico.  These ports account for 99.3% of all container 
                                                            
14 See Appendix D for a list of the expanded sample. 
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shipping traffic in the U.S. and capture almost the entire spectrum of container traffic in the 
United States. 
While the sample ports were selected based on container throughput, other selection 
options include cargo volumes or the number of vessel shipping calls as the primary selection 
criteria.  For this study, container shipping is the ideal selection criterion because containers are 
the primary transport mode for illicit cargo (UNODC 2010; UNODC 2012). 
5.1B Units of analysis 
The SVF examines vulnerability at seaports across multiple levels of analysis.  The 
primary unit of analysis is the seaport.15  Due to the multi-jurisdictional and multi-stakeholder 
webs which characterize seaports, some vulnerabilities are coded using a divergent spatial or 
administrative level of analysis.  For example, at a higher spatial order of analysis, vulnerability 
at a seaport is examined at the port district level, which may be defined differently by each local 
port authority.  If the port district level is left undefined by the port authority, the PNYNJ’s port 
district limitations (New York Code: Art. II) definition is adopted by default: a 25 mile radius 
from the port’s main shipping terminal.  Within seaports, the economic sector is another unit of 
analysis. Within economic sectors, the individual company is a unit of analysis.  The employee is 
also used as a unit of analysis when examining employee corruption.  Finally, the waterfront 
labor union is a unit of analysis that cuts across the organizational and individual units listed 
above. 
5.2 Data  
Note on coding 
                                                            
15 Defined as “harbors for seagoing vessels with facilities to lade and unlade cargo and/or passengers and with easy 
access to the sea (from the 24 nautical mile contiguous zone to the terminal) (Interagency Commission on Crime at 
U.S. Seaports 2000: 2).” 
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The comparative analysis framework is divided into three categories of vulnerability 
based on the theoretical level of utility of the vulnerability to a network:  low, moderate, and 
high order vulnerabilities.  The vulnerabilities are coded based on a tri-order scale of 
measurement with 3, 6 and 9 as the highest code depending on the order of utility for a network.   
1. Low order vulnerabilities are coded between zero and three (0-3). 
2. Moderate order vulnerabilities are coded between zero and six (0-6). 
3. High order vulnerabilities are coded between zero and nine (0-9). 
Five of 15 vulnerability categories had a baseline of one (1) as the lowest possible score.  
As a result, the minimum score is 5 and the maximum is 63, with a range of 5 to 63.  This 
chapter examines the data used for the analyses, explains the coding schema, and discusses 
limitations of data sources. 
Table 2- Vulnerability Coding Chart 
Low order vulnerability  Coding  Creates a low level of access or 
attraction to a criminal network; alone 
this is not enough to create access to a 
port. 
 
Port security funding per 2013 container 0-3 
Open structure 0-3 
Spatial concentration of CRAVED 
products  
0-3 
Import of CRAVED products 0-3 
Peripheral companies 1-3 
Vehicle traffic 1-3 
Intermodal connections 1-3 
Physical/administrative security 
procedures 
1-3 
Throughput 1-3 
Container vessel traffic 0-3 
Interagency cooperation 0-3 
Moderate order vulnerability  Coding Creates a moderate level of access or 
serves to attract networks to a specific 
port. 
Illicit import/export market in port district 0-6 
Historical presence of criminal networks 0-6 
High order vulnerability  Coding Creates a high level of access; alone 
this may be sufficient for a network to 
access a seaport. 
Organizational corruption 0-9 
Employee corruption 0-9 
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5.2A Port security funding per 2013 container (0-3) 
Since 2002, port security agencies and private entities have been eligible to apply for Port 
Security Grant Program (PSGP) funding.  From 2002 to 2013, the PSGP provided 
$2,431,381,580 in funding or $56.41 per 2013 container (AAPA 2006; DHS 2007; DHS 2008; 
DHS 2009; DHS 2011; DHS 2012; DHS 2013; DHS 2014; FEMA 2014).  While a significant 
portion of PSGP funding is not focused directly on container traffic, funding for port security 
nonetheless affects container security and the overall movement of illicit cargo.  PSGP funding 
records which note the port, the amount, the project description, and, in some cases, the direct 
beneficiary, were used to build a proxy dataset to measure how much funding has been disbursed 
for a particular port’s security for the seaport sample in this study.  Measuring the amount per 
container across a longitudinal period provides a way to quantify how much security funding was 
invested at one particular seaport relative to other seaports. 
- A port with no or less than 25% of the average PSGP investment per container is coded 3. 
- A port with a PSGP investment between 25% - 50% of the average PSGP investment is 
coded 2. 
- A port with a PSGP investment less than the average PSGP investment but more than 
50% of the average is coded 1. 
- A port with a PSGP investment at or above the average PSGP investment is coded 0. 
Data quality/limitations 
This category relies on U.S. government issued data, either identified directly through the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which determines PSGP levels, or the 
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American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), which collates FEMA PSGP data.16  This 
provides for a strong level of reliability as the same data sources is used across all ports.  The 
primary limitation with this data source is that for certain ports, FEMA and AAPA listings only 
displayed the organization that received the funding as the Port Authority, without 
disaggregating which specific agencies or organizations received funding.  
5.2B Open structure (0-3) 
Open structure was analyzed using Google Earth and internal port documents.  In some 
cases, it was possible to identify the seaport boundaries without the use of internal port maps, 
such as with the ports of San Diego, Oakland, and Freeport (Texas).  A number of seaports 
structures were unusually complex, with multiple terminals across a wider area.  For these ports, 
such as the Ports of New York and New Jersey, Savannah, and Houston, both internal port maps 
and Google Earth were used to identify port facilities.  Where a port had more than one terminal 
with separate entry/exit points, it was scored as if it had multiple entry/exit points, since access to 
one terminal would provide access to others, particularly if cargo were to be moved once in the 
port. 
- Open structure is coded for ports that display the following features:  (a) more than one 
entry/exit point; (b) port facilities near public access roads; or (c) containers in large open 
access yards.  Open structure ports are coded between 1 and 3.  If a port displayed all 
three features it was coded as 3; ports with two of the three features are coded as 2; and 
those with one feature are coded as 1. 
- Ports without these features are coded as closed structure ports and are coded 0. 
                                                            
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014); AAPA 2006. 
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Data quality/limitations 
Google Earth has previously been used as a tool and data source for criminological 
research (Duwe, Donnay, Tewksbury 2008; Irvin-Erickson 2014) as an accessible cross-
comparative data source.  While researchers (Cayo and Talbot 2003; Zandbergen 2008) have 
identified that using Google Earth for geocoding presents significant data limitations, for the 
purposes of identifying access roads, entry/exit points, and open container yards, Google Earth 
data triangulated with available port maps provided a reliable data source.   
5.2C Spatial Concentration of CRAVED products (0-3) 
Among its containerized cargo, a port may have a high concentration of CRAVED 
products.  Not all seaports will have high concentrations if they are primary entry points for bulk 
cargo such as paper, timber, and petroleum.  To code for CRAVED products spatial 
concentration at the port, this analysis uses the proxy measure of whether the port had a 
centralized examination station (CES) where CBP examines cargo for illicit inclusions or 
fraudulent declarations.  According to the Code of Federal Regulations (19 CFR 118.2), the CBP 
Port Director determines whether there is a need for a CES at the port, and this will depend on a 
multitude of measures including whether high value cargo transits the port and there is a need for 
specialized inspection facilities (CBP January 2012).  Since more expensive commodities, often 
with higher duty rates (Mason 2013), are more likely to be incorrectly declared, purposefully or 
accidentally (Hintsa et al. 2011), the presence of a CES (where those goods will be inspected) at 
the port, or within a short distance from the port (five miles or less) is used as a proxy measure of 
whether CRAVED products are spatially concentrated at the port because CRAVED products are 
likely to be concentrated in the same location, increasing vulnerability to criminal networks.  
Where available, private warehouse data was used to identify high value storage at a port; this 
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was as an additional data source to confirm the presence of CRAVED products.  This 
vulnerability is coded either a 0 or 3 with no intermediary score. 
- A seaport with CRAVED products was coded as 3 if:  (a) it contained CES locations; or 
(b) if it contained facilities that house high value items within seaport boundaries. 
- A seaport was coded as 0 if it did not have either a CES or other identifiable locations 
with high value cargo. 
Data quality/limitations 
The greatest data limitation was identifying the presence of a CES.  Because there are no 
standardized listings of these stations, internet searches were used to identify (1) whether the port 
had a CES and (2) where the CES was located.  The CES location was then identified on Google 
Earth to determine the proximity to the port. 
5.2D Imports of CRAVED products (0-3) 
In addition to the spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo at a port, this vulnerability 
measures the presence and amount of CRAVED product imports.  To identify the level of 
imports of CRAVED products, I use a trade data aggregator WorldCity Trade Numbers 
(www.ustradenumbers.com), which aggregates U.S. CBP import/export data by commodity for 
each port area in the U.S. by both tonnage and value of the commodities.  I use the tonnage 
aggregator to measure the quantity of CRAVED cargo imported into the port, in the latest 
available period of data June 2015 to May 2016.  This enables this analysis to examine the top 
ten import commodities by tonnage in each of the 30 ports in the sample.17  Commodity 
categories are aggregated using titles from The Statistical Classification of Domestic and 
                                                            
17 The only port that utilizes non-U.S. CBP commodity data is Apra, Guam, which is provided through the Guam 
Bureau of Statistics and Plans (2014b).  Port of Boston data is aggregated by value as tonnage data is not available. 
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Foreign Commodities, or Schedule B, which lists 9,000 export codes used to identify 
commodities (U.S. Census Bureau 2016).  To determine whether the top ten commodities are 
CRAVED cargo, I used the 2014 FreightWatch International Global Cargo Theft Report 
(FreightWatch International 2014) to identify the top stolen commodities, see Figure 2 (Jaillet 
2015).   I aggregated the entire set of import commodities into a unified list and then cross-
referenced with the top ten stolen commodities to identify which import commodity is a 
CRAVED product.18  Vulnerability is then coded based on the number of import CRAVED 
commodities. 
 
Figure 2: U.S. cargo theft by type of product (2014): Source (Jaillet 2015)  
                                                            
18 Appendix K lists all of the commodities identified under this analysis and whether they met the CRAVED criteria. 
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This vulnerability is coded between 0 and 3. 
- A port where more than five of the top ten commodities are CRAVED is coded 3. 
- A port where three to five of the top ten commodities are CRAVED is coded 2. 
- A port where one to two of the top ten commodities are CRAVED is coded 1. 
- A port with no CRAVED imports in the top ten commodities is coded 0. 
Data quality/limitations 
U.S. Census Bureau aggregation of U.S. CBP data is used by companies around the 
United States and throughout the world as a reliable source of financial data to identify 
import/exports by commodity (Tomer and Kane 2015).  The WorldTrade aggregator is a 
respected site that provides financial and commodity data to clients.  The primary limitation with 
using census data is that it aggregates the category of the commodity.  For example, the Schedule 
B commodity title “Computers” does not provide further detail as to the type of computers, size, 
or other physical characteristics that would enable greater dis-aggregation under CRAVED 
criteria. 
5.2E Peripheral companies (1-3) 
Peripheral companies are entities that provide services that require them to be present at 
the port on a semi-regular basis, freight forwarders being the most common peripheral company 
at ports.  The size of the freight forwarder sector is the proxy measure to identify the level of 
peripheral companies operating at the port.  The number of freight forwarders at the port relative 
to the monthly container throughput provides a measure of the proportion of the freight 
forwarder presence at the port.  I used a widely used freight forwarder directory to compile the 
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list of freight forwarders capable of operating at the port.19  The cut off measure for freight 
forwarder area of operations is 75 miles from the port, which is the outer length of what is 
considered a drayage truck distance (Bensman and Bromberg 2009).  Based on the fact that in 
certain parts of the U.S. ports are located within 75 miles of each other, overlaps of freight 
forwarders operating at multiple ports were often identified.  However, under the determination 
of this vulnerability, a freight forwarder could be identified as operating at more than one port 
and was considered an individual forwarder for each port, and at ports which are contiguous, 
there are very closely similar, if not identical, determinations of vulnerability in this category.  
These ports include the port pairs of Ft. Lauderdale and Miami, Long Beach and Los Angeles, 
and Seattle and Tacoma – all clustered within 40 miles of each other.  Similarly, at island ports 
such as such as Honolulu, Kahului, Apra, or San Juan, freight forwarders would likely work 
throughout the whole island, not those just near the port; as such, island-wide listings are used. 
To determine the level of peripheral company presence at a seaport, the following formula 
was used:  [Service providers in a sector/Average Monthly Container throughput in last full year 
of data] X 10^4 (weight). 
- Ports that scored over 21 were coded as 3 for a high proportion of freight forwarders to 
the amount of monthly container cargo. 
- Ports that scored 11 to 20 were coded as 2 for a medium proportion of freight forwarders 
to the amount of monthly container cargo. 
- Ports that scored 0 to 10 were coded as 1 for a low proportion of freight forwarders to the 
amount of monthly container cargo. 
                                                            
19 www.forwarders.com. 
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Data quality/limitations 
The measurement for this vulnerability relies almost exclusively on one data source, 
www.forwarders.com.  While this is the largest resource online for identifying freight 
forwarders, it is self-selected since freight forwarders have to request to be listed on the site.  In 
areas with many small entities, such as Miami, NY/NJ, Houston, and LA/Long Beach regions, 
the website likely undercounts the number of forwarders providing services to that port because 
small providers may be more likely to operate for local diaspora communities and for specific 
local clients without a need or desire for widespread advertising. 
5.2F Vehicle traffic (1-3) 
To identify the number of trucks using a port daily, data was obtained primarily through a 
variety of public sources, such as media accounts, industry publications, and environmental 
impact studies.  Truck traffic at seaports is a significant concern for city and state environmental 
agencies mainly because many ports are often legacy structures located within built-up urban 
areas, and environmental concerns of the impact of ports on local communities have led to 
environmental impact studies which identify truck traffic.  For example, a number of West Coast 
ports, including Seattle, Tacoma, Oakland, Los Angeles, and Long Beach instituted “green” port 
trucking requirements due to the environmental and health impacts of diesel fumes (Ross and 
Associates Environmental Consulting 2007; Board of Port Commissioners City of Oakland 
2009; Port of Seattle 2014; Unified Port of San Diego). 
The absolute number of daily truck visits to a port alone does not provide a reasonable 
measure of the volume of truck traffic since it does not take into account the amount of cargo 
passing through the port on a daily basis.  As a result, the scoring for this measure is based on a 
ratio of daily container traffic to daily average truck visits.  This method paints a fuller picture of 
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a port’s vehicle traffic.  For instance, some ports may have significant throughput without a 
significant level of truck traffic due to heightened intermodal transfers through rail or barge 
traffic.  In contrast, other ports have significant truck traffic without a significant number of 
container throughput because the port lacks intermodal transfer options and a high level of bulk 
transfers must be transported by truck.  To determine the level of vehicular traffic at a seaport, 
this formula is used:  [Average daily truck traffic/Average Daily Container throughput in last full 
year of data] X 100 (weight). 
- Ports that scored over 51 are coded as 3 for a high proportion of daily truck traffic to the 
daily amount of container cargo. 
- Ports that scored over 21 to 50 are coded as 2 for a medium proportion of daily truck 
traffic to the daily amount of container cargo. 
- Ports that scored 0 to 20 are coded as 1 for a low proportion of proportion of daily truck 
traffic to the daily amount of container cargo. 
Data quality/limitations 
There is no single data source that identifies daily truck traffic to a port.  Each individual 
port analysis required specific internet searches to identify the daily number of truck visits to the 
port.  In some cases, media articles identified the number of truck visits per day through 
interviews with port officials often in relation to security (Swedberg 2007) or environmental 
impact surveys (Environmental Defense Fund 2009).  The major limitation was that truck traffic 
was not always available for the same year as the container traffic, which used 2013 data, and 
therefore vulnerability coding in this category has to be examined per port to identify how off set 
the actual vulnerability is by the year of traffic.  For example, in a port with an estimate of truck 
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traffic in 2011 coded against 2013 container traffic, the actual vulnerability may fluctuate higher 
or lower depending on whether truck traffic increased or decreased in 2013. 
5.2G Intermodal connections (1-3) 
The more intermodal port connections a port has, the greater the transport opportunities 
not only for legitimate entities but also for illicit entities (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 
2014).  Intermodal connections are identified by the presence of an international airport, large 
number of railway transfers and multiple rail lines, and a heavy level of vehicle traffic as 
determined the vehicle traffic category.  The primary sources consulted were internal port 
documents and listings of railways, media accounts of railway transfers at the port, and economic 
studies.  In addition, standard internet searches were used to determine the presence of an 
international airport in the port district. 
Ports were coded based on the variety and extent of intermodal transfers. 
- Ports are coded as 3 if:  they have more than one rail connection to the port hinterland 
and surrounding regions; they have a large number of railway TEU transfers, determined 
by yearly TEU throughput / yearly TEU railway lifts, and where the percentage of 
railway lifts is over 10% of all loaded import/export TEUs; or they have at least one 
international airport within the port district or a large presence of short haul trucking 
operators. 
- Ports with two of the three coding criteria are coded as 2. 
- Ports with one of the three coding criteria are coded as 1. 
Data quality/limitations 
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 The primary data limitation encountered in determining vulnerability in this category 
relates to railway transfers.  Some ports have highly detailed monthly and annual statistics 
regarding container throughout which includes railway traffic statistics (Port of New York and 
New Jersey), while other ports do not post monthly container statistics (Port of Mobile, 
Alabama).  To identify the level of rail traffic at ports alternate sources of data were required 
such as railway traffic surveys, regional transportation plans (Cambridge Systematics 2016), and 
other documents. 
5.2H Physical/Administrative security procedures (1-3) 
This vulnerability measures whether key physical or administrative security procedures 
are employed at the port and is coded through the presence of situational crime prevention (SCP) 
techniques which have specific relevance to seaport security (Clarke 1997).  The 11 SCP 
techniques include, with orange highlighted techniques now standard practice at U.S. ports either 
through U.S. CBP recommendations for container seals (U.S. CBP B) or federal regulations 
through the 2002 MTSA and SAFE Port Act. 
Table 3: Physical/Administrative Technique Relevant to Port Security 
SCP Technique  Port specific application 
Target Hardening Containers are locked with tamper proof seals;  
Tamper detection for containers 
Access control Access is restricted to only entrants holding port specific documentation 
Screen exits Vehicles are searched upon exit from the port facility  
Extend 
guardianship 
Employees are encouraged to report signs of criminal activity in their 
employer or in their workplace 
Natural 
surveillance 
Adequate lighting is available for all sections of the seaport  
Reduce 
anonymity 
Seaport employees carry clearly visible identification 
Use of place 
managers 
Maritime security training is prominently highlighted by the port 
authority and companies operating at the port 
Formal 
surveillance 
Port facilities are fully covered by working CCTV cameras 
Conceal targets Knowledge of container manifests is restricted to select employees 
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Remove targets High value cargo is kept in enclosed secure facilities with high security 
than for open access cargo 
Identify property Cargo is identified by unique seal identification numbers 
 
To identify the baseline security techniques in 17 of the 30 ports for the comparative port 
sample, I relied on a previous port security study by Pate et al. (2008), which identified baseline 
security through site visits.  In addition, primary source data from the Port Security Grant 
Program project descriptions was used to triangulate data to determine whether a particular SCP 
technique was present.  Several SCP techniques are now standard practice at U.S. ports due to 
the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA) and the Security 
and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act).  These techniques are 
highlighted in Table 3 and confirmed through site visits to four seaports:  Port of Miami, Port of 
San Diego, Port of Long Beach, and Port of New York and New Jersey. 
- Ports are coded as 3 where 7 or more of these SCP techniques were not applied. 
- Ports are coded as 2 where between 4 and 6 techniques were not applied. 
- Ports are coded as 1 where 3 or fewer techniques were not applied. 
Data quality/limitations 
While six of the eleven SCP techniques are standardized practice at U.S. seaports, the 
remaining techniques remain at the discretion of security agencies at ports.  Remaining 
techniques were determined by public sources.  In some cases it is likely that specific techniques 
would not be identified or highlighted in port documentation, either through PSGP grant funding 
announcement or in port documentation highlighting security procedures.  For example, it was 
difficult to determine whether port employees are encouraged to report signs of suspicious 
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behavior.  Some ports, such as PNYNJ, specifically highlight that in public documentation, while 
others do not. 
5.2I Throughput (1-3) 
Container throughput at the top 30 ports was assessed using the American Association of 
Port Authorities (AAPA) annual survey of seaports in North America and Mexico.  The survey 
information was collected via the 2013 NAFTA Regional Container Traffic Survey and 
comprises the latest and most complete data set for container throughput for all available 
seaports.  Ports with a higher level of container throughput are coded for a higher level of 
vulnerability. 
- Ports with over two million TEUs annually are coded as 3. 
- Ports with one to two million TEUs annually are coded as 2. 
- Ports with less than one million TEUs annually are coded as 1. 
Data quality/limitations 
The AAPA, the primary port industry group, develops the NAFTA Regional Container 
Traffic Survey as the primary comparative data source for cargo traffic across North American 
and Mexican seaports.  This provides a strong level of reliability for comparative port analysis.  
While there may be questions raised as to the incentive for ports to report higher levels of 
container traffic, these levels are often provided to federal and state agencies for regulatory 
reasons and there is no reason to expect that ports will provide falsified figures to the AAPA. 
5.2J Container Vessel traffic (0-3) 
The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) compiles vessel call data at U.S. maritime 
ports of entry to produce a report detailing the number of vessel calls for privately-owned ocean-
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going merchant vessels of all flags of registries for over 1,000 gross registered tons calling at 
ports and selected ports/terminals within the contiguous U.S., Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and Puerto 
Rico.  In 2013, container vessels comprised, on average, 33% of all vessels calling at ports in this 
comparative sample ports.  The 2013 average (Maritime Administration 2013) was used as the 
baseline to determine whether a port had advanced experience handling containerized 
import/export traffic.  Ports with low levels of container vessel calls would be scored for higher 
vulnerability, using the average vessel calls in 2013 as a baseline.  
- Ports are coded as 3 where less than 20% of vessels were container ships. 
- Ports are coded as 2 where between 20-32% of vessels were container ships. 
- Ports are coded as 1 where between 33-50% of vessels were container ships. 
- Ports are coded as 0 where over 50% of all vessels were container ships. 
Data quality/limitations 
MARAD data (2013) provides a strong level of reliability for comparative port analysis, 
as this is the primary and only comparative data source for vessel calls across U.S. seaports. 
5.2K Interagency Cooperation (0-3) 
At Coast Guard district sectors (See text box on page 36), the MTSA mandated the 
institution of Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), which were developed to resolve 
issues identified in the Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports (2000).  AMSCs are 
chaired by the U.S. Coast Guard and include all port security stakeholders with a port security 
interest or mandate in the port region, which may be more expansive than the port district.  Each 
of the 36 Coast Guard sectors has a stand-alone AMSC and the composition of the group varies 
across each sector.  At U.S ports the presence of an AMSC provides for a minimum level of 
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interagency cooperation and communication, in addition to coordinating annual security 
exercises and trainings. Participation in an AMSC provides four components of cooperation (1) a 
mechanism for joint training among agencies; (2) consistent information exchanges; (3) an 
appropriate venue to share information; and (4) an oversight mechanism to limit territoriality.  
Data sources to identify AMSC composition vary but normally include local port region Coast 
Guard documentation or public press releases and in some cases public media articles noting the 
port’s participation in the AMSC. 
- Ports with one or zero components are coded as a 3. 
- Ports with two components are coded as a 2. 
- Ports with three components are coded as a 1. 
- Ports with all components are coded as a 0. 
Data quality/limitations 
Despite the federal mandate, the composition of AMSCs is at the discretion of maritime 
and port stakeholders in the region.  In some port regions, the Coast Guard has to release regular 
circulars in the Federal Register soliciting applicants to participate in AMSCs (Federal Register 
A; Federal Register B).  In certain port districts, the local Coast Guard sector did not publish or 
cite the composition of the AMSC, and publicly available documentation did not provide 
evidence that the port was a member. As a result, it was not always possible to identify whether 
the port participated in the AMSC. 
5.2L Illicit import/export market (0-6) 
Three standardized data sources were used to determine whether an illicit import/export 
market existed in the port district.  First, U.S. Department of Justice High Intensity Drug 
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Trafficking Area (HIDTA) data was used to identify whether the port is located in a county with 
a high level of drug trafficking and to identify which transport methods of trafficking are most 
prevalent in the port district area.20  Second, to determine the level of cargo thefts in the port 
district, FreightWatch International’s Route Analysis Tool was used to map cargo theft incidents 
within a 75 mile radius of each port.  A high level of cargo thefts in the port district is a 
supporting factor to identify whether the port region is located in an area with organized criminal 
network operations, as many types of cargo thefts are conducted by organized theft rings 
(FreightWatch International 2013; 2014; 2016).  Finally, to determine the rate of suspect auto 
theft transfers, datea from the 2003-2008 National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) database of 
suspect unique VINs and the 2003-2008 National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) on 
identified stolen vehicles yielded a data set from which to identify above-average levels of such 
vehicle transfers. 
Ports in close proximity to a large import/export market for illicit goods will be coded on 
the following criteria, and the sum of scores for the three composing variables comprise the total 
code for this vulnerability: 
1) If the port district is in an HIDTA county where maritime transportation is a known method 
for drug trafficking, the port will be scored as 2.  If the port is in an HIDTA county where 
maritime transportation is not a known transportation method for drug trafficking, the port will 
be scored as 1; 
2) If the port or port hinterland experienced more than 10 cargo theft incidents within the past 
two years, as reported by FreightWatch International, it is scored 2; 
3) If the port has an above-average rate of NICB and NCIC hits (1 point each). 
                                                            
20 See Appendix F for a map of HIDTA counties designated in 2015. 
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Data quality/limitations 
HIDTA surveys provide the best method of identifying narcotics trafficking areas.  
However, while ports may be located in an HIDTA identified county, the vector of narcotics 
trafficking into that region may primarily be through road or air.  To alleviate this limitation, 
HIDTA analyses which cite maritime trafficking as a known method in the area support a higher 
code in this segment of the category. 
A common problem with using self-reported maritime statistics is that data is likely 
skewed conservatively as companies and individuals do not want to highlight thefts or incidents 
in their commercial environments (Europol 2009; Lombardo 2014).  FreightWatch theft data is 
self-reported and likely under counts actual numbers of thefts in specific areas.  As a result while 
thefts are likely under reported, this cross comparative data source provides a reasonable 
measure to identify the level of cargo theft in port regions, if the assumption that it is 
underreported in the sector applies to all geographical representatives in the sector.  In 
consideration of alternate data sources, such as Uniform Crime Report, cargo theft statistics do 
not allow for a method to determine whether thefts took place in the port region of the state.  
Moreover, since agency participation in the Uniform Crime Report is voluntary, there are 
significant gaps in participation which occlude comparative analysis in port regions (FBI 2014 
B). 
The NICB and NCIC database entries for vehicle transfers at U.S. ports have their own 
set of limitations.  It is likely that a proportion of the vehicles identified through NICB data do 
not include all stolen vehicles.  Furthermore, this data could contain false positives where cars 
were not yet registered under new VINs or were broken down in “chop shops” for resale 
overseas, but which were not stolen.  NCIC data is of a greater level of reliability and as a result 
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the number of vehicles identified is significantly smaller.  Furthermore, the available data was 
from the period of 2003 to 2008 and vehicle transfers and movement trends will likely have 
fluctuated since that time period. 
Note on next three vulnerabilities 
The following three vulnerabilities rely on the use of public data sources, such as media 
accounts, to identify cases of organizational and employee corruption and historical presence of 
organized crime or criminal network involvement in the port economic sectors.  Organizational 
and employee corruption data was supplemented with data from CBP and ICE media release 
notes.  Both data sources provide a rich library of media releases detailing illicit activity 
throughout the U.S. including data on arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and sentences for 
individuals processed through the federal justice system (with primary jurisdiction over 
trafficking cases) for illicit trafficking. 
CBP data primarily identifies incidents of seizures.  However, in some cases, CBP also 
identifies which organizations were involved in the incident and whether internal conspiracies 
were suspected or confirmed in the seizure incident.  ICE news releases focused on arrests, 
investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing data for networks involved in smuggling, and, as 
such, the ICE news releases provided a wider source of data.  To measure the extent of official 
corruption, I used a secondary database of CBP officers who have been indicted or arrested for 
corrupt activity. 
5.2M Historical presence of criminal networks (0-6) 
To determine whether a port had a history of organized crime in any of the labor or 
economic sectors, data was gathered from open source searches of media on illicit or organized 
activity in the port sector.  The primary database used was Lexis-Nexis, and the searches were 
  
78 
 
structured to cast a wide net to identify instances of organized crime presence.  The primary 
search terms were “name of the port” AND “organized crime,” or “criminal network,” 
“corruption,” “internal conspiracy.” 
This vulnerability was coded based on the duration of criminal network(s)’ financial 
interests in some aspect of seaport administration, maintenance, or maritime function. 
- Seaports with sectors with over 20 years of criminal influence are coded as 6. 
- Seaports with sectors with between 5 and 20 years of criminal influence are coded as 4. 
- Seaports with sectors with fewer than 5 years of criminal influence are coded as 2. 
- If there is no evidence in the public record of criminal network influence in some aspect 
of seaport administration, maintenance, or maritime function, the seaports are coded as 0. 
5.2N Organizational corruption (0-9) 
In addition to Lexis Nexis media searches, CBP and ICE media releases enabled 
identification of indictments and pending cases of port employees involved in illicit activity at 
ports.  CBP media releases are publicly available from 2010 through the present and can be 
searched through a key word search term.21  Media releases covering incidents of seizures were 
used to identify the types of organizations involved in the smuggling incident and whether there 
was involvement by freight forwarding companies, terminal employees, or management.  ICE 
media releases were searchable through 2008 and yielded a wider data set from which to identify 
ports with employee or organizational corruption, but also included data on immigration and an 
array of other criminal activity under ICE’s jurisdiction.22  ICE media releases could be searched 
with a keyword but could also be grouped based on the topic of the release and the country or 
                                                            
21 http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-releases/all. 
22 https://www.ice.gov/news/all. 
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countries mentioned in the release.  In addition, to press release data, to identify official 
corruption in CBP, I used a database developed by the Center for Investigative Reporting that 
collated cases of CBP officers who were reprimanded, arrested, and/or sentenced for violations.23  
In some instances, CBP officers were identified in port districts that had land and air ports of 
entry.  Because CBP officers are rotated across different postings within a district (GAO 2013b), 
if the officers identified were within the port district and had operated at a land or air crossing, 
the port would be coded for vulnerability. 
While organizational and employee corruption were measured, organizational corruption 
focused on any type of corrupt activity and not necessarily those that led solely to illicit maritime 
transportation.  Corrupt incidents could include taking bribes for construction payouts, and price 
fixing in local maritime services, among others.  Seaports marked by organizational corruption 
experienced multiple incidents of corruption involving either public or private employees within 
single entities.  Corruption involving public employees was coded higher due to the privileged 
access conferred. 
- A port with a high level of organizational corruption has three different entities with more 
than two publicly documented instances of corrupt public or private employees in the 
past five years and is coded as 9; 
- A port with a medium level of organizational corruption has two different entities with 
more than two publicly documented instances of corrupt public or private employees, or 
one entity with more than two documented instances of public employee corruption in the 
past five years and is coded as 6; 
                                                            
23 http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/. 
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- A port with a low level of corruption has no documented instances of public employee 
corruption and one entity with more than two instances of private employee corruption in 
the past five years and is coded as 3. 
- A port without any incidents of private or public corruption is coded as 0. 
5.2O Employee corruption (0-9) 
Employee corruption focuses on corrupt activity that led to a maritime transfer or 
facilitated a maritime transfer, and this vulnerability was identified and coded to operationalize 
the commonly used term “internal conspiracy.”  An employee working in a public or private 
seaport sector is corrupt if he/she exploits his/her position to:  (1) take an offered or solicited 
bribe to improperly  influence an action or decision on behalf of a criminal network; (b) engage 
in theft of employers’ resources; (3) engage in fraud, involving the use of false or misleading 
information to induce the owner of property to part with it voluntarily; (4) embezzle property 
that has been entrusted to them; (5) extort goods or services on behalf of a criminal network; or 
(6) hire or fire individuals on behalf of a criminal network.  This definition is based on the 
United Nations (2004) definition of corruption. 
A port with documented incidents of employee corruption that lead to illicit maritime 
transfers is coded as 9. 
- A port with documented incidents of employee corruption which do not lead to illicit 
maritime transfer or a port with suspected or alleged employee corruption leading to 
illicit transfers is coded as 6. 
- A port with suspected incidents of corruption which do not lead to illicit transfers is 
coded as 3. 
- A port with no evidence of employee corruption is coded as 0. 
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Data quality/limitations 
As the highest rated vulnerabilities, evidence of organizational or employee corruption 
are also the most difficult to measure comparatively.  Because ports in the U.S. are subject to 
many different security agencies and in any given port, the only similar agencies will be CBP, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other federal agencies, it is difficult to 
identify a comparative data source for evidence of corruption at ports.  Public media accounts 
and federal and local agency press releases provide the primary data sources for all three 
vulnerabilities but have a set of limitations: 
1) CBP and ICE press releases provide a data source, which is comparative and chronological 
but incidents of corruption at specific companies operating at specific ports are not easy to 
extrapolate within the press release information which often provides minimal detail. 
2) One of the key issues with secondary data is the need to identify the original purpose of the 
source material and the source itself (Earl et al. 2004).  Organizations put out press releases 
to show their particular strengths in their area of operations.  Both CBP and ICE follow this 
pattern, in addition to Waterfront Commission press releases of longshore worker corruption 
at the Port of New York and New Jersey, a key source of data in the case study analysis.  As 
a result, incidents identified by CBP, ICE, and the Waterfront Commission will reflect 
opaque decision making processes, which likely aim to reflect the organization in a positive 
light.  Cases involving corruption where the agency misidentified individuals or mishandled 
the case would not likely be sent out for public consumption, though this would be valuable 
data to understand the efficacy of these organizations. 
3) To further identify information, public media accounts are used to identify the number of 
individuals involved, timeline of the incidents, and other key details.  Relying on media 
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sources means that in certain news markets, stories on the port or port operations may not be 
deemed valuable enough to the reading public and therefore creating a void of public 
information on that port (McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000; Bevan et al. 2013).  
This may be the reason why relatively few ports received scores for employee or 
organizational corruption as this would be the primary method to identify cases of 
corruption. 
4) For those articles that do discuss corruption at ports or the influence of organized crime at 
ports, they will likely be biased by what has been published before and may be less attune to 
new forms of criminal activity at the port.  Even organizations, which themselves are 
supposed to identify new forms of crime, may focus on older groups where they have 
greater resources such as informants and a better historical understanding24. 
5) The Center for Investigative Reporting database is built from publicly available data sources 
including law enforcement press releases.  As such, the attendant issues discussed above 
apply to the use of this source. 
5.3 Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) specific vulnerabilities 
The comparative seaport analysis examines 15 of 21 vulnerabilities while the PNYNJ 
case study employs the entire SVF due to greater access to data.  Operationalized definitions for 
the remaining six vulnerabilities enable the case study method to examine the entire SVF at the 
PNYNJ.  These additional operationalized definitions are below along with discussion regarding 
data quality and limitations. 
                                                            
24 This was my experience at the Waterfront Commission, where operations focused on traditional organized crime 
groups at the expense of new diaspora groups.   Greater resources and a better law enforcement understanding of more 
established organized crime groups drove some of that focus, in addition to the actual operations of newer groups 
which have not made inroads into physical control of companies that operate within the Waterfront Commission 
jurisdiction. 
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5.3A Small vessels in/near the seaport harbor (0-3) 
Some port regions are co-located with a large presence of recreational or fishing vessels.  
While the U.S fishing fleet rarely shares space with commercial ports,25 small vessels do make 
up part of the environment of the harbor and port.  The larger the number of small vessels 
present in the harbor the more complex it is for officials to identify legitimate vessels and their 
intentions (U.S. DHS 2008).  In addition, certain ports in the U.S. are in close proximity to areas 
of small vessel smuggling, primarily in Southern California and South Florida.  To identify cases 
of small vessel smuggling and proximity to port operations, a database of CBP press releases and 
nearest proximity ports was developed26 and is used to identify small vessel smuggling incidents 
and nearest proximity ports.  This provides a method to determine whether small vessels in the 
area are used for illicit trafficking, heightening the vulnerability of the port for criminal network 
use: 
- If the port is located within twenty miles of more than five incidents of small vessel 
smuggling in the past two years, it is coded 3. 
- If the port is located within twenty miles of less than five, but more than one, incidents of 
small vessel smuggling in the past two years it is coded 2. 
- If the port is located within twenty miles of one incident of small vessel smuggling in the 
past two year it is coded 1. 
- If the port is not located within 20 miles of smuggling incidents it is coded 0. 
Data quality/limitations 
                                                            
25 The Port of Seattle is the main exception and houses the Pacific Northwest fishing fleet at its own marine 
terminal. 
26 See Appendix B. 
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The same limitations apply as those discussed in the previous set of vulnerabilities when 
using press release data. 
5.3B Port divergence 
Port divergence is coded as a decreasing volume of trade, relative to ports in the region.  
Port divergence is measured using the AAPA NAFTA Regional Container Traffic Survey 
throughput statistics for North American seaports in 2013.  Divergence is measured by 
examining the percent change in seaport throughput over a twelve year period, relative to major 
comparable throughput ports in the region (e.g., divergence at the Port of New York and New 
Jersey is measured by comparing container throughput at the Port of Baltimore and Port of 
Philadelphia).  If the port has decreasing cargo traffic - measured as an overall reduction in 
container throughput by 2014 - while neighboring ports see an increase in cargo throughput, the 
port will be coded for this vulnerability. 
- If the annual percent change between the port and the average of the nearest two ports is 
greater than 10% (ex. Port X has an average yearly difference of -7% between 2000-
2014, while the port’s nearest neighbor ports have an average yearly difference of 5%, a 
difference between the two of 12%), the port is coded as 3. 
- If the annual percent change between the port and the average of the nearest two ports is 
between 5-10%, the port is coded as a 2. 
- If the annual percent change between the port and the average of the nearest two ports is 
between 0-5%, the port is coded as 1. 
- If the port has a greater increasing throughput relative to the two nearest ports, the port is 
coded as 0. 
Data quality/limitations 
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The AAPA, the primary port industry group, provides the NAFTA Regional Container 
Traffic Survey as the primary comparative data source for cargo traffic across North American 
and Mexican seaports.  This provides a strong level of reliability for comparative port analysis. 
5.3C Automation/Cyber security vulnerability 
A port’s level of cyber security vulnerability will increase with the greater use of 
automated terminal operations.  All ports have a baseline of automation with inherent cyber 
security vulnerability.  More dependence on automation (i.e., more port functions are automated 
than at the average port) generates greater terminal operations vulnerabilities to hacking and 
cyber penetration.  For example, where a port has one automated terminal for 35% of all 
container traffic at the port, the port would be coded as 4 for a medium level of cyber security 
vulnerability.  To identify port terminal automation, port documentation and information listed 
on terminal websites provide detail of the level of automation at the port. 
- A port with more than 50% automated port terminal operations is coded as 6. 
- A port with between 50% and 25% automated port terminal operations is coded as 4. 
- A port with less than 25% automated port terminal operations is coded as 2. 
Data quality/limitations 
The primary limitation is that all terminals will be automated to some degree, and it is not 
possible, with the current data, to accurately identify the level of automation above the baseline.  
For example, container cranes may be handled manually, but they are operated through 
computerized systems, even in a terminal where other activities are not automated.  This 
vulnerability relies on identifying data that can provide an approximation of how much container 
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traffic is handled by fully automated terminals, and thereby provide a rough estimate of the level 
of automation. 
5.3D Vulnerable sectors and sector size 
The Port of NY/NJ case study examines four primary vulnerable sectors:  longshore 
workers; drayage truck drivers; freight forwarders; and the ancillary services.  These sectors are 
examined through examination of all available data sources, including interviews with port 
officials, case file documents, public source documents, and press release documentation from 
the Waterfront Commission, ICE, and CBP.  Each sector has to be examined in the context of a 
specific port, which is why this vulnerability is only examined at the Port of NY/NJ where I had 
greater access to data.  As a result, this vulnerability does not have a score but nonetheless 
constitutes an important vulnerability which should be grouped with all high order vulnerabilities 
such as organization and employee corruption.  A port with vulnerable economic sectors will 
have economic sectors that:  
- are integral to maritime smuggling networks; 
- provide opportunities for criminal network access; and 
- have weak or nonexistent regulatory oversight. 
The sizes of the vulnerable economic sectors will impact port vulnerability differently. 
- Sectors consisting of many entities will have wide and shallow access to port operations. 
- Sectors consisting of few entities will have deep and narrow access to port operations, 
often developed through long-standing presence at the port. 
Data quality/limitations 
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The limitations of press releases have already been discussed, but this vulnerability also 
uses interview and primary sources such as agency documents to support the analysis.  Case file 
data on port specific trafficking was difficult to identify, though those files which I was able to 
obtain did provide a strong level of granularity for the participation of employees in specific 
labor sectors in trafficking operations.  In addition, through participant observation, I was able to 
sit in on testimony of longshore workers at Waterfront Commission administrative proceedings.  
This produced a skewed picture of the type of illicit activity occurring at the Port of NY/NJ since 
all of the administrative hearings were focused on labor exploitation issues and not trafficking.  
Fourth, I utilized public case file and testimonials from law enforcement officials to supplement 
information on the kind of activity occurring at the port.  As Natarajan et al. (2015) note, one of 
the primary difficulties of studying illicit trafficking organizations is that law enforcement is 
attracted to particular groups, and this skews what is available for researchers and, as a result, the 
perception of the most prevalent types of illicit activity. 
5.3E Export cargo vulnerability 
A port with a high percentage of export containers will be more vulnerable to illicit 
exports, such as stolen cargo, cash outflows, unlicensed defense tools/equipment, and other 
illegally exported goods.  Port of NY/NJ official monthly statistics are used to identify the levels 
of import/export traffic. 
- A port where exports constitute over 50% of all container cargo is coded as 3. 
- A port where exports constitute 25-50% of all container cargo is coded as 2. 
- A port where exports constitute less than 25% of all container cargo is coded as 1. 
Data quality/limitations 
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Some ports provide official container throughout statistics highlighting the levels of 
imports and exports.  The Port of NY/NJ publishes official trade statistics that provide up to date 
information on the levels of import/export traffic (Port Authority 2014D; 2015), both in raw 
volume of tonnage and in containers, the unit of measurement for this study.  As official 
statistics, these are reliable and provide the best measure of import/export traffic available. 
5.4 Case Study Method 
The second analysis in this dissertation examines in detail the PNY/NJ using a case study 
design (Yin 2009: 59).  Yin (2009: 18) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”  Furthermore, 
the case study inquiry “copes with technically distinctive situations in which there will be many 
more variables than data points, and as one result; relies on multiple sources of evidence, with 
data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result; benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”  A case study 
design offers the distinct advantage of supporting a set of defined theoretical propositions (the 
SVF outlined in Chapter 3). 
The methodological approach herein builds upon previous research in which a case study 
was used to examine seaport administration and economic sector vulnerability to criminal 
networks (Cirtwell, Crowly and Frost 2001; Hall 2004; UNESCAP 2005; Zauner 2008).27  The 
case study method allows for the examination of multiple units within the overall case, to focus 
on the primary research question and propositions (Easton 1998).  The unique multi-
                                                            
27 Diamond industry (Van der Beken et al. 2004); the European transport sector (Bucquoye et al., 2005; Klima 
2011); the European pharmaceutical sector (Calovi and Pomposo, 2007); the European waste management industry 
(Van Daele et al. , 2007); the trade in electronic waste (Bisschop 2012); and the timber trade in Europe (Bisschop 
2012b). 
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administrative and multi-jurisdictional complexity of most modern seaports means the case study 
method is well-suited for application to seaport analysis. 
5.4A Case selection 
 The case study examines the Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) as an example 
of a theoretically high vulnerability port (Patton 1990; Coyne 1997) making it an ideal test case 
to apply the vulnerability framework. 
5.5 Data Sources 
The six most commonly used sources of data for case studies are:  documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts 
(Yin 2009: 101).  Interviews, documentation, archival records, and direct observation constitute 
the primary sources of data for this case study. Agency documents contained information which I 
developed into data sets for application in the SVF.  In addition, primary source data from 
interviews, archival documents, and site visits was used to triangulate observations derived from 
the analysis of secondary data sources. 
Interviews 
For the interviews, I used a selective sampling strategy and focused on individuals with 
pre-identified knowledge of seaport functions (Patton 1990).  Due to the compartmentalization of 
port functions, no specific individual has knowledge of overall vulnerability at any given seaport. 
Rather, interviews revealed vulnerabilities in specific seaport sectors or procedures, such as 
import/export patterns and trends, knowledge of the organizational culture in companies or port 
authorities, and other port functions.  For the PNYNJ case study, 19 interviews were conducted 
with Waterfront Commission, Port Authority, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, and 
freight forwarders to supplement documentation and public sources. 
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Document Analysis 
Internal documents reveal organizational and agency standards, and illicit activity and 
unethical behavior can be determined by examining an organization or agency’s standard of 
operations and administrative penalties for unethical behavior.  For example, the Waterfront 
Commission requires compliance with numerous standards prohibiting association with 
organized crime and with ethical standards for licensed longshore workers at the PNYNJ.  These 
standards are examined and then overlaid with information from instances of criminal or 
unethical behavior to illuminate vulnerabilities at the port.  In addition, at the PNYNJ, publicly 
available case file data is also used to identify criminal network exploitation (Natarajan and 
Belanger 1995; Natarajan 2006; Shelley 2011; Natarajan et al. 2015). 
5.6 Conclusion 
To provide a dual process of understanding port vulnerability, the comparative analysis 
of the top 30 seaports scores each port on 15 of 21 SVF vulnerability categories and the PNYNJ 
is examined on each of the 21 SVF vulnerability categories.  Table 4 below details six types of 
information. 
- Vulnerability categories. 
- Primary data sources. 
- Whether the vulnerability is examined in the comparative port analysis and the PNYNJ 
case study, graded as red or green. 
- Consequentiality of the vulnerability to criminal network access, graded as low, medium, 
or high where: 
o low consequentiality means that the vulnerability alone cannot produce access to 
the port for a criminal network, 
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o medium consequentiality creates a moderate level of access or serves to attract 
networks to a specific port, 
o high consequentiality creates a high level of access; alone this may be sufficient 
for a network to access a seaport. 
- The conceptual level of policy or regulatory manipulability of the vulnerability, graded as 
low, medium or high policy manipulability where: 
o low means that authorities have few options to decrease the level of vulnerability, 
o medium means that authorities have options to decrease the level of vulnerability, 
but options may be cost prohibitive, not a priority in light of other security 
requirements, or may not be easily applicable across the and 
o high means that authorities have a wide range of inexpensive and proven 
interventions which can lead to decreased vulnerability. 
- The generalizability of the vulnerability to non- U.S. seaports using the conceptualized 
data sources and coding schema where: 
o low means that the vulnerability cannot be generalized without major revisions to 
the coding structure, 
o medium means that with minor modifications to the coding structure the 
vulnerability can be generalized to non U.S. seaports, and 
o high means that the current coding structure of the vulnerability can be applied to 
non U.S. seaports. 
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Table 4: Seaport Vulnerability Framework Summary   
Vulnerability category Data  Comparative  NY/NJ   Consequentiality Manipulability Generalizability 
Index Examined Low 
  Not Examined  Medium 
  High 
Port Security Funding   
Port Security Funding PSGP funding 
announcements compiled by 
the AAPA 
      
 Physical      
Open structure Google Maps; Port maps      
Spatial concentration of 
CRAVED products 
Public data on CES locations      
Peripheral seaport 
companies 
Forwarder.com listings      
Vehicle traffic Port traffic studies, 
environmental impact 
studies, media accounts 
     
Small vessels in/near 
port 
CBP press release small 
vessel interceptions, state or 
municipal data on 
recreational boating 
community 
     
Intermodal connections Port literature, container 
traffic studies 
     
Physical/Administrative 
security procedures 
MTSA 2002, SAFE Port Act 
2006, port literature, public 
media accounts, PSGP 
funding announcements 
     
Proximity to illicit 
import/export market 
NCIC/NICB vehicle export 
data, HIDTA listings, Freight 
Watch International Route 
Analysis Tool 
     
 Administrative      
Port divergence AAPA 2000-2013 NAFTA 
Container Traffic Survey 
     
Automation/cyber 
security vulnerability 
Port terminal listings, public 
data analysis 
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Interagency cooperation U.S. Coast Guard documents, 
port literature, media 
accounts of AMSC 
participation or security 
exercises 
     
Vulnerable labor 
sectors 
CBP Corrupt Office Database 
(Center for Investigative 
Reporting), individual media 
accounts, press releases (ICE, 
Waterfront Commission, 
CBP) 
     
Number of service 
providers in a sector  
Forwarders.com, FMC 
forwarder listings, port 
documents 
     
Historical criminal 
network presence 
Individual media accounts, 
press releases (ICE, 
Waterfront Commission, 
CBP), CBP Corrupt Office 
Database (Center for 
Investigative Reporting) 
     
Organizational 
corruption 
IBID      
Employee corruption IBID      
 Logistical      
Container throughput AAPA 2013 Container 
Traffic Survey 
     
Imports of CRAVED 
products 
FreightWatch International 
2014 Commodity Theft data; 
U.S. Census Import data 
     
Export cargo 
vulnerability 
IBID      
Vessel traffic U.S. Maritime 
Administration container 
vessel statistics 
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Chapter 6 - Vulnerability of the Top 30 U.S. Container Seaports 
6.1 Port results 
This chapter examines the vulnerability scores of the top 30 U.S. container seaports.  
Individual seaport analyses for the top nine most vulnerable ports are included in this section 
(with Chapter Seven focusing in depth on the Port of NY/NJ), and, for the remaining 20 seaports, 
in Appendix G.  Each individual port analysis details vulnerability in the three primary 
categories.  Ports are coded between 5 and 63.  The average code is 26.5, while the average of 
the top ten ports is 39.7.
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6.2 Vulnerability scores 
 
52
47 46
42 41
39
35
32 31 30
27 26.5 26
24 23.5 23 23 22 21 20 20 20
18 18 17 17 16 16
13
11
Top 30 U.S. Container Ports
Figure 3: Vulnerability Scores of Top 30 U.S. Container Ports 
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6.3 Vulnerability analysis 
The top ten ports in the comparative SVF analysis display several key characteristics, 
which manifest themselves most clearly along geographic lines but also along the examined 
vulnerabilities, see Figure 4.28   
 6.3A Location 
 
Figure 4: Top ten scoring ports. 
Of the top ten most vulnerable ports, six are on the East Coast, with the Ports of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach, Port of New Orleans, Apra (Guam), and San Juan (Puerto Rico) as the 
outliers representing the other U.S. maritime region on the West Coast, Gulf Coast, Caribbean, 
and Pacific regions.  The location of the most vulnerable ports is a function of the confluence of 
vulnerability but is heavily affected by the highest order vulnerabilities measuring corruption at 
ports and the historical presence of organized crime.  The geographic delineation of vulnerability 
                                                            
28 The data set for the top ten ports, with base data for the Port of NY/NJ can be found in Appendix E. 
5,986 miles 
from California 
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is clearly visible in Figure 9.  However, this is not purely a function of the geography and 
historical development of ports but also of the labor organizations at ports.  East Coast port 
vulnerability is, in part, a function of longshoreman participation in illicit trafficking (see 
Hampton Roads, Miami, Everglades, Baltimore, and NY/NJ) but also the historical involvement 
of organized crime groups in aspects of port operations, whether through ownership of 
companies (Miami and NY/NJ) or in aspects of labor control (NY/NJ). 
6.3B Port size 
The average code of the top ten ports for container throughput is 1.7, slightly above the 
average across the SVF sample (1.6).  However, six of the top ten vulnerable ports are coded as 
low-throughput ports with less than one million annual TEUs.  Only three ports are coded as 
high-throughput ports and include two of the largest ports in the country:  NY and LA/LB.  The 
phenomenon of smaller ports scoring high on vulnerability may be due to several factors: 
Smaller ports are less likely to have standalone police forces and more likely to rely on divisions 
of local law enforcement for security services.  While this alone does not increase vulnerability, 
port police divisions in law enforcement organizations may be under-resourced and attract older 
officers, in some cases retired from municipal or state agencies (Messing 2014).29  
For example, airport police divisions share similar characteristics to port police divisions.  
At Jacksonville International Airport, a debate over whether to contract airport police services to 
a local department or to keep the services in-house outlined several key concerns which are 
applicable for seaport agencies (McCormack 2011). 
                                                            
29 This is based on observations and informal discussion with officers at the Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor and PortMiami. 
  
98 
 
1. Expense:  It is more expensive to contract with local law enforcement to provide services than 
to keep an in house force. 
2. Continuity:  Continuity of personnel is a concern as officers trained on port specific issues 
can be rotated out due to department issues not related to port security. 
3. Training:  Training can be expensive and due to rotation officers may not be ready to conduct 
duties while training. 
Four of the top ten ports used a division of a 
local law enforcement agency as their primary port 
law enforcement force, including the Ports of Long 
Beach, Miami, Everglades, and San Juan.  Separate 
port law enforcement and port authority entities 
require greater coordination and without increased 
resources and built in interagency communication 
procedures; this may lead to increased vulnerability.  
For example, low-level incidents which may indicate 
larger issues may not be communicated across all port 
security stakeholder agencies if the security 
organizations are separate from port management. 
Smaller ports are also generally under-resourced, 
unless they are located in large metropolitan areas 
and have other maritime assets which necessitate 
security funding.  Of the top ten most vulnerable ports, only the Port of New Orleans received an 
above average level of PSGP funding, while all of the remaining most vulnerable ports received 
Table 5: PSGP Funding per 2013 container 
PSGP Funds 
 2013 
container 
Kahului $0.27  
Anchorage $7.73  
Savannah $12.02  
Wilmington DE $13  
LA/LB $19.54  
San Juan $20.45  
Norfolk $23.59  
Palm Beach $25.89  
Tacoma $26.52  
Port Everglades $28.11  
Gulfport $31.96  
Honolulu $33.45  
Charleston $34.86  
Oakland $43.49  
Jacksonville $44.79  
Miami $46.64  
Apra (Guam) $48.82  
Portland OR $49.15  
NY/NJ $52.87  
Hueneme $65.70  
Baltimore $69.53  
Mobile $75.44  
Seattle $80.60  
Wilmington NC $101.01  
Houston $115.08  
Boston $163.97  
Freeport TX $196.23  
Philadelphia $259.56  
San Diego $288.37  
New Orleans $300.28  
Container Traffic 
High  Medium Low 
  
99 
 
less than average PSGP funding, see Table 5.30  One of the smallest ports in the U.S. with a high 
level of federal funding for port security is the Port of San Diego.  There, every container 
receives the equivalent of $288 in port security investments due to the proximity to the United 
States’ border with Mexico, the presence of the naval fleet, and multi-use maritime facilities.  In 
contrast, the Port of Anchorage receives $7.73 per container, lacks multi-use facilities, and is not 
likely to be targeted by terrorist attacks on infrastructure – a key factor in port security 
allocations in the PSGP.  The fact that the ports rated least vulnerable under the SVF also 
received some of the highest levels of port security funding may be an indication that PSGP 
funds do contribute to decreased overall port vulnerability, however that would require a greater 
level of disaggregation at the individual agency and project level – data which is not readily 
available for analysis across this comparative sample. 
6.3C Non-mainland ports 
Of four ports in the comparative analysis which are not located in the contiguous U.S., 
two – San Juan and Apra – display heightened vulnerability.  Unlike the other two non-
contiguous ports, Honolulu and Kahului in Hawaii, San Juan and Apra are located along 
maritime transshipment routes in busy sea lanes with significant levels of illicit traffic (National 
Drug Intelligence Center 2011e; Bureau of Statistics and Planning 2014).  Cargo which is 
transshipped through Guam en route to the U.S. does not need to be inspected by U.S. CBP after 
it leaves Guam, but while in Guam, it is subject to Guam Customs and Quarantine Agency 
(GCQA) authority.  This increases jurisdictional vulnerability considering the smaller resources 
and size of the GCQA (CQA 2014).  The Port of San Juan, on the other hand, is subject to a 
significant U.S. CBP presence at the port itself and through offshore assets in concert with the 
                                                            
30 Figure  17 shows PSGP funding per 2013 container at the top thirty U.S. ports (Sources: AAPA 2006; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014). 
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U.S. Coast Guard, but Latin American criminal networks continue to target the Port of San Juan 
as an entry point into the continental United States (Gootenberg 2012; DEA 2015).  This is due 
to criminal network expectations that security will be less sophisticated than at other ports in the 
United States, that co-conspirators operating at the port will be easier to identify, and that once 
illicit cargo enters Puerto Rico onward movements are not subject to further U.S. CBP inspection 
(Ewing 2005; Campo-Flores 2013).  The vulnerability of these two ports highlights the need to 
examine ports located on the fringe of regulatory and security apparatuses, whether located in 
geographical location with a cultural or environmental draw to diaspora criminal networks (San 
Juan) or a combination of both territorial distance and jurisdictional separation (Apra).  The two 
island ports which do not display either of these conditions, Honolulu and Kahului, without 
either jurisdictional separation or a cultural or geographical draw for criminal networks, both 
score 16 and are among the least vulnerable ports in the sample, respectively fourth and third 
least vulnerable of the sample. 
6.3D CRAVED products- import and spatial concentration 
All but one of the top ten ports have a spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo.  The 
average code for the top ten is 2.88 (out of a maximum 3), while for the remaining twenty ports, 
the average is 1.  In fact, seven out of top ten ports are coded the maximum amount for this 
vulnerability.  While the limitations of data in this category make it difficult to identify exactly 
which type of cargo is present in high quantities at the port, the presence of a CES means that 
high value cargo is concentrated in or near the port, and therefore increases the attraction of the 
port to criminal networks.  However, ports that did not rate in the top ten for vulnerability, such 
as Anchorage, may still have significant vulnerability in this area since they are heavy 
destinations for CRAVED products such as seafood.  Not only do the top ten ports rate high for 
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the concentration of CRAVED products, they also have a high level of CRAVED imports.  The 
top ten ports have an average score of 2.4 while the remaining ports score on average 1.95.  No 
ports received a score of zero, reflecting consumption patterns in the United States. 
6.3E Illicit import/export market 
The top ten ports also scored high for their location in illicit import/export markets.  The 
average code of the top ten ports is 4.4 (out of a maximum 6), while the remaining sample 
average is 2.85.  Theoretically, the presence of an illicit market would drive the need for 
transportation of illicit materials into the port region, however the coding also accounts for ports 
that were used as transit points for stolen vehicles, one of the few types of quantifiable illicit 
cargo exported from the United States to other countries (Clarke and Brown 2003; Dauvergne 
2007; Morselli and Roy 2008; Clarke and Brown 2010).  While the type of illicit cargo imported 
into the United States differs significantly from that which is exported, the mechanisms for 
moving that cargo through a port are similar including, among others, relying on cargo volume to 
mask illicit shipments, identifying corrupt individuals in a port organization to facilitate transfer, 
and creating shell companies to mask illicit shipments.  Of all the top ten ports, one was not 
located in a High Intensity Drug Trafficking County (ONDCP 2015), Charleston, with Guam not 
included in HIDTA assessments. 
6.3F Employee corruption 
The top ten ports, particularly those along the East and Gulf Coasts, have experienced 
significant employee corruption that resulted in illicit maritime transfers.  These scores increased 
those ports’ levels of vulnerability, and only the top ten ports scored at the highest levels for 
employee corruption.  The average code for the top ten ports is 8.4 (out of a maximum 9). 
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The origins and vectors of corruption varied across these ports.  In some ports, such as 
LA/LB, a high score was the result of corruption by customs officials facilitating illicit transfers 
to avoid import taxes (DHS ICE 2012) and from the recent arrest and sentencing of the Port of 
Los Angeles Police Chief for corruption (FBI 2015; Hamilton 2016).  In other ports, activity by 
corrupt workers with privileged access to port facilities was the primary reason for increased 
vulnerability.  The port of Hampton Roads in Virginia exemplifies these dynamics.  There, 
longshore workers facilitated the movement of illicit narcotics through the port with the 
assistance of a drayage truck driver (McGlone 2007).  At other ports, U.S. Customs officers who 
participated in corrupt activity increased the vulnerability level (Port of Los Angeles- DHS ICE 
2012; Port of New Orleans- U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana).  As, federal 
investigations of such cases have improved, consequently, this has also increased the likelihood 
that federal employees will be apprehended for participating in illicit schemes than for private 
organization employees with privileged access (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2015).  In 
any case, there are still gaps in the number of investigators focused on corruption in the 
Department of Homeland Security and CBP specifically (del Bosque and Michaels 2015).  As a 
result, criminal networks are more likely to target port workers with privileged access, and these 
incidents constitute the primary reason that ports scored higher on employee corruption 
vulnerability. 
6.3G Official corruption 
As discussed above, only a small set of ports had heightened vulnerability due to corruption 
by officials in law enforcement agencies at the port or operating directly in the port authority itself 
to include the ports of NY/NJ, LA/LB, New Orleans, Apra, Jacksonville, Miami, and Everglades.  
Five of these ports had incidents of corruption by CBP officers working at the port or in the district, 
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while four (Apra, Jacksonville, NY/NJ, LA/LB) had evidence of corruption in the port authority 
or other law enforcement agencies operating at the port.   
Corruption in official organizations at ports is multi-faceted and represents the range of 
human behavior and motivations.  At the Port of Los Angeles, the port police chief was indicted 
and sentenced for corruption related to tax evasion and improper use of office.  At the Port of New 
Orleans, CBP officers transported and smuggled narcotics, and at least one used her office to claim 
benefits for housing, while at the Port of LA/LB, a CBP officer assisted in moving cargo to avoid 
customs duties.  However, in most identified cases, at seaports and port districts, officials did not 
actively assist criminal networks with illicit maritime trafficking, either for import or export.   
However, along the land border with Mexico, CBP officers have actively assisted networks with 
illicit trafficking (Center for Investigative Reporting; del Bosque and Michaels 2015). 
While diverse factors led to corruption, there are a number of factors at seaports that can 
be identified as precipitating factors, including: 
1. Opportunities for abuse:  The volume of cargo traffic at U.S. seaports is significant.  
Of the five ports identified with official customs corruption, two (NY/NJ and LA/LB) 
are the largest in the country with thousands of containers imported/exported daily, 
thousands of companies using the port for legitimate transfers, and complex operating 
environments.  For enterprising customs officers, financial opportunities are rife, and 
some officers are tempted to take advantage of their position (DHS ICE 2014). 
2. Lack of oversight:  Regulatory agencies such as CBP, either through lack of funding or 
a full understanding of their operations, lack significant oversight through internal 
inspection or auditing authorities.  For example, CBP was until recently overseen by 200 
investigators from the DHS Office of the Inspector General (which was responsible for 
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all 220,000 DHS employees, or one investigator for every 1,000 workers) (del Bosque 
and Michaels 2015).  At the PNYNJ, the Waterfront Commission had no oversight 
mechanism until the State of New York decided to conduct an inspection of the agency 
for corruption, an unprecedented oversight action on the Waterfront Commission (Fisch 
et al. 2009). 
3. Opaque environment:  Ports are complex operating environments that develop internal 
sub-cultures with security actors who have specialized knowledge over arcane 
regulations and day to day operations (Brewer 2014; Eski 2016).  This contributes to an 
opaque environment not readily accessible or intelligible to most outsiders and makes 
regulating the port environment a challenging prospect. 
6.3H Organizational corruption 
All but one of the top ten ports (New Orleans) received a score in this vulnerability.  
However, only the top three ports, the ports of New York, Baltimore, and Miami received the 
maximum score.  These scores resulted from multiple incidents of employee corruption in 
individual companies and within economic or labor sectors.  At the PNY/NJ, company owners 
have participated in illicit trade, and top level management at companies or labor organizations 
have used the organizations they work for to assist criminal networks in multiple separate 
incidents.  At the Port of Baltimore, warehouse company owners organized thefts of high-cost 
raw materials, such as high value metals, in multiple separate incidents, increasing the port 
vulnerability score (DHS ICE 5/23/2012).  While at the Port of Miami, longshore workers (DHS 
ICE 2010) and privately hired security guards assisted Latin American criminal networks (U.S. 
Attorney’s Office Southern District of Florida 2013), affecting the vulnerability determination. 
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The primary characteristic shared among these three ports is that they are in port regions 
with a long standing history criminal network involvement in the labor sector; all three score 
either high or medium in that vulnerability category.  Another characteristic is that there are large 
numbers of immigrant groups in all three areas which may constitute a contributing variable in 
whether a port has increased vulnerability for illicit import/export schemes.  In the New York 
and New Jersey metropolitan statistical area (MSA),31 28.5% of the population is foreign born.  
The Baltimore MSA is 9.4%, and the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale MSA is 38.7%, the most of any 
MSA in the United States (Migration Policy Institute).  However other port regions around the 
country also have large levels of immigration and do not display similar heightened 
vulnerability.  These include the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area where the foreign born 
population in 2013 was 17.1% of the total population, San Diego at 23.4%, and Houston at 
22.5% (Migration Policy Institute).  This disparity indicates that diaspora participation in the 
illicit import/export trade is tempered by other vulnerability characteristics, and the relationship 
requires further research to determine if there is an actual linkage. 
6.3I Historical criminal network presence  
 Of the top ten ports, six scored for a historical criminal network presence in port 
operations.  This was a difficult vulnerability to code for, but the ports that received a score for 
this included the PNYNJ (the port with longest historical record of criminal network 
involvement in port operations), Port of Miami, Port Everglades, and Port of San Juan.  The three 
East Coast ports of New York, Miami, and Port Everglades share a common history of criminal 
network involvement with narcotics traffic and with corrupt longshore workers.  Evidence of this 
                                                            
31 Metropolitan statistical areas are geographic entities delineated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
for use by federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal statistics.  A metro area 
contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population (U.S. Census). 
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history reaches back into the 1980s for the Port of Miami and Port Everglades (U.S. Customs 
Service 1997; Zimmerman 2006) and considerably further back for the PNYNJ, as detailed in the 
port specific vulnerability analyses.  However, it can be inferred that the length of a criminal 
network presence at a port contributes to the depth of the influence, such that the greater the 
history of criminal network involvement then the deeper the criminal network influence reaches 
into some aspect of port operations.  For example, at the PNYNJ, the port with the longest 
history of criminal network involvement, certain port sectors particularly in the area of labor 
operations have mid- or upper level management with significant ties to organized crime 
(WCNYH 2012b; Rooney 2013). 
Therefore, the identification of a long standing presence of criminal networks in port 
operations is an indication of the depth of that influence in port operations.  This is due to the 
fact that if networks look to develop commercial ties within a port and law enforcement is 
unsuccessful in dislodging those groups from commercial entities, then those ties will grow 
deeper over time, as has occurred at the PNYNJ. 
The converse of this is that in ports such as Miami where narcotics continue to be imported 
(DEA 2015), and criminal networks are heavily targeted by federal law enforcement agencies 
(Zimmerman 2006; Gootenberg 2012), new entities may constantly have to emerge to handle illicit 
traffic.  The extraordinary number of freight forwarders operating in South Florida, relative to the 
container traffic, may be indicative of the many smaller commercial entities involved in the cargo 
trade in the region, of which some proportion are involved in illicit import/export schemes (Weaver 
2014; DEA 2016).32  This supports a vulnerability model where time + enforcement pressure  
                                                            
32 South Florida has by far the largest number of freight forwarders for the level of cargo traffic across the entire 
sample of container ports.  There are almost the exact same number of forwarders listed for south Florida (697) as 
there are in southern California (694), where the amount of cargo is nearly seven times greater (forwarders.com). 
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breadth, where time itself is a function of the suitability of the port and the region for the 
importation of illicit goods.  In Miami, the Latin American diaspora community underlies some of 
the suitability of the region to the long standing presence of criminal network operations (Garzón 
2013). 
Therefore, historical criminal network presence at ports displays two diverging 
implications.  In one model, criminal groups will develop deeper ties with specific commercial 
entities; this is more evident at ports where the activities of those criminal groups are not heavily 
scrutinized by law enforcement.  In the other model where the activity of the group is considered 
by law enforcement to be highly damaging, enforcement pressures will lead to a diffusion of 
small entities into the illicit import/export system. 
6.4 Port analyses 
The top nine of the top ten most vulnerable ports (excluding the Port of NY/NJ, examined 
in the following chapter) are detailed below33.  Table 6 below outlines the vulnerability 
categories and scores across the four vulnerability categories for all thirty ports, while Table 7 
provides detailed scores in each category for the top ten ports, followed by detailed case studies 
for the top nine ports which delve into the specific vulnerability categories. 
                                                            
33 The Remaining 20 port analyses are in Appendix G. 
Table 6: Categorical vulnerability scores 
Port 
Port 
Funding Physical Administrative Logistical 
Overall 
Score 
2. NY/NJ 1 15 29 7 52 
16. Baltimore 0 15 26 6 47 
14. Miami 1 12 29 4 46 
1. LA/LB 2 14 20 6 42 
12. Port Everglades 1 13 23 4 41 
10. San Juan (PR)  2 8 24 5 39 
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5. Hampton Roads-
Norfolk 2 12 16 5 35 
8. Charleston 1 14 13 4 32 
17. New Orleans 0 14 12 5 31 
26. Apra (GUAM)  1 7 17 5 30 
13. Jacksonville 1 11 10 5 27 
3. Savannah 2 13.5 6 5 26.5 
21. Palm Beach (FL) 1 15 4 6 26 
6. Houston 0 9 7 8 24 
4. Oakland 1 14.5 2 6 23.5 
7. Tacoma 1 14 4 4 23 
29. San Diego 0 10 6 7 23 
24. Boston 0 11 5 6 22 
18. Philadelphia 0 11 3 7 21 
27. Freeport 0 9 6 5 20 
9. Seattle 0 12 4 4 20 
28. Hueneme 0 10 3 7 20 
25. Portland (OR) 1 12 0 5 18 
19. Wilmington (DE) 0 8 5 5 18 
23. Gulfport 0 10 1 6 17 
22. Mobile 0 10 1 6 17 
11. Honolulu 1 8 3 4 16 
30. Kahului  3 6 0 7 16 
20. Wilmington (NC) 0 10 0 3 13 
15. Anchorage  3 5 0 3 11 
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Table 7: Detailed Top 
Ten Port Scores Port Security 
Container 
Funding (3) Open structure (3) 
Concentration of 
CRAVED Products (3) 
Imports of 
CRAVED 
products (3) 
Peripheral 
companies (3) Port 
2. NY/NJ 1 3 3 3 2 
16. Baltimore 0 3 3 2 3 
14. Miami 1 0 3 3 3 
1. LA/LB 2 3 3 3 1 
12. Port Everglades 1 2 3 3 3 
10. San Juan (PR) * 2 3 * 2 1 
5. Hampton Roads-Norfolk 2 3 3 2 1 
8. Charleston 1 3 3 1 1 
17. New Orleans 0 3 3 2 1 
26. Apra (GUAM) * 1 0 2 3 2 
Port 
Vehicle traffic 
(3) 
Intermodal connections 
(3) 
Physical/Administrative 
security  (3) 
Throughput 
(3) 
Container Vessel 
Calls (3) 
 
 
2. NY/NJ 3 3 1 3 1   
16. Baltimore 3 3 0 1 0   
14. Miami 3 1 2 1 0   
1. LA/LB 3 3 1 3 0   
12. Port Everglades 3 1 1 1 0   
10. San Juan (PR) * 3 0 1 2 1   
5. Hampton Roads-Norfolk 3 3 1 3 0   
8. Charleston 3 3 1 2 0   
17. New Orleans 3 3 1 1 0   
26. Apra (GUAM) * * 1 2 1 1   
Port 
Interagency 
Cooperation (3) 
Illicit import/export 
market (6) 
Historical Criminal 
Network Presence(6) 
Organizational 
corruption (9) 
Employee 
corruption (9) 
Total 
Score    
2. NY/NJ 0 5 6 9 9 52   
16. Baltimore 3 4 4 9 9 47   
14. Miami 0 5 6 9 9 46   
1. LA/LB 0 5 0 6 9 42   
12. Port Everglades 0 5 6 3 9 41   
10. San Juan (PR) * 0 6 6 3 9 39   
5. Hampton Roads-Norfolk 0 4 0 3 9 37   
8. Charleston 0 1 0 6 6 32   
17. New Orleans 3 3 0 0 9 31   
26. Apra (GUAM) * 0 3 2 6 6 30   
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6.4A Port of Baltimore – 47 
The Maryland Ports Authority (MPA) manages the Port of Baltimore as a landlord port 
(Maryland Port Administration), and is one of the larger ports on the East Coast, ranked 16th in 
overall U.S. container traffic (AAPA 2013).  It has the highest level of vehicle import/exports in 
the United States with 753,265 imports and exports in 2015 (Maryland Port Administration 
2016).  The MPA security division contracts out access control to a private company, Securitas 
Inc., while law enforcement functions at the port are provided through a contract with the 
Maryland Transportation Authority Police (Maryland Port Administration). 
Physical 
Baltimore primary displays significant vulnerability in the open structure layout of the 
terminals and close proximity to I-95, the eastern seaboard’s primary overland travel corridor.  
The port also scores high/medium for vulnerability on both CRAVED categories with a 
concentration of cargo in a CES, within 3 miles of the primary container terminal (Belts 
Logistics), and three primary CRAVED commodities amongst the port’s imports, including two 
types of metal commodities, which is a targeted theft commodity at the port (DHS ICE May 
2012).34 
Administrative 
The primary vulnerabilities at the Port of Baltimore are administrative.  The port has a 
strong illicit import/export market, as a port in an HIDTA county with maritime transportation as 
recognized method of illicit importation (National Drug Intelligence Center 2009b; ONDCP 
2015), and 20 cargo thefts within a 75-mile radius over the past two years FreightWatch 
                                                            
34 www.usatradenumbers.com. 
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International Route Analysis Tool).  The Port of Baltimore’s connectivity along the eastern 
seaboard has fostered a high level of intermodal connectivity.  In addition to this intermodal 
connectivity, a large truck fleet services the Port of Baltimore, with estimates varying between 
3,000-10,000 trucks a day at the port, with the low end estimate reflecting a high level of truck 
traffic relative to the amount of container traffic.  Economic sectors in the Port of Baltimore have 
a record of criminal network exploitation and organization corruption.  For example, with the 
warehousing sector, there have been multiple incidents of warehouse owners abetting theft of or 
actively stealing CRAVED and expensive metals warehoused on their premises (DHS ICE May 
2012), increasing the port’s vulnerability for organization corruption.  The port scores higher for 
employee corruption through numerous incidents among cruise ship employees who assisted in 
narcotics trafficking (U.S. CBP December 2012).  In the longshore sector, federal agencies have 
targeted longshoreman and time keepers for no-show jobs, including indicting and sentencing 
individuals with strong ties to the narcotics trade in the Baltimore region (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2010; FBI 2010; FBI 2011a).  This wide variety of illicit activity across multiple sectors 
increases the vulnerability at this port. 
Logistical 
While the Port of Baltimore does not have a significant level of container traffic, it does 
have the largest level of automobile import/exports and has been identified as a port which is 
used for exports of stolen vehicles (Lantsman 2013). 
6.4B Port of Miami (PortMiami) – 46 
PortMiami is one of the two largest container ports in South Florida.  It has the highest 
level of passenger traffic in the United States with 15 cruise lines calling at the port and is 14th in 
the nation for container traffic (AAPA 2013).  Security duties at the port are divided between the 
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PortMiami Safety and Security division responsible for access control and the Miami-Dade 
County Police Seaport Operations Bureau stationed at the port (Pate et al. 2008).  This sub-unit, 
in turn, works with the PortMiami Safety and Security Division.   
Physical 
PortMiami is the only major port in the United States wholly located on an island with 
significant restricted access control.35  Accordingly, the port scores low on open structure 
vulnerability, though the port scores high for peripheral access based on the high level of freight 
forwarders relative to cargo traffic.  This large freight forwarding sector in South Florida 
services many small shipping lines that call at PortMiami, PortEverglades, Port of Palm Beach, 
and small terminals along the Miami River.  Only recently the port re-furbished a disused 
railway line to add a rail link to its intermodal options (PortMiami B), but the port still has a high 
volume of truck traffic to service the cargo and cruise industries with nearly 4,500 trucks per day 
in 2009 (Port of Miami Tunnel). 
Administrative 
Historically, South Florida has had a significant illicit import market for narcotics and 
export market for illicitly trafficked firearms (ONDCP 2011b).  PortMiami, and the Miami River 
terminals, had been at the heart of the cocaine trade in the 1980s and early 1990s, though 
narcotics traffic dropped off in the 1990s and early 2000s (Zimmerman 2006; Gootenberg 2012).  
The resuscitation of Caribbean drug trafficking routes in the 2000s has led to increased narcotics 
smuggling through South Florida (DEA 2015), some of which now transits through small 
vessels.  Accordingly, South Florida ports are the only ports on the East Coast which have an 
increased vulnerability due to the illicit small vessel trafficking of people and narcotics.  Of the 
                                                            
35 In the past year, the PortMiami Tunnel was built to provide greater access to the port, but the tunnel is highly 
monitored via CCTV, license plate-reading equipment, and a heavy police presence (Observation 6/21/2015). 
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101 incidents detailed through CBP press releases identifying interceptions of small vessels, 18% 
were in the Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach region, primarily identified as migrant 
smuggling vessels.36  In addition to illicit imports, South Florida ports are also an export point 
for illicit firearms bound for Central and South America and the Caribbean, where the firearms 
can sell for over 10 times their U.S. value (Ramsey 2012; Cayman Compass 2013; U.S. State 
Department 2014).  Traffickers normally export firearms in “dribs and drabs” as part of 
piecemeal shipments, often hiding firearms in legitimate exports of used vehicles (Small Arms 
Survey 2015).37  In the Small Arms Survey (2016) study of illicit firearms trafficking, South 
Florida figures prominently as a region where maritime exports of illicit firearms are conducted 
by legitimate freight forwarders and illicit networks, taking advantage of the maritime shipping 
afforded by PortMiami, Port Everglades, and the Port of Palm Beach.  South Florida also 
experiences significant problems with cargo theft, with 93 thefts reported between March 2013 
to 2015 (Freightwatch International), including thefts of CRAVED cargo,38 such as food 
products (including yogurt, bone-in hams, and frozen seafood), home and garden products 
(including small appliances, A/C units, and other electronics).  Furthermore, cargo theft at the 
port is organized and increased likely as a result of the dissolution of the Miami Dade County 
Cargo Theft task force (Burges 2012; American Institute of Marine Underwriters 2013).  In 
addition, PortMiami has an above average NCIC hit rate of export vehicles identified as stolen, 
though the NICB hit rate is lower than average. 
PortMiami scores high on organizational and employee corruption indicators, in addition 
to a historical criminal network presence in port and maritime operations (Gootenberg 2012).  
                                                            
36 See Appendix B 
37 In the Small Arms Survey (2016) study of 159 criminal cases of illicit firearms trafficking of 52 cases where the 
mode of smuggling was identified, 25% involved hiding firearms in an export vehicle. 
38 Identified through FreightWatch Route Analysis tool 
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Port security employees were arrested for theft as recently as 2012 (Munzenreider 2013), and 
eight incidents of corruption, involving Miami-area CBP officers were involved in drug 
trafficking offenses occurring between 2005 to 2012 (BorderCorruption.Org).  Furthermore, the 
longshore labor sector has significant issues with corruption linked to illicit maritime transport of 
narcotics (DHS ICE 2010). 
Logistical 
PortMiami’s average annual container throughput hovers between 900,000 and one 
million containers and scores low for container throughput (AAPA 2013). 
6.4C Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach (POLALB) - 42 
The largest port complex in the country, the POLALB is ranked third with a significant 
vulnerability profile.  The complex is composed of two separate landlord port authorities, but 
because they are co-terminus and share a similar geographic and customs enforcement profile, 
they are considered as one unit in terms of this vulnerability assessment, or a port complex.  The 
ports, however, have divergent security structures.  The Port of Long Beach utilizes the Long 
Beach Police Department (Port of Long Beach B) as their primary law enforcement agency while 
the Port of Los Angeles has a stand-alone police department (Pate et al. 2008). 
Physical 
The POLALB is an open structure port with cargo and containers stored in open yards 
(GoogleMaps).  However, the location of the ports abutting the cities of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach means that storage space is at a premium and port management and terminal operators 
endeavor to move cargo off the port as quickly as possible.  On the west coast, the union 
organization for waterfront labor, the International Longshore Workers Union has participated in 
work stoppages and slowdowns that have created significant issues for cargo bottlenecks 
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(Journal of Commerce 2014).  While both ports have primary trucking gates, they have other 
multiple entry/exits, and the port complex has a CES location located within three miles of the 
port (PriceTransfer Inc).  Notably, despite the large amount of cargo that passes through, the port 
complex does not have a relatively large presence of freight forwarders.  Even accounting for the 
cargo traffic separately between both ports, they still register a low presence of forwarders 
relative to the cargo throughput.  Conversely, for vehicle traffic, the port complex registers a 
high volume of truck trips, though the complex has a high level of inter-modal connectivity, with 
nearly half of cargo moving by rail (Port of Long Beach; Port of Los Angeles). 
Administrative 
The port complex is a key example of how a confluence of vulnerability creates 
heightened vulnerability, not through a strong level of criminal network presence in port 
operations, but through heightened vulnerability across three of four highest vulnerability 
categories.  As would be expected from a port complex, located in the heaviest import/export 
environment in the United States, the ports score high for the presence of an illicit import/export 
market with 158 incidents of cargo theft within 75 miles of the ports (FreightWatch International 
Route Analysis Tool),39 numerous instances of illicit import traffic seizures, especially of IPR 
infringement seizures,40 primarily due to its function as the largest import gateway for Chinese 
made goods (LA Times 2011), and an above average rate of NCIC and NCIB hits.  Though the 
port complex is located in a HIDTA county, maritime methods are not the primary method of 
transportation in the area (ONDCP 2011c).  While the port  complex does not display the 
maximum score for organizational corruption, there is evidence of companies using the port  
complex for the transportation of stolen CRAVED cargo, specifically for high value metals such 
                                                            
39 See Section 5.2L for a justification of measuring cargo theft regionally in addition to those thefts directly at the 
port. 
40 Roughly 40% of all IPR in the United States seizures occur at the port complex. 
  
116 
 
as copper (DHS ICE 2013).  The port complex rates high for employee corruption with 
numerous instances of CBP officers who colluded to smuggle cargo, including supervisory 
officers (DHS ICE 2012).  Finally, the Port of Los Angeles specifically has undergone a 
tumultuous period when the Port Police Chief was indicted and sentenced for corruption (United 
States v. Ronald Jerome Boyd 2015).  While a culture of corruption that is present in some 
organizational sectors in other ports is not widespread at the port complex, the above examples 
show that even individual cases of corruption can rise to the highest levels of port security 
management. 
Logistical 
The port complex scores high for container throughput vulnerability with quadruple the 
throughput of the next largest container port in the United States, the PNYNJ (AAPA 2013). 
6.4D Port Everglades – 41 
Port Everglades is operated as a department of Broward County as a limited operating 
port, which means that the port authority operates certain facilities and leases others.  The port 
hosts a significant amount of cruise ship traffic, with ten cruise lines calling at the port (Port 
Everglades 2015), in addition to 35 cargo shipping lines making it the 12th busiest port in terms 
of container traffic.  The Broward Sheriff’s Office provides law enforcement services at the port 
to include access control (Broward County Sheriff’s Department).   
Physical 
The port maintains three primary terminals, with the main terminal – Port Everglades 
Terminal – with one entrance, while the two smaller terminals, including Holt breakbulk 
terminal have multiple entry and exit points directly into the city of Ft. Lauderdale.  The primary 
terminal has large open access yards, but with the single access point, the port receives a medium 
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vulnerability score.  As the port undergoes a transformation to increase intermodal options for 
shippers, it continues to have a high level of vehicle traffic for drayage (Port Everglades 2015).  
In addition, the port scored high for both the spatial concentration of CRAVED cargo 
(International Warehouse Services), and CRAVED cargo imports, with six of the top ten 
commodities as CRAVED cargo (WorldCity Trade Numbers). 
Administrative 
As with other South Florida ports, the primary vulnerabilities is the location of the port in 
a significant illicit import/export market, situated in a HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015).  Similar to 
the Ports of Miami and Palm Beach, maritime transportation is the primary method of illicit 
trafficking (DEA 2015).  The port is located in an area known for cargo theft, like Port of Miami, 
with over 90 high value thefts recorded between March 2013 and March 2015 (FreightWatch 
International).  The port has also been the site of significant organizational corruption with an 
entire ocean forwarder company heavily infiltrated by Colombian drug trafficking network (U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for Southern District of Florida 2013; DEA 2014).  This increased the 
organizational corruption score for the port and significantly increased the employee corruption 
score as well.  The operation of Kings Ocean Services was part of a long standing pattern of 
criminal network operations at the port from as far back as the 1980s (Gootenberg 2012) through 
1990s (Lebowitz 1998).  In 1998, for example, nearly 50% of the longshore workers at the port 
had criminal records, and the port had no access control at all (Lebowitz 1998).  In the early 
2000s, the president and two employees of Port Services International (PSI), the contractor 
responsible for vetting and hiring port security officers, were arrested and convicted of fraud for 
facilitating the hiring of guards who were unqualified and were improperly vetted, leading to the 
take-over of security functions by federal agents (Bernard 2004).  While these vulnerabilities 
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have decreased with the introduction of TWIC cards and the relative equal security standards of 
the MTSA, Port Everglades still has registered high levels of administrative vulnerability. 
Logistical 
With just under one million TEUs in 2013, the port scores low for throughput 
vulnerability (AAPA 2013). 
6.4E Port of San Juan (Puerto Rico) - 39 
The Autoridad de los Puertos de Puerto Rico (the Port Authority of Puerto Rico), 
governs the Port of San Juan, one of the largest ports in the Caribbean and the 10th largest port in 
the United States (AAPA 2013).  A division of the Puerto Rico Police, equivalent of a U.S. state 
police agency, the Policia de los Puertos (Port Police) provides law enforcement security at the 
port.  While the port is heavily secured with CCTV and a centralized command center with 
integrated security systems (Honeywell International), the port continues to be heavily targeted 
by criminal networks for illicit import/export schemes (Ewing 2005; National Drug Intelligence 
Center 2011e; Campo-Flores 2013). 
Physical 
Despite the port’s island location, San Juan is a large metropolis, and the port is one of 
the larger ports in the United States, ranking tenth in overall container traffic.  The layout of the 
port is spread out over several neighborhoods with eight cargo terminals located in the Puerto 
Nuevo district and three located in the Guaynabo municipality.  To reach the five primary cargo 
terminals at the Puerto Nuevo district, there are multiple entry points, with a main entrance and 
at least two other side entrances (GoogleMaps). Furthermore, a major thoroughfare, JFK 2, is 
directly adjacent to the port to enable cargo transportation.  There is no publicly available 
information on the presence of a CES, and the port registers a medium score for imports of 
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CRAVED cargo with three CRAVED commodities in the top ten imported and exported goods 
(WorldTrade Numbers).  Moreover, the port does not have a large freight forwarder presence.  
There was no data available to measure truck traffic but a proxy measure for the amount of truck 
traffic notes that there is a large presence of daily vehicular traffic in that area (Puerto Rico 
Public Private Partnerships Authority 2010).41 
Administrative 
The Port of San Juan scores high for numerous administrative vulnerabilities.  The port is 
located in region with increased illicit narcotics smuggling and has a high level of seizures of 
narcotics and illicit firearms (National Drug Intelligence Center 2011e; DEA 2015).  For 
example, in 2013, federal agencies conducted an unprecedented number of seizures, including 
21,831 pounds of narcotics and 37,958 illegal weapons and ammunition (US CBP January 2014).  
This represented a two percent increase in narcotics seizures and a 118 percent increase in illegal 
weapons and ammunition seizures compared to the previous year (US CBP December 27 2012; 
February 13 2013).  These significant increases are related to the increasing use of Caribbean 
trade routes for narcotics trafficking following pressure along the Southwest border region in the 
United States (Gootenberg 2012; DEA 2015).  The port also displays a historical presence of a 
criminal network influence in the longshore sector, with a drug trafficking group operating 
through longshore workers and through a freight forwarding company for over ten years until the 
group was disbanded through federal action in 2013 (U.S. Department of Justice 2013).  This 
incident increased both the organizational and employee corruption scores of the port, due to the 
                                                            
41 In 2008-09, 85,950,000 vehicles travelled along the PR 22 road that services the cargo terminals of the Port of San 
Juan.  According to the Port of San Juan, roughly 18% of all yearly traffic is attributable to the port.  Average daily 
traffic along PR 22 is 235,000 vehicles. A rough estimate places 44,358 trucks per days for the port.  This is likely 
an overestimate considering that the port carries roughly 3479 containers a day on average.  However, figuring in 
bulk traffic and that 90% of Puerto Rico’s cargo arrive by maritime methods there is likely a heavy flow of truck 
traffic into and out of the port (Puerto Rico Public Private Partnerships Authority 2010). 
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fact that the criminal network was in full control of freight forwarding company and facilitated 
illicit maritime transfers through the port. 
Logistical 
The Port of San Juan is the tenth largest container port in the U.S. and carries a 
significant amount of throughput, putting it in the mid-level of vulnerability (AAPA 2013). 
6.4F Hampton Roads-Norfolk – 35  
Virginia Port Authority (VPA) operates Hampton Roads facilities through a separate 
private operating company, Virginia International Terminals, Inc. (Old Dominion University 
2010).  The VPA owns Norfolk International Terminal, Newport News, Marine Terminal, and 
Portsmouth Marine Terminal, all in the Hampton Roads area, and is the fifth largest container 
port in the United States (Pate et al. 2008).  The VPA Police Department provides all law 
enforcement services, and unlike many other ports, no private security is allowed on the premises 
(Virginia Port Authority). 
Physical 
The ports primary container terminals have multiple entry and exit points at both Norfolk 
International Terminals and Newport News Marine Terminal.  However, CRAVED cargo is not 
spatially concentrated as the CES is located nearly 20 miles from the port in Chesapeake, 
Virginia (Hampton Roads Examination Warehouse).  The port has a medium level of CRAVED 
cargo imports, with commodities such as foodstuffs, motor vehicle parts, and furniture among 
the CRAVED imports (WorldTrade Numbers).  While the port has a high score for vehicle 
traffic (Bronzini 2008) and significant intermodal capabilities with 33% of all cargo transiting 
through rail (Port of Virginia 2015), it does not have a significant presence of peripheral 
companies such as freight forwarders.  This may be due to several factors including the lack of a 
  
121 
 
large immigrant diaspora population and that a significant portion of container traffic at the port 
is military traffic. 
Administrative  
Hamptons Roads scores high in three administrative categories.  First, it is a mid-level 
vulnerability illicit import/export market region, showing both above average scores of NICB 
and NCIC hits for exported vehicles from the port, and the presence of an illicit import market 
for narcotics, evidenced by several seizures of narcotics in container traffic at the port (DHS ICE 
2012; Daugherty 2014).42  In 2014, Hampton Roads and the six surrounding counties were 
designated as HIDTAs (Federal Register 2014), and in drug market assessments, the port is 
identified as a vector for illicit narcotics transportation (National Drug Intelligence Center 
2003b; 2009b).  The port also scores high for employee corruption through incidents in which at 
least two longshore workers belonging to the ILA, and a port trucker, were indicted for 
offloading narcotics from Panama for distribution in the area and for onward transit to New York 
State (McGlone 2007). 
Logistical 
Hampton Roads, as the fifth largest container port in the in the United States, has a high 
score for vulnerability with over two millions TEUs annually (AAPA 2013). 
6.4H Port of Charleston - 32 
The Port of Charleston is operated by the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) 
and ranks eighth in container traffic (AAPA 2013).  The SCSPA owns the five primary terminals 
                                                            
42 Led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the BEST teams incorporate personnel from ICE, 
CBP, and the U.S. Coast Guard within DHS; the DEA, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF), and U.S. Attorney’s Offices within the Department of Justice; as well as other key federal, state, local and 
foreign law enforcement agencies to leverage federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign law enforcement resources to 
combat transnational crime and collaborate on intelligence led seizures of narcotics and other illicit cargo (ONDCP 
2013). 
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and operates them with its own staff, with some exceptions for licensed operators at the port 
(Pate et al. 2008).  Law enforcement is provided by the SCSPA Police Department though 
terminal lease holders may hire private security (Pate et al. 2008). 
Physical 
The Port of Charleston scores high for:  (1) the open structure of the port with five 
terminals (Wando Welch, North Charleston, Columbus Street, Union Pier, and Veterans) all 
within one mile of large public access highways; (2) the container serving terminals with open 
yards; (3) the presence of CRAVED products (Port of Charleston); and (4) through an onsite 
CES, and for a high presence of vehicular traffic.  In addition, the port has a high level of 
intermodal connectivity through the presence of two rail lines, CSX and Norfolk Southern 
(SCSPA), with an estimated 25% of cargo moving by rail (Wilbur Smith Associates 2002). 
Administrative 
The port scores a low level of vulnerability for an illicit import/export market though it 
registers a significantly above average score for NCIC registered exported vehicles but below 
average for NICB hits.  In recent years, however, the port’s seizures of illicit cargo has been 
trending significantly lower.  For example, in 2006, CBP reported that they had seized over 
2,000 pounds of narcotics, while by 2007 CBP reported seizing only 1l pounds (U.S. CBP).  In 
addition, in 2015, the ONDCP did not identify Charleston County, the location of the Port of 
Charleston as an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015).  Despite this, the port has been used by illicit 
smuggling groups including the same group that operated at the Port of Hampton Roads 
(McGlone 2007).  The port has also had incidents of CBP officers abusing their authority, 
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slightly increasing its vulnerability score under organization corruption 
(BorderCorruption.Org).43 
Logistical 
The port scores a mid-level of vulnerability with 1.6 million TEUs in 2013 (AAPA 
2013). 
6.4G Port of New Orleans (PONO) – 31 
PONO owns or controls 22 miles of wharves and terminals spread along the Mississippi 
River, the Industrial Canal and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet as a landlord port and ranks 17th 
in the United States (Port of New Orleans).  The port is an important export port for bulk cargo 
such as grain and petroleum products.  It has a specialized Harbor Police Department, which is 
responsible for law enforcement in the port but private security provides gate services and 
security for tenant spaces (Harbor Police Department 2005). 
Physical 
PONO scores high for open structure, the presence of CRAVED products with an on-site 
CES location (U.S. CBP), and a high level of vehicle traffic (Port of New Orleans B).  
Furthermore, the port has a significant intermodal presence as the only port in the United States 
to be serviced by all six major U.S. railways (Port of New Orleans C).  However, rail is not a 
primary mode of intermodal transport with only 3% of containerized traffic shipped by rail (Ports 
of Louisiana). 
Administrative 
The port does not display evidence of a historical presence of criminal networks nor is 
there evidence of criminal network involvement in port operations.  However, the port is located 
                                                            
43 In 2010, two CBP officers at the Port of Charleston were sanctioned for the use of government computer systems 
to illicitly check on coworkers, neighbors, and other unauthorized usage. 
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in an HIDTA identified trafficking county (ONDCP 2015) and also displays an above hit rate of 
NCIC hits increasing the illicit export market vulnerability.  There is no evidence of 
organizational corruption, though two U.S. CBP officers were arrested for corruption in previous 
years including one who assisted in drug trafficking, increasing the employee corruption 
vulnerability (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana; Center for Investigative 
Reporting). 
Logistical 
PONO has a low level of container cargo throughput, with 476,000 TEUs in 2013 
(AAPA 2013). 
6.4I Apra (Guam) – 3044 
The Port Authority of Guam (PAG) manages the Port of Apra which handles more than 
90 percent of the island’s total imports, the majority imported from the United States (Port 
Authority of Guam).  In addition, the Port of Guam also serves as the transshipment hub for the 
United States, Hawaii, and Far East to the western Pacific region making it the 26th largest 
container port in the U.S. (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013).  As a U.S. territory, Guam is subject to 
U.S. law but has a separate customs agency, Guam Customs and Quarantine, which enforces all 
U.S. customs regulations on cargo at Guam’s port of entries (Port Authority of Guam).  Port 
security is provided for by the PAG Port Police (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013). 
Physical 
PAG does not have an open structure, though containers are kept in an open yard, and the 
port has only one entrance restricting access.  The port does have increased vulnerability for both 
concentration of CRAVED products (EA Engineering, Science and Technology 2012) and a high 
                                                            
44 Score does not include vehicle traffic input due to a lack of data identifying the daily truck transits. 
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level of CRAVED product imports with seven of ten of the top import/export commodities being 
CRAVED (University of Guam 2014). 
Administrative 
Despite the lack of physical vulnerabilities at the port, the Port of Apra displays 
significant administrative vulnerability.  Due to a lack of funding, the port has identified several 
physical security measures that are lacking.  For example, both natural guardianship through 
adequate lighting and formal surveillance procedures are lacking as “the Port has video cameras 
installed throughout the terminal facilities, (but) they are not maintained.  Additionally, the 
existing camera system does not provide complete coverage of the terminal (Parson Brinckerhoff 
2013).”  The lack of this standard SCP technique raises the vulnerability score, an uncommon 
heightened score at a U.S. seaport.45  PAG also registers a higher score for an illicit 
import/export market primarily because once cargo enters into Guam, it is not subject to further 
inspection once it is transshipped to the mainland United States (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013).  
Furthermore, maritime transportation in a known method of illicit trafficking into and through 
Guam, underscoring that transshipment ports with heightened vulnerability can attract networks 
through the jurisdictional arbitrage (Bureau of Statistics and Planning 2014).  The Port of Apra 
also registers for jurisdictional vulnerability as there is shortage of PAG police officers to handle 
the necessary security duties, in addition to difficulty in retaining personnel once hired (Parson 
Brinckerhoff 2013).  The port also scores highly for organizational and employee corruption due 
to corruption within the PAG and more recent incidents with corruption accusations in the Guam 
Customs and Quarantine service (Aguon 2012; Toves 2015). 
Logistical 
                                                            
45 Of the entire 30 port sample, only five ports registered above a low level of vulnerability in this category, 
including:  Miami, Philadelphia, Hueneme, Honolulu, and Apra. 
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The Port of Apra is a low throughput port, with 169,000 TEUs yearly (AAPA 2013). 
6.6 Conclusion 
The preceding data collection, analysis, and coding provides a useful method to 
determine a baseline level of seaport vulnerability.  It is important to mention that the highest 
possible score under the SVF is 63 with the tenth most vulnerable port in the United States, 
Apra, receiving a score of 30, and the most vulnerable, the Port of NY/NJ, 52.  This implies that 
port security in the United States is, at a baseline, reasonably secure and that most ports do not 
display the vulnerabilities that would attract criminal networks to exploit their operations for 
illicit purposes.  The average score for a port is 26.5, or less than half of the maximum under the 
SVF. 
The SVF, therefore, is best used as a baseline framework to move towards further in 
depth case analysis of a specific port of interest.  By examining the SVF across other available 
port security frameworks such as the USCG International Port Security Program vulnerability 
analyses, World Customs Organization SAFE Framework assessments standards, and the 
International Standards Organization 28000 Port Security standards, the SVF provides a novel 
and discretized set of criteria to identify vulnerability at seaports in concert with criteria used by 
other organizations.  However, to identify the nuances of port vulnerability, any individual 
analysis assessment should be followed with in-depth case study analysis. 
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Chapter 7 - Port of New York and New Jersey Case Study 
7.1 Introduction 
The Port of New York and New Jersey (PNYNJ) is the largest port complex on the East 
Coast and demonstrates the importance of maritime trade to the development of New York.  The 
relationships between security stakeholders, the private sector, and historical criminal influence 
in port operations have created a complex vulnerability environment. 
The PNYNJ is the oldest, continuously functioning seaport in the United States, and like 
many other ports, it is spread across multiple shipping terminals, which are spread across a large 
geographical area.  The Port is in New York harbor, an area of more than 1,200 square miles that 
covers more than 430 square miles of water, including the 122 square mile expanse of the Lower 
Bay and the protected waters of the Upper Bay where port facilities are primarily located (WPA 
Writers Project 2004).46 
In the harbor’s early years, the Port was neither the largest nor the most significant port in 
Colonial and Federal period America (Albion 1970).  PNYNJ lagged behind Boston and 
Charleston in the early eighteenth century and behind Boston and Philadelphia in the late Colonial 
period - Boston had a stronger maritime tradition and Philadelphia had a more developed 
hinterland (Glaeser 2005).  But, by the mid-nineteenth century, New York had overtaken all other 
ports on the eastern seaboard to become the premier port for imports (Rodrigue 2004). 
                                                            
46 Note on terminology: In the 19th C. most terminal and cargo operations were concentrated in the city of New 
York, particularly the piers and wharves of Brooklyn and Manhattan, which is referred to as the Port of New York. 
Towards the early 20th c. Hoboken, Jersey City and Bayonne began to have greater prominence in terminal and 
wharf operations, while by the mid-20th C. Elizabeth and Newark began to develop terminal operations as well. By 
1921 when the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was established, the Port of New York would 
encompass operations on the New Jersey side of the harbor. 
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The advantages of New York harbor became apparent after the opening of the Erie Canal.  
As a closed harbor with an open ocean entrance, the short distance from the harbor entrance to 
the port itself became a strong incentive for shipping lines to call at the port (WPA Writers 
Project 2004).47  The Port of New York also offered lower transportation costs, as manufacturing 
grew within and near the city.  Shipping volumes rose as immigrants entered the New York 
region, which, in turn, lowered transportation costs through economies of scale.  As more vessels 
called at the port, competition to house and discharge vessels decreased transportation costs 
(Glaeser 2005).  This pattern of dominance in port operations continued through the twentieth 
century.  However, as transportation costs fell alongside the rise in technological innovation, the 
dominance of New York decreased relative to other ports on the eastern seaboard and across the 
United States (Rodrigue 2004).  Today, the port, however, retains a strong market share on the 
eastern seaboard as the largest container port and overall tonnage port, even surpassing the Ports 
Los Angeles and Long Beach (AAPA 2013). 
7.2 Port management 
The Port is managed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, or the Port 
Authority (Port Authority).  The Port Authority was formed in 1921 as a bi-state agency to manage 
maritime operations in New York Harbor and to settle increasingly frequent arguments between 
the states of New York and New Jersey over the movement of cargo to and from New York City 
(New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact of 1921; Rodrigue 2004).48  For maritime 
                                                            
47 Los Angeles and Long Beach have perhaps the easiest entrance to the open ocean and are the largest ports in the 
U.S.  While access to the ocean is not always the key determinant in port dominance, today it is a factor that 
shipping lines consider in their vessel and terminal operations decision making, though with the growth of container 
vessels and the ease of rail and road transport this may not be as determinative as in decades past. 
48 “The port authority shall constitute a body, both corporate and politic, with full power and authority to purchase, 
construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within said district; and to make charges for the 
use thereof; and for any of such purposes to own, hold, lease and/or operate real or personal property, to borrow 
money and secure the same by bonds or by mortgages upon any property held or to be held by it.”  (New York-New 
Jersey Port Authority Compact of 1921) 
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operations, the Port Authority functions as a landlord port, leasing terminals to private companies 
that operate and manage maritime operations on-site.  However, port operations only account for 
a small percentage of Port Authority operating revenue, totaling just six percent in 2013 (PANYNJ 
2014). 
7.3 Terminal management and layout49 
The port has six primary terminals; four in New Jersey that handle the vast majority of 
container cargo and two in New York City.  The New Jersey terminals move the majority of 
cargo, around 80% of all tonnage (Rodrigue 2004). 
The five primary terminals have different management and labor structures, though all 
are serviced by the International Longshoreman’s Association, or ILA, through different union 
locals.  Management ranges from global corporate ownership of APM Terminals (APM; 
Notteboom and Rodrigue 2012) in Elizabeth, New Jersey to North American terminal operator 
PortsAmerica management of Port Newark Container Terminal (PortsAmerica).  Howland Hook 
in Staten Island and Global Container Terminals in Bayonne are both owned and operated by 
Global Container Terminals, a Canadian based terminal operator with a small footprint in the 
United States (Global Container Terminals; Port Authority B).  The last remaining operating 
marine terminal in Brooklyn, Red Hook Container Terminal is operated by Red Hook Container 
Terminal LLC, a sole operator that does not operate any other terminals in the U.S. or worldwide 
(Red Hook Terminals). 
 
                                                            
49 Note:  The Port Authority has specific terminology for the marine terminals it leases out, for example Howland 
Hook Marine Terminal, but when the lease holders for these terminals change, the common name for the terminals 
changes as well.  For example, Howland Hook Marine Terminal was operating as New York Container Terminal 
prior to acquisition by Global Container Terminals Inc, and now operates as Global Container Terminals NY LLP. 
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7.4 Labor at the PNYNJ 
 
The ILA is the primary labor provider for longshore labor at PNYNJ terminals.  The 
union represents all unionized longshore workers along the East and Gulf coasts and negotiates a 
master contract with the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX).  The master contract governs 
broad ILA-management relations including workdays, traditional benefits, jurisdiction, 
technology, and other benefits (USMX 2013).  Unlike other ports in the United States, the ILA 
master contract for the PNYNJ reflects the special position of the PNYNJ by including PNYNJ 
specific provisions on health care and drug testing (USMX 2013).50  In addition to the master 
contract, the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) negotiates with the ILA on PNYNJ 
specific issues such as work hours, pensions, local work rules, holidays, vacations, and other 
issues not covered by the master contract (Waterfront Commission 2012). 
In the mid-twentieth century at the height of the port’s reputation as a “mob controlled” 
port, the port labor system was governed by the “shape up” (Johnson 2005; Stewart 2012).  The 
shape up was a daily occurrence where laborers would present themselves at the hiring hall 
hoping to be given a position on work gang.  As a result, the hiring agent yielded considerable 
power and criminal groups sought to install members of their organizations into these positions 
(Johnson 2005; Stewart 2012).  The Waterfront Commission was formed in response to this 
problem, with the express purpose of carefully regulating and modulating the port’s labor supply 
(Block 1982; Demeri 2012). 
                                                            
50 Article VII, Section 7. 
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The work structure at the port is idiosyncratic to the PNYNJ.  The port operates under a 
gang system,51 which requires a full gang to finish unloading or loading a vessel (Waterfront 
Commission 2012).  At the PNYNJ, the gang system actively employs three teams that work an 
eight hour shift each and are paid even when they are not working their shift (Waterfront 
Commission 2012).  The NYSA has admitted that this relatively inefficient and cost intensive 
labor structure is a vestigial custom and practice at the port resulting in a variety of abuses by 
unscrupulous workers (Waterfront Commission 2012: 4). 
In recent years, the introduction of larger container vessels has increased the need for 
automated terminals and further reduced the need for longshore labor.  Automated terminals can 
move 30 containers an hour indefinitely while a skilled longshore laborer can only keep up 30 
moves an hour during their peak performance for a few hours a day (Mongelluzzo 2015b).  The 
PNYNJ has yet to fully automate, with only Global Container Terminals in Bayonne with partial 
automation (Strunsky 2014).  As automation increases at PNYNJ, its vulnerability profile will 
subsequently change, but for the time being, longshore labor remains an important factor to 
consider at the PNYNJ.  The sprawling terminal layout, multiple ownership structures and labor 
idiosyncrasies at the PNYNJ are overlaid with a similarly byzantine set of security agencies. 
7.5 Port security structure 
 
The security agency umbrella at the PNYNJ is similar to other ports in the United States 
but with a greater number of agencies.  These agencies can be categorized as federal, state, local, 
and specialized agencies. 
Federal agencies 
                                                            
51 West Coast ports operate under a shift system where workers are paid for only the shift they work (Waterfront 
Commission 2012). 
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The primary federal oversight agency in the United States is the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) which leads the New York section Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC).  The 
New York AMSC has oversight responsibility for transportation channels and approaches into 
New York harbor (Code of Federal Regulations 33 22) and reviewing facility security plans 
(USCG 2013).52 
While USCG provides oversight of facility security, the Transportation Safety Agency, 
(TSA) manages the MTSA-mandated Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) 
required for all longshore workers to gain access to port facilities (Emsellem 2009; TSA).  TWIC 
is the primary form of identification at ports around the country and is a biometric based ID card 
that creates a baseline level of identification requirements at U.S. ports (TSA).  In recent years, 
the TWIC program has been criticized for being ineffective in preventing unauthorized entry into 
secure port working environments, and also for loopholes which allow temporary IDs to be 
granted to new employees for the first thirty days of their employment (U.S. GAO 2013; Ford).  
Container security and inspections are conducted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, as the 
sole customs agency in the United States, while investigations of any smuggled cargo once 
identified by CBP are handled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and, in some 
cases, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). 
State agencies 
The primary state agency with a security role at the PNYNJ is the New Jersey State 
Police Marine Services Bureau (NJSPMSB), which has jurisdiction over New Jersey’s 
waterways.  As Port Newark and Port Elizabeth are located on the west side of Newark Bay, the 
NJSPMSB has jurisdiction over the waterways leading into Port Newark and Port Elizabeth and 
                                                            
52 See Chapter 8- Implications for Policy and Praxis for an examination of the USCG assessment tool. 
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can participate in investigations and provide additional waterside security in that area (New 
Jersey State Police). 
Municipal agencies 
The New York Police Department Harbor Unit patrols the waterways of New York 
Harbor and provides security support to Coast Guard assets when specific vessels require extra 
protection, such as cruise ships that dock at the Manhattan Cruise Terminal (South 2008; Baker 
2011).  In addition, municipal police agencies in Bayonne, Jersey City, Elizabeth, and Newark 
all have responsibility for basic law enforcement services in the areas around terminals located in 
those cities. 
Specialized agencies 
The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) provides overall law enforcement services 
at Port Authority facilities.  The PAPD is one of the largest port police units in the United States 
(Reaves 2011).  As marine terminal operations are a fraction of Port Authority revenues, the 
number of officers devoted to the marine terminals is a small portion of the total officers in the 
department (Citizen Budget Commission 2012).  The PAPD also has an investigative division 
that investigates transportation-related criminal activity within Port Authority jurisdiction, such 
as cargo theft on Port Authority properties (Pate et al. 2008). 
The primary specialized agency at the PNYNJ is the Waterfront Commission of New 
York Harbor (Waterfront Commission).  Arguably the most controversial agency at the port, the 
Waterfront Commission was introduced in 1953 by an act of the U.S. Congress and was formed 
through a compact between the states of New York and New Jersey (Levy 1989) with the 
primary purpose investigating and combatting criminal activity and influence in the Port of New 
York and New Jersey to ensure fair hiring and employment practices.  This entails the regulation 
and licensing stevedoring companies operating in the harbor and on the piers in addition to 
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individuals who handle waterborne freight.53  The Waterfront Commission also regulates the list 
of registered workers to ensure that full-time work is available to registrants and to limit 
competition for slots (Fisch et al. 2009).  Unlike other port security agencies, the Waterfront 
Commission’s jurisdictional authority has long been questioned by the ILA, NYSA, and 
legislators in New Jersey who view the agency as a regulatory burden on port operations  and 
which therefore affects how other entities at the port cooperate with the Commission on 
investigations (Levy 1989; NJ State Bill 2277 2015; Aron 2015; NJ State Bill 2277 2015). 
The multiplicity of agencies with differing jurisdictions and with historically volatile 
relationships (Fisch et al. 2009) is a factor leading to increased vulnerability, and one which may 
be unavoidable due to the development of the PNYNJ across two states in one of the largest 
commercial regions in the United States.  The mitigation factors to address jurisdictional and 
interagency vulnerability are especially important at the PNYNJ and are examined in the section 
that details interagency cooperation at the PNYNJ. 
7.6 Data sources54 
Public sources 
The case study relied on data sources used in the comparative port analysis using 
identical or similar sources where applicable, to develop a baseline level of vulnerability, in 
addition to additional data sources not available for other ports. 
                                                            
53 The Commission’s jurisdiction has been a source of contention.  According to the Compact, the Commission has 
jurisdiction over licensing any companies operating with 1,000 yards of a “pier” that perform activities inherent to 
the transportation of waterborne freight. In a 2013 suit, the Commission contended that a pier includes the area 
where waterborne containerized freight is loaded, unloaded and stored, and that the 1,000 yard measurement should 
be taken from the property line of the pier nearest the company under question for licensing.  In Continental 
Terminals Inc. V. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 2013, the Southern District of New York agreed 
with the Commission’s interpretation of that jurisdiction and effectively allowed the commission to continue with 
licensing warehouses and other companies operating within 1,000 yards from the nearest point of the nearest pier, 
provided they meet the requirements and do not function as a regular warehouse (Continental Terminals Inc. V. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 2013).  
54 See Appendix H for IRB approval documentation. 
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Observations 
Between June 2011 and December 2012, as a research analyst at the Waterfront 
Commission I completed background checks on companies and individuals, observed Waterfront 
Commission public hearings,55 and conducted site visits to Howland Hook Marine Terminal, 
Port Newark Container Terminal, and Global Container Terminals on routine visits with 
Waterfront Commission police. 
Interviews 
In addition to sitting in on public hearings, conducting site visits, and participant 
observation during the period of June 2011 to December 2012, I conducted interviews with 19 
port security stakeholders at the port.56  All interviews were de-identified and interviewees 
agreed verbally to participate in the study.  Using ATLAS.TI software, interviews were 
transcribed and coded based on vulnerability categories.  In addition to these formal interviews, I 
had multiple informal conversations and discussions with port security stakeholders at the Ports 
of Miami, Baltimore, Los Angeles, Long Beach, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the World Customs Organization. 
Documents 
In addition, I examined primary documents such as:   proceedings of public Waterfront 
Commission decisions to revoke longshore registration; New Jersey Superior Court of Appeal or 
New York State Court appeals (Waterfront Commission 2013; Waterfront Commission 2013b; 
Application of Margaret Dilin v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 2013; Superior 
Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 2015); Waterfront Commission Annual Reports 2000-
2012; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey annual reports; indictments of individuals 
                                                            
55 Hearings were held January 19, 2011, May 19, 2011, September 20, 2011, October 27, 2011, December 15, 2011, 
February 8, 2012, and March 7, 2012. 
56 See Appendix I for the list of interview subjects. 
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with waterfront connections (United States V. Stephen DePiro et al. 2010); New Jersey State 
legislature hearing transcripts (New Jersey State Legislature Waterfront Commission Hearing 
2010); Union contracts including the master USMX-ILA (USMX 2013) and the NYSA-ILA 
CBA (NYSA 2013); New York State Inspector General’s Report (Fisch et al. 2009); affidavits of 
federal agent testimony at trial (Southern District of New York 2010); and CBP, ICE, and 
Waterfront Commission press releases documenting arrests, indictments, and sentencing of 
longshore workers. 
7.7 Vulnerability analysis 
The PNYNJ displays the highest level of vulnerability across the top 30 U.S. container 
ports.  To create a baseline for comparison, I scored the PNYNJ on the SVF categories applied in 
the previous chapter to the other 29 seaports.  The PNYNJ receives a score of 52 out of 63.  The 
case study provides further detail on the individual vulnerabilities at the PNYNJ and shows that 
vulnerability at the PNYNJ is the result of a confluence of individual vulnerability, which 
combines to create the most vulnerable port to criminal network exploitation. 
7.8 Port security funding 
Between 2002 and 2013, in absolute terms, the PNYNJ received the second largest 
amount of PSGP funds, or $292 million (AAPA 2006; DHS 2007; DHS 2008; DHS 2009; DHS 
2011; DHS 2012; DHS 2013; DHS 2014; FEMA 2014).  Relative to the amount of container 
throughput, the port scores a low level of vulnerability in this category, with $52.87 for every 
2013 container transiting the port.  However, as shown in the previous chapter, port security 
funding is not always a function of container or cargo traffic.  Regression analysis of PSGP 
outlays and container throughput shows no statistical relationship between container throughput 
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and port security grant program funding at the PNYNJ.57  In fact, cargo volumes grew by 45% 
from 2002 to 2013 and did not result in a commensurate growth in funding (PANYNJ 2014d). 
The lack of increased PSGP funds for the port may be attributed to several factors: 
including the DHS formula which heavily weighs terrorism over criminal network exploitation 
(US GAO 2011); the total available amount of PSGP funding, which decreased from $388 
million to $93 million in 2013 (AAPA); and that some ports are able to secure funds despite 
having low cargo throughput as a function of having a higher terrorist threat profile.  Lack of 
security funding alone does not create vulnerability, but PSGP funding is a key source of 
additional security funds to invest in basic physical security infrastructure such as lighting, 
fencing, and CCTV.  Without PSGP funds, physical security measures may not be implemented 
and increase the level of physical vulnerability. 
7.9 Physical vulnerabilities 
7.9A Open structure 
The PNYNJ is an open structure port with multiple access points within terminals, 
proximity to interstate transportation and road such as Interstate 95, and open container storage 
(Google Maps).  At a basic level, the five shipping terminals each have primary gate entrances, 
but facilities are directly adjacent to public access roadways that allow easy access to intruders 
(GoogleMaps).  This is a function of the port’s development in a highly dynamic and populated 
region.   
                                                            
57 The value of R is -0.0441.  The value of Pearson’s R^2, the coefficient of determination, is 0.0019 and shows that 
container throughput is able to predict less than 1% of variability in port security grant funding. 
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Because there is no critical infrastructure at the port outside of the USCG defined secure 
zones (33 U.S.C. 1231), these roads are accessible to anyone.  Security stakeholders recognize 
the vulnerability: 
Within the last month there was an emotionally disturbed individual, with a 
warrant out for his arrest, who hopped a fence into the port and was found in the 
Masters office…When you look at that incident; you can’t physically monitor 
hundreds of miles of fence line in a port…Could we have prevented that?  Some 
would argue yes and some would argue no.  There are always going to be areas 
of vulnerability…The public berth is essentially an open parking that is just a 
thoroughfare to the vessel...There’s not a thing you can do there.   (Director of 
Security Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 10/10/2012). 
 
Despite the subject’s determination that this type of vulnerability is not preventable, it 
nonetheless contributes to the criminological vulnerability profile of the port (Albanese 2003).  
Other observers note that the level of public access through adjacent roads provides significant 
access: 
The problem with the port of New York is that it’s…an open port…In most other 
ports there’s one facility.  There’s only one access point.  You enter the port, and 
you leave the port.  The closest thing we have here is the north and south entrance 
to Port Elizabeth and Port Newark, but even all those roads in there are public 
roads.  (Director of Legal and Licensing WCNYH, 10/12/2012). 
 
The open structure of the port increases the access points for criminal networks that may 
seek to participate in theft from the port or adjacent areas.  However, based on the classic routine 
activities framework, open structure vulnerability functions is a contributing factor to the lack of 
a suitable guardian, while the presence of targets in the form of CRAVED cargo creates a set of 
suitable targets for criminal networks. 
7.9B Imports of CRAVED goods 
The New York and New Jersey region is a heavy consumer market and has a high level 
of CRAVED cargo (FreightWatch International 2016).  In 2014, two of the top three import 
commodities by tonnage were CRAVED, including beverages and preserved foods, while all of 
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the five top containerized cargo imports were CRAVED including furniture, beverages, 
machinery, appliances, and apparel (Port Authority 2014d).  In this category the PNYNJ, like 
other ports in the United States scores high as the consumer market in the region creates a trade 
profile where ports in large urban areas generally have higher levels of CRAVED imports to 
satisfy consumer demand.  This then leads to the continual presence of suitable targets for theft 
networks at ports like the PNYNJ. 
7.9C Spatial concentration of CRAVED goods 
As the largest port on the East Coast, the port is a primary import location for every 
imaginable type of product sold in the United States.  To create centralized inspection sites for 
the volume of cargo, CBP has five Centralized Examination Stations (CES) in the region 
(PANYNJ E).58  Four of the five are either located directly or adjacent to the port, leading to a 
concentration of CRAVED goods. 
In addition to these stations, the Port Authority also leases port property to numerous 
warehouses (Port Authority F).  However, the spatial concentration of cargo at the port has 
shifted away from the port especially in the past twenty years.  Not only has the Port Authority 
sought to reduce warehouse space on port property to increase space for container housing 
(Director of Legal and Licensing WCNYH, 10/12/2012), the Waterfront Commission’s increased 
licensing of warehouses has had a displacement affect (Executive Director, WCNYH 9/28/2012).  
As warehouse space decreases, warehousing within 15 miles of the port, a standard industry 
measurement for seaport real estate accessibility, has increased, with vacancy rates declining 
steadily since the end of the recession which began in 2007 (Jones Lang and LaSalle 2014).  
However, cargo held in warehouses away from the port is subject to less oversight authority, as 
                                                            
58 Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (ATCET), Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII), Agricultural 
Inspection, and Trade Compliance Inspection. 
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the Waterfront Commission’s jurisdiction does not extend past the PNYNJ.  This means that not 
only is CRAVED cargo spatially concentrated at the port, but that as cargo moves off the port, it 
is subject to decreased regulatory control increasing the attractiveness of the PNYNJ for theft 
groups, indicated by the high level of cargo thefts in the port region (FreightWatch International 
Route Analysis Tool).59 
7.9D Peripheral companies  
The large amount of cargo that transits the PNYNJ necessitates support and peripheral 
services such as freight forwarders.  In the New York and New Jersey region, there are a total of 
622 listed freight forwarders:  487 in New York and 135 in New Jersey (www.forwarders.com).  
The greater concentration of forwarders in New York reflects the larger and denser population 
center and the distribution of immigrant diasporas.  Immigrant diasporas often provide small 
scale forwarding services to their countries of origin through quickly formed and dissolved 
companies (Eckstein 2009).  Study informants confirm the quick start-up and dissolution of 
companies operating in this sector: 
There [are] many more smaller forwarders than NVOs (non-vessel operating 
common carrier).  A lot of freight forwarders are ‘fly by nights,’ a lot of Asian 
[forwarders].  (Former Customs Broker, 10/1/2012). 
 
While the large number of forwarders that operate in the port region is an indicator of the 
absolute size of the forwarding sector in the area, the sector is at a medium level of vulnerability 
based on the monthly cargo throughput60. This contrasts with a port like Port Miami or Port 
Everglades, where there are 10% more forwarders for a cargo throughput amount that is only 
25% of PNYNJ’s throughput amount.  Nonetheless, even with a medium level of vulnerability in 
                                                            
59 There were 166 thefts between July 2013 and July 2015. 
60 The port receives a score of 13.49 and is coded for a medium level of vulnerability.   
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this category, access to even an individual forwarder can assist a network with illicit transport 
(Zaitch 2002; Lantsman 2013). 
7.9E Vehicle traffic 
Due to the level of cargo traffic, there is a constant need for drayage service at the port.  
While the number of drayage companies, 142, is a strong indication of the size of the sector, the 
estimate of daily truck trips, 16,000 (PANYNJ 2012; PANYNJ 2014 B; PANYNJ 2014 C), is an 
indication of the drayage sector labor structure.  This reflects the preponderance of owner-
operators (Bensman and Bromberg 2008; Belzer and Swan 2011).  As a result of the high level 
of daily truck trips, the port is coded for a high level of vulnerability relative to the amount of 
daily cargo throughput. 
To mitigate security risks from the level of vehicle traffic, the Port Authority has security 
systems to determine whether trucks are supposed to be at the port on any given day.  For 
example, trucks must be registered internally in the Port Truck Pass (PTP) where they are issued 
and managed Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags for drayage trucks.  A series of readers 
installed at each container terminal gate then read the RFID tags and allow the terminal operator 
to determine if the truck meets the requirements for entry (PANYNJ 2014 C).  While physical 
mitigation procedures are strong asset to the PNYNJ, the number of daily truck trips means that 
there are many more opportunities for illicit networks to not only smuggle cargo in and out of the 
port but also for organized crime groups to exploit drayage workers. 
7.9F Small vessels in/near the port 
A large small vessel community in a port area can create higher levels of security 
vulnerability by deflecting resources away from port security to focus on mundane marine calls 
for service.  To determine the extent of this vulnerability, the size of the boating community in 
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the port area is used as a proxy measure.  The New York and New Jersey region has a large 
boating community, but this analysis focuses primarily on the boating community in New York 
counties because the port takes up the majority of area in industrial north New Jersey, and the 
marine community is concentrated further south (Marine Trades Association of New Jersey 
2008; NY State Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation 2014).  New York counties in the 
port district have a combined total of 21,308 registered small vessels (NY State Parks, 
Recreation, and Historic Preservation 2014).  This does not factor in the vessels registered in 
Nassau County, with nearly 29,000 registered alone.  In New York State, the ratio of small 
vessels to inhabitants is 1:43, while in the PNYNJ port district counties, it is 1:394.  As a result, 
there are significantly fewer recreational vessels in the harbor in comparison to a port like Miami 
where law enforcement officials note that small vessels are their greatest security concern 
(Personal Communication June 23, 2015). 
As an additional measure of small vessel vulnerability, an analysis of small vessel 
smuggling shows that the PNYNJ is not a proximity port for smuggling traffic, which is mainly 
concentrated in South Florida and Southern California.61 
For port security, the small vessel threat is different from that currently conceptualized by 
federal security agencies where the concern is focused on terrorism (DHS 2008).  The vector of 
the threat is mainly through a more complex harbor environment that requires scarce law 
enforcement resources to focus on small vessels at the expense of other port security concerns.  
The PNYNJ registers in a low range for this vulnerability with a small boating community in 
relation to other areas around the country and few marinas for small vessels (Marine Trades 
Association of New Jersey 2008; NY State Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation 2014). 
                                                            
61 See Appendix B for the panga interception data set. 
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7.9G Intermodal connections  
The PNY/NJ has a high level of intermodal connectivity with rail, air, and road networks 
linking the port to its hinterland and the rest of the country and use this level of intermodal 
connectivity as a selling point for business (PANYNJ 2014 G).  While this is a net positive for the 
port in terms of economic benefits, this creates a higher level of vulnerability.62  For rail, the 
primary intermodal connector at the port is the ExpressRail, which in 2014, moved roughly 10% 
of all containers at the port, meeting the minimum criteria for rail intermodal use (PANYNJ 2014 
D; PANYNJ 2014 C).  Furthermore, with three international airports in the port district and 3,500 
domestic and international movements, illicit cargo can transit by air quickly and easily anywhere 
in the United States and worldwide (PANYNJg).  Finally, the high level of trucks using the port, 
16,000 daily, shows that by road, the port has a high level of connectivity (PANYNJ 2012).  
Intermodal connectivity creates port security vulnerability only in as much as greater 
connectivity allows licit traffic to flow from a larger number of inbound and outbound points 
(VECTOR 2009; Moser 2013).  As the number of intermodal vectors increase, the security of 
each of those vectors becomes interconnected with the security of the port, since inserting cargo 
at a rail distribution point may be easier than doing it at the port (Kolbenstvedt and Amundsen 
2012). 
7.9H Physical/Administrative security procedures 
As with other ports in the United States, the PNYNJ has a baseline level of physical and 
administrative security as part of the mandated security under the MTSA.  Seven of the eleven 
                                                            
62 In a demonstration of the importance of intermodal connections to illicit networks, a recent study examined at why 
Chicago an inland city far from the southwest border has become a distribution point for the Sinaloa cartel (Moser 
2013).  In fact, it is the historical development of the city as a geographic hub of transportation for rail, road, air and 
maritime shipping along the Great Lakes that served the city so well in the 20th century and today creates the ideal 
hub to ship illicit drugs to points across the U.S. (McGahan 2013). 
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SCP techniques below have been incorporated in port procedures, whether as a standard practice 
as a result of the MTSA, through Coast Guard enforcement or another agency.63  The PNYNJ 
primarily experiences lapses in three areas: screen exits, natural surveillance, and formal 
surveillance through evidence of faulty lighting and poor functioning CCTV cameras, as detailed 
in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: SCP techniques at the PNYNJ 
SCP 
Technique 
PNYNJ Practice 
Target 
Hardening 
Containers are locked using de-identified container seals under CBP mandate 
that allow a consignee, customs, or other entity to check whether a container 
has been opened or tampered (U.S. CBP April 2014). 
Access 
Control 
TWIC cards function as baseline access control at U.S. ports and the PNYNJ 
(Director of Security, PANYNJ 10/10/2012).  Port Authority also uses the 
Secure Worker Access Consortium (SWAC), to screen employees who 
require access to secure areas or confidential information (Director of 
Security, Port Authority 10/10/2012; Secure Worker Access Consortium). 
Screen exits It is not possible to inspect all vehicles on exit.  On any given day the PAPD 
has four officers at Port Newark (Chief of WCNYH Police, 11/11/2012).  To 
mitigate this, the Port Authority institutes random vehicle inspections 
(Losak). 
Extend 
guardianship 
The Waterfront Commission has an established tip line and works through a 
consortium site that provides anonymity to informants (Chief of WCNYH 
Police, 11/11/2012; MYPD). 
Natural 
Surveillance 
The Port features high mast lighting at all five terminals (Observation, 
November 18, 2014).  However lighting does not always function and in a 
number of vehicles thefts at the port, poor lighting enabled criminals to slip 
into the high value lot to steal vehicles (Lantsman 2013). 
Reduce 
anonymity 
All employees must carry TWIC cards, have a Port Authority issued ID, and 
longshore workers must also carry a Waterfront Commission ID card. 
Place 
managers 
The Port Authority has an Operational Security Program that provides 
training for employees and tenants (PANYNJ 2014 B). In addition, the 
Waterfront Commission incorporates security trainings for security guards 
that work at port facilities (Chief of WCNYH Police, 11/11/2012). 
Formal 
surveillance 
The Port Authority has CCTV cameras throughout its facilities including all 
marine terminals (Amsec).  However, in several instances of vehicle theft 
from lots at the port, Waterfront Commission investigators identified that due 
                                                            
63 See section 5.2H for a discussion of how SCP techniques comport with physical and administrative procedures 
required at U.S. ports. 
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to non-functioning CCTV cameras thieves were able to get past the security 
perimeter to steal vehicles from holding lots at the port (Lantsman 2013). 
Conceal 
targets 
High value cargo is kept in a high value yard at Port Elizabeth.  It is a 
standardized practice, due to the anonymity of shipping and consignee data 
that few employees have access to container manifests, consignee 
information, and yard information. 
Remove 
targets 
There is a high value container yard for higher value cargo (Maritime lawyer, 
10/17/2012). 
Identify 
property 
Container seals are de-identified based on a set of numbers and letters, but 
allow property to be retrieved based on matching consignee and consigner 
information to seal number (U.S. CBP April 2014). 
 
U.S. ports have a strong framework of port security mandates, which create physical and 
administrative security mitigation procedures.  As a result, it is more useful to look for lapses in 
security mitigation procedures, theorized through the SCP framework.  However, it is important 
to consider that SCP techniques and mitigation procedures are most effective when applied at the 
facility level, or even lower units of analysis.  While the port may have mandatory mitigation 
procedures, lapses at individual facilities create increased vulnerability.  This analysis does not 
focus at the individual facility level, which is instead accomplished through USCG vulnerability 
assessments of facility security procedures (USCG 2015). 
7.9I Illicit import/export market 
To determine whether the port is in a large illicit import/export market, three primary 
measures are analyzed based on ONDCP and HIDTA accounts of maritime transportation as a 
known method for illicit imports, cargo thefts in the port hinterland region (75 miles), and 
suspect vehicle exports and customs recovered stolen vehicles at the port.  These focus on three 
primary types of supply chain illicit activity- illicit imports, cargo theft, and illicit exports. 
Narcotics imports 
The New York and New Jersey High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) identifies 
multiple drug trafficking networks operating in the region, primarily in the southern tier of New 
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York and in northern New Jersey.  These include the strongest concentration of Colombian and 
Dominican networks in the United States, in addition to Mexican networks that traffic in a wider 
range of narcotics than the Colombian or Dominican groups, which focus on cocaine (ONDCP 
2011).  Furthermore, the HIDTA drug market analysis (NDIC 2009; ONDCP 2011), the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (Southern District of New York 2010), and the Waterfront Commission 
note that maritime transportation is a known method of importing narcotics into the region.  
Dominican networks primarily smuggle cocaine from South America and Caribbean and 
Jamaican networks transport marijuana from Jamaica aboard shipping vessels and in containers, 
while there is evidence that Afghani and Pakistani drug trafficking organizations smuggle limited 
quantities of southwest Asian heroin into the New York and New Jersey region in maritime 
cargo as well (NDIC 2009). 
Cargo thefts 
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 Cargo theft in the port region is significant with 166 reported incidents, of various level 
of intensity from thefts of entire containers to pilferage of CRAVED cargo, reported to 
FreightWatch International in the period of July 2013 to July 2015 (FreightWatch International 
Route Analysis Tool).  See Figure 5.  In the comparative analysis, it was highly uncommon to 
identify cargo thefts that occurred on actual port property, but at the PNYNJ, a number of thefts 
were reported in Port Authority jurisdiction.  This casts doubt on the effectiveness of counter-
theft physical and administrative mitigation techniques.  Furthermore, this measure is based on 
self-reported insurance data and likely undercounts the actual level of cargo theft in the region.  
Figure 5: Cargo theft incidents in the Port of New York/New Jersey region, July 2013-July 2015 
(FreightWatch International Route Analysis Tool) 
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By focusing on the port region, the cargo threat profile provides a method to determine if 
CRAVED cargo is actually targeted by theft networks and is a key indicator of the  of illicit 
activity that the port may be generating through CRAVED cargo import/exports.  At PNYNJ, as 
warehousing space on the port decreases, cargo thefts related to import/exports are more likely to 
be found in thefts from warehouses in the port region as opposed to the port itself. 
Suspect vehicle shipments 
In 2014, the PNYNJ was the largest port for 
vehicle import/exports in the United States with 
shipments of 640,820 new and used vehicles 
(PANYNJ C).  In 2013, CBP reported 312 recovered stolen vehicles, more than double the 
amount reported by CBP in 2012 with 20% of all recovered vehicles from the PNYNJ (Sherman 
2014).  See Table 9.  This provides a baseline measure of the level of recoveries at the PNYNJ 
but not a proxy for the number of illicit shipments.  Available NICB and NCIC data for vehicle 
exports shows that the port has a slightly above average rate of NICB suspect vehicles in the 
period of 2003 to 2008 with 35.27% of all exported vehicles, and a near average rate of NCIC 
suspect vehicles with .88% of all exported vehicles.  While actual numbers of stolen vehicles 
shipped through the PNYNJ are unavailable, NICB and NCIC data, along with the picture filled 
in through recovery data, provides a further method to identify that the port is a preferred export 
point for criminal networks. 
As one of the largest consumer markets for consumer goods in the United States, the New 
York and New Jersey region illicit import/export profile is similar in scope as well (Caulkins and 
Reuter 2004; ONDCP 2015).  Across illicit imports, exports, and cargo theft, the PNYNJ has a 
high vulnerability to illicit networks.  The size of the illicit import/export markets is in part a 
factor of all the vulnerabilities in this analysis, and others latent vulnerabilities waiting to be 
Table 9: CBP recovered stolen vehicles 
(Sherman 2014) 
  FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 
PNYNJ 270 130 312 
National 1329 1177 1554 
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identified.  At a minimum, the physical vulnerabilities highlighted in this section combine to 
create the market that use the port for illicit transfers.  In confluence with the administrative 
vulnerabilities highlighted in the following section, the PNYNJ is the epicenter of port security 
criminal network vulnerability. 
7.10 Administrative vulnerabilities 
7.10A Port divergence 
Divergence of cargo traffic is theorized as an economic structural change that can lead to 
vulnerability by decreasing the security scrutiny of existing port tenants and new companies that 
are considering doing business at the port.  The PNYNJ is not at risk of this vulnerability as 
cargo traffic at the port has grown consistently in the period of 2005 to 2013, consistent with 
ports across the eastern seaboard, including Hampton Roads, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and 
Boston (AAPA 2013; PANYNJ 2014d)64.  
7.10B Automation/cyber-security vulnerability 
All ports in the United States have a baseline level of automation through (1) container 
management systems that electronically track container movement throughout the port from the 
vessel to where on the yard the container is kept or in a vessel itself (Verizon 2016) or (2) 
automated security systems such as CCTV (Cloudview; Russon 2015).  The PANYNJ is leading 
the way in automation with partial automation at Global Container Terminal (GCT) in Bayonne 
which has semi-automated, rail-mounted cranes for stacking containers in the yard (Kulisch 
2014).  Through GCT’s expanded operations, it can handle roughly 36% of all container traffic 
capacity at the port (Strunsky 2014).  This increased automation does create heightened cyber 
                                                            
64 In 2009, ports around the country experienced a strong drop in cargo throughput as a result of the economic 
recession (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2009b).  See Appendix J for cargo throughput data. 
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security vulnerability at the PNYNJ.  However, there have been no recognized incidents of cyber 
penetrations at the PNYNJ, with the primary cyber incident a result of a different terminal, 
Maher, switching computer systems leading to a slowdown in operations (Mann 2013; 
Bloomberg News 2013).  In addition, cyber vulnerability is micro-located in individual 
computers, systems, or through human-created vulnerability, such as workers responding to 
spear phishing which requires further micro-assessments outside the scope of this document 
(USCG 2015). 
7.10C Interagency cooperation 
The PNYNJ has one of the most complex port security jurisdictional environments in the 
United States, with a large set of port security stakeholders in federal, state, municipal, and 
specialized agencies (Smythe 2013).  This is a function of the development of the port across two 
states but also labor conditions, which led to the creation of a port specific agency.  The primary 
oversight mechanism at the PNYNJ that fosters interagency coordination is the MTSA-mandated 
Area Maritime Security Committees (GAO 2012).  At the PNYNJ, more than 350 different 
agencies and stakeholders are members of the New York AMSC with six different committees 
(O’Brien Jr. 2007).  While a committee is often the starting point for strong interagency 
cooperation, the PNYNJ requires an added level of interagency cooperation through a joint 
operations center (JOC). 
Instead of a physical JOC, the PNYNJ has a virtual JOC through the implementation of a 
USCG-developed communications system, WatchKeeper, mandated through the 2006 SAFE 
Ports Act (GAO 2012b).  However, the lack of a physical joint harbor operations command 
center that provides a unified working environment is a key vulnerability at the port and not an 
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issue at other large ports around the country such as the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 
(POLB C). 
Due to the physical layout of the PNYNJ, large number of security agencies, the large 
private sector, and the population distribution in spatial proximity to port operations, a virtual 
operations center may not create the level of interagency communication required for effective 
port security information sharing.  Information sharing and cooperation is a key requirement to 
support physical security but is more important when managing the security challenges created 
by vulnerable economic or labor sectors. 
7.10D Vulnerable economic sectors and sector size 
This section describes the four primary economic sectors, the profile of the workers in the 
sector, the vulnerability conditions, and the size of the sector that lead employees to be targeted 
by criminal networks as victims or participants in criminal ventures.  Sector size is a key 
consideration in any vulnerability assessment and constitutes one of the primary vulnerability 
categories when examined in concert with a vulnerable sector.  Similar to how members of 
criminal networks note that the more cargo throughput there is in any given port, the easier it is 
to transport illicit cargo through that port (Zaitch 2002), vulnerability is heightened when there is 
a large number of entities operating in a sector. 
Complicating the assessment is that the shipping industry is undergoing a process of 
massification and atomization, terms which have been developed to described the underlying 
structural conditions for increased numbers (atomization) of operating entities at ports as a result 
of fewer but larger (massification) container vessels (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2009).  
Massification is the process where increasingly large vessels carry greater quantities of cargo 
(whether containers or bulk) leading to increased strain on shipping terminals to load and offload 
  
152 
 
cargo.  In response to massification, atomization is the process more drayage drivers and 
forwarders are required to handle the larger quantity of offloaded cargo.  These processes have 
led to increases in the quantity of operating entities in both of the sectors that participate in 
destination or origin distribution, freight forwarders and drayage truckers. 
At the PNYNJ, this has created a nuanced vulnerability profile such that sectors even 
with few operating entities, such as ancillary services, can display significant criminal network 
vulnerability due to structurally fixed conditions.  The primary sectors with low composition but 
high vulnerability is the longshore sector and ancillary services. 
Longshore labor 
The waterfront labor sector in the port has a significant vulnerability profile. While the 
nature of the work itself does not lend the sector vulnerability, privileged access to the port, 
coupled with the historical presence of criminal networks in waterfront operations, produces a 
profile that creates vulnerability to criminal networks. 
Labor profile 
Labor at the port is a patchwork.  The Waterfront Commission register lists 6000 to 7000 
employees specializing in different types of work such as driving straddle carriers, office clerical 
work, maintenance technicians, and others (WCNYH 2012; WCNYH 2013c; NYSA 2015).  
Longshore labor, specifically loading and offloading vessels, requires special skills training, and 
today’s longshore workers are not only more educated than previous generations, they are also 
well compensated for their skilled labor (Mongelluzo 2015c).  The key question in this sector is 
what are the conditions that create vulnerability to criminal network exploitation? 
Access and time sensitive work 
Longshore workers have privileged access to secure parts of the seaport.  This is the key 
aspect of the sector and which separates it from other historically vulnerable labor sectors in the 
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New York region (Raab 1998).  Despite being subject to multiple levels of access control and 
security through the TWIC, the Waterfront Commission ID and registration process, Port 
Authority SWAC card there are still numerous instances of longshore workers assisting criminal 
networks with illicit trafficking at the port (Southern District of NY 2010).  Similar to other 
economic sectors where criminal networks operate, the time sensitive nature of the shipping 
industry creates a vulnerable space for criminal networks to exploit the labor force (Albanese 
2003; Shelley 2003; WCNYH 2010).  Longshore labor has the ability to impede cargo, and ILA 
management has used that power to enforce work stoppages at the PNYNJ, most recently in 
January 2016 (Mongelluzzo Bonney 2016).  The confluence of privileged access in a time 
sensitive industry creates the underlying condition of vulnerability in this labor sector. 
Longshore worker as victim 
The twin conditions described in the previous section also create a condition where 
longshore workers are a key access point for criminal networks to ports.  At the PNYNJ, 
dockworkers are also victims of organized crime.  Historically workers are subject to extortion 
by ILA union leaders through a long standing practice of demanding payment of Christmas time 
bonuses, averaging $15,500 a year (Obel 2012; USMX 2013; Department of Justice 2014). 
Sector size 
As a sector that is affected directly by the amount of cargo that passes through the port, 
the labor sector displays the tensions between atomization and massification on a local scale.  
The Waterfront Commission regulates the longshore register and determines how many 
longshore workers can vie for work on a given day (Johnson 2005) to decrease labor oversupply.  
Coupled with employment scarcity, this can lead to organized crime exploitation (Obel 2012; 
Department of Justice 2014). 
Vulnerability analysis 
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The size of the sector is not a contributing factor to vulnerability to criminal networks, 
since the sector displays a relatively fixed labor pool regulated at the federal (through the TWIC) 
and state level (through the Waterfront Commission).  In fact, the overarching conditions of 
access and time sensitive work creates such overwhelming utility for criminal networks that 
criminal networks continue to try to infiltrate the sector (Southern District of New York 2010).  
As the labor force at the PNYNJ diversifies, the sector’s vulnerability will likely change as new 
workers come into the industry.  Furthermore, as automation decreases the number of longshore 
labor required for essential operations, vulnerability may shift from the longshore labor operating 
the cranes to the technically skilled employees who will operate the automated machinery. 
Drayage Drivers 
Vulnerability conditions 
Like longshore workers, drayage drivers are subject to security oversight, through TWIC 
and Sea Link, the PANYNJ’s trucker ID (PANYNJ 2014 H).  However, despite formal oversight 
mechanisms, working conditions in this sector increase the vulnerability of the sector to criminal 
network use.  The primary labor vulnerability conditions are that workers lack certainty of 
continuous employment and have increasingly poor working conditions.  Prior to the 1980s, 
regulatory frameworks created conditions of stable employment and rising wages for many 
workers in the trucking industry (Belzer 2000; Belzer and Swan 2011).  Following the passage of 
the 1980 Motor Carrier Act, the drayage sector fragmented and become increasingly competitive 
(Jaffee 2010b).  The deregulation of the trucking industry then led to increased numbers of 
owner-operators or independent contractors, who are now the dominant type of drayage worker 
at U.S. ports.  This change freed trucking companies from financial and legal obligations 
inherent in a formal employment of a trucker (Jaffee 2010b).  This places owner operators at the 
bottom of the truck labor hierarchy with few legal protections or benefits, and salaries as low as 
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$6 an hour (Prince 2005).  At the PNYNJ, drayage drivers may average $35,000 a year with 58 
hours a week of work, including significant waiting time while containers are loaded and 
inspected by ILA checkers (Bensman and Bromberg 2008).  As one study participant notes: 
With the advent of the owner operator, there’s no loyalty.  They cut each other’s 
throat in terms of pricing...By going to that end of the labor market you don’t 
have this career driver, instead you have this poor guy scraping together…He’s 
got to make five moves a day to break even…They’re absolutely a vulnerability.  
(Former Police Chief WCNYH, 10/1/2012) 
 
At the PNYNJ, one of the unique conditions which increases the vulnerability and 
possible targeting of drayage drivers is a specific contractual section in the master ILA contract, 
called the Trailer Interchange Report (TIR).  TIR allows ILA workers to inspect containers for 
damage before they exit the port, and if damage is found, the containers must be repaired in that 
port by maintenance workers.  The identification of damage and repair is conducted by ILA local 
1804-1, one with a long history of organized crime influence over both leadership and rank and 
file (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2004; Jacobs 2007; Director of Legal and Licensing WCNYH 
10/12/2012; Strunsky 2013).  This uniquely PNYNJ vulnerability is at its core a confluence 
where a labor conflict of interest in a time sensitive field of work takes advantage of the poor 
working conditions of another labor group.  As the amount of time trucker wait at the port to 
pick up a container have been very high (Bonney 2015b), the checking process creates 
conditions where ILA checkers can exploit their position to hold up traffic at the port and target 
drayage drivers to extricate or insert cargo (Law Fellow, Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor 10/24/2012). 
Sector size 
The atomization of shipping traffic and the increase in truck owner operators creates a 
large sector of drivers who operate at the PNYNJ.  At the port, 169 drayage firms are listed as 
operating entities and contract out to independent truck owner operators, with an estimated 
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16,000 truckers (PANYNJ 2012; PANYNJ 2014b; PANYNJc) using the port on a daily basis.  
The size of the sector increases the opportunity for criminal networks to seek access to the port.  
Moreover, increased work uncertainty may make some more inclined to participate in illicit 
schemes. 
While the formal security structure for drayage drivers is strong, the working conditions 
and contractual vulnerability through the TIR scheme creates increased vulnerability in the 
sector. 
Freight Forwarders 
Forwarders are a key sector with privileged access to the port but lack significant 
regulatory oversight.  There are no special qualifications for someone to be a freight forwarder, 
and the primary level of oversight is the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) license, which is 
required if a forwarder will issue their own house bill of lading, file their own manifest with U.S. 
Customs and issue their own delivery order to the consignee.  FMC oversight entails an initial 
application and does not include a more intensive background check (WCNYH Director of 
Licensing, 10/1/2012).  In addition, FMC oversight over licensed forwarders has been lax, as  
FMC audit rates from 2011 show that the FMC Bureau of Investigation, responsible for auditing 
registered freight forwarders, audited five out of 1048 licensed freight forwarders (Office of 
Inspector General 2012).  Considering that many more forwarders handle maritime cargo than 
are registered with the FMC, forwarders lack the level of oversight that should be commensurate 
with their key role in the transportation supply chain. 
Sector size 
In section 7.10d, the analysis focused on the size of the freight forwarding sector as a 
ratio of monthly traffic to identify whether there many peripheral companies accessing the port 
on a periodic basis.  This section focuses on examining the absolute number of forwarders in the 
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sector and the effect of shipping atomization at the PNYNJ.65  While there are differing estimates 
of the number of freight forwarders operating in the port region, based on FMC records, there are 
between 442 and 568 forwarders either within 25 or 75 miles of the Statue of Liberty66, 
respectively (standard radius measurements for port region or hinterland radius).  The full FMC 
count of 568 is comparable to the standard industry-wide listing of 692 forwarders in the overall 
New York and New Jersey region67 and indicates a large number of freight forwarders that can 
be used to move cargo in the port region.  At the Waterfront Commission which conducts many 
of the primary investigations of illicit activity at the PNYNJ, the complexity of the shipping 
industry, especially when cargo movement shift hands across multiple forwarders creates 
conditions that make investigations difficult. 
With all the freight forwarders and stuff it’s hard to keep track of where things go 
and where they come from.  Our police have trouble figuring out where a 
container goes.  They have to figure out where a container came from, where it 
was broken apart and so on, it definitely does hinder.  I’ve seen our police do the 
tracking but sometimes without success.  (Associate Counsel, WCNYH 
11/27/2012). 
 
There are many more smaller forwarders than the NVOs.  A lot of these are ‘fly 
by nights.’  A lot of Asian (companies).  The motivation for them is just money.  
Always money, money laundering.  They would collect money or get illegal money 
and just funnel it through (by shipping cargo or assisting in the importation of 
illicit cargo).  (Director of Auditing, WCNYH, 10/1/2012). 
 
Vulnerability analysis 
 
                                                            
65 While it is true that some of the largest ports in the country also have a large forwarder presence, reflecting the 
atomization principle, some ports that have large throughput such as Hampton Roads and Savannah, do not have a 
commensurately large forwarding presence which decreased their vulnerability score.  The conditions that lead to a 
larger forwarding sector are not solely the amount of cargo shipped through a port, but also include such 
characteristics as the diversity of diaspora and emigrant groups in the port region, including but not limited to Asian 
diaspora groups and Latin American groups.  These tend to participate in import/export businesses and require the 
services of forwarders to ship products and cargo to/from destinations in those areas.  This in part, explains why 
south Florida ports score so high in this vulnerability but do not have commensurately high levels of cargo 
throughput. 
66 The Statue of Liberty is used as the primary geographic reference point in the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey compact and is used here as the primary geographic reference point to determine port region and 
hinterland extent to measure the number of forwarders operating in the region and hinterland. 
67 www.forwarders.com. 
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Similar to the longshore sector, access to shipping is the key component of this sector’s 
vulnerability; however freight forwarders have a different type of access than longshore workers.  
While longshore workers have physical access to the port, freight forwarders have a better 
understanding of trade patterns and vessel movements, how cargo is dispersed across multiple 
layers in the supply chain, and, consequently, where and how to ship cargo (Former Customs 
Broker, 10/1/2012; Lantsman 2013).  While longshore workers and drayage drivers handle the 
manual labor of either extricating or inserting illicit cargo, a forwarder colluding with a criminal 
network provides the administrative knowledge that can assist a network to evade notice by 
authorities (Trace 2009). 
For freight forwarders, the lack of oversight and the size of the sector in the New York 
and New Jersey port region create the conditions of vulnerability. 
Ancillary Services 
Ancillary services refer to the services necessary to run terminal operations and assist in 
the day to day operations at a port, such as sanitation, cleaning services, and maintenance and 
repair.  Ancillary services such as container repair and maintenance are, from the perspective of 
the Waterfront Commission, operated by associates of local organized crime groups.  For 
example, internal investigations note that the container repairs, mechanical repair, landscaping, 
paving, and garbage removal are often controlled by associates of local organized crime groups 
(WCNYH Executive Director, 9/28/2012). 
The primary vulnerability conditions of this sector is the longstanding presence of 
organized crime operatives in entities operating in this sector and the privileged access afforded 
to employees working in one of these companies.  The example of American Maritime Services 
at Red Hook Container Terminal which had been using workers that had not been registered with 
Commission and had circumvented the Commission’s background check and hired organized 
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crime associates workers highlights how organized crime figures control or pursue control of 
companies in the ancillary services sector (WCNYH 2012b; Rooney 2013). 
The vulnerability of this sector is also a result of the financial benefit control of this 
sector is deemed to have to organized crime groups.  The quote below is from a wiretapped 
investigation where in discussion with a Genovese family associate, two members of an ILA 
longshore union highlight how they control the sector and extract money from companies 
operating in the sector (Demeri 2012). 
CAFARO:  I told our friend...‘[W]e got to do the repair, container repair, chassis 
repair, store them and charge a rent and the trucking.’ 
D’URSO:  And what did he say? 
CAFARO:  ‘You're right.’ 
DURSO:  What happens if legitimate guys come in and do it?  Then what? 
CAFARO:  They give them a hard time with the union.  You know what I mean?  
DURSO:  They'll sick them on them  
CAFARO:  Yeah, they'll give them a hard time with the union. 
Sector size 
The problematic companies in this sector are those in container maintenance and repair 
(Director of Licensing, WCNYH, 10/12/2012; Executive Director, WCNYH 9/28/2012).  Since 
these companies are staffed by employees who are regulated by the Waterfront Commission, the 
latest worker registration data suggests that the number of workers who operate in this sector is 
roughly 25% of all Waterfront Commission licensed workers at the port or roughly 1000 out of 
4500 registered longshore workers in the register (Bonney 2015).  The number of companies 
operating at the port in this sector is difficult to determine exactly, but based on the Port 
Authority directory (PANYNJ I), there are three.  The larger number of workers is likely 
reflective of terminal operations with in house container repair and maintenance yards.  While 
the number of entities operating in this sector is significantly lower than in other sectors, it 
displays characteristics of vulnerability because the low level of entities and coupled with the 
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TIR scheme allows companies that have an organized crime connection to make money off of 
repair of containers through collusion with corrupt checkers working the TIR shifts.    
The real issue now is container repair. That’s where there’s money to be made. 
That’s the maintenance local, D….s local, you know D…. is part of this civil 
RICO.  The federal scheme that requires TIR reports, it’s a federal scheme for 
highway safety, but if you look at it, it puts an awful lot of power into the hands of 
the individuals who are doing these reports, it allows for anything from bribery 
right there at the point of doing the report, it allows basically the people who are 
doing the repairs, the same locals who do the repairs, are doing the TIR reports 
which send containers for repairs.  (Director of Licensing, WCNYH, 
10/12/2012). 
 
Sector analysis 
In these four primary sectors, vulnerability is dependent on sector size and working 
conditions.  Sectors that are bound by spatial reasons to work within the area of the port have a 
fixed or low level of workers or entities, and their vulnerability less affected by the size of the 
workforce or number of entities.  These sectors are valuable targets for criminal networks 
because of the access they can afford a group.  Moreover, because of few entities in a sector, port 
operations have no recourse but to work with the available companies regardless of suspected or 
known affiliation with criminal networks.  Sectors that can operate anywhere and are not 
spatially bound to the confines of port have a larger number of entities and therefore create a 
greater number of targets for criminal networks groups to exploit, including freight forwarder 
and drayage sectors.  See Table 10 below. 
 
Table 10: Structural conditions of labor sectors and vulnerability  
Sector Structural conditions Conditions of vulnerability 
Longshore labor Regulated supply 
Decreasing sector 
Port access 
Control over time sensitive 
operations 
Specialized port knowledge 
Drayage truckers Free market supply 
Large sector size 
Port access 
Low wages 
Uncertainty of work 
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Sector size 
Freight forwarders Free market supply 
Large sector size 
Port access 
Specialized transportation 
knowledge 
Sector size 
Ancillary services Fixed supply 
Stationary sector size 
Historical organized crime 
involvement 
Port access 
Control over time sensitive 
operations 
7.10E Historical presence of criminal networks 
At the PNYNJ, corruption in the unions, port labor force, or other economic sectors is 
often ascribed to the custom and practice that has developed at the port (WCNYH 2012; NYSA 
2012).  This encompasses the wide range of labor inefficiencies built into the labor structure, the 
known historical associations with organized crime families in different port operations, and the 
interconnectivity between labor, management, and organized crime.  Typical media accounts 
note the presence of organized crime at the port in the following terms: 
Local 1588 was historically so corrupt that mob enforcers were unnecessary, 
according to one veteran investigator. Kickbacks, extortion and fraud became as 
routine as a Labor Day picnic at the local, long a lucrative outpost for the 
Genovese crime family.  (McShane 2004) 
 
The primary question this section attempts to answer is how the historical presence of 
organized crime manifests itself in operations at the port and does that provide access to criminal 
networks for illicit transportation of cargo. 
“Traditional” organized crime 
At the PNYNJ, traditional, Italian-American organized crime groups continue to exercise 
various degrees of control over labor in certain aspects of port operations (Herszenhorn 1998; 
Demeri 2012).  The history of organized crime at the PNYNJ can be traced to the Prohibition 
era.  Rum running groups used the shipping industry to ship illicit liquor into New York and sold 
to bootleg establishments in the city (Stewart 2012).  After prohibition, longshore workers whose 
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life was an “unending parade of drudgery and the closest thing to being a peon in America at the 
time,” began to be exploited by organized crime groups that Malcolm Johnson detailed in his 
series of articles for the New York Sun in the late 1940s (Johnson 2005): 
Once they got into labor racketeering in the trucking and the shipping industries, 
any industry that had time sensitive constraints was vulnerable.  You have this 
culture, where the old guys were all originally from the bootlegging and they 
passed that on to what they were doing in labor racketeering, and that culture 
was passed on to the younger generation.  By the 1970s all of those Irishmen 
passed on or were quietly replaced by mafia people, and some who wouldn’t 
move over got killed. And to some degree that dynamic has persisted today.  
(Former Deputy Director Local 1588 12/8/2012) 
 
Historically, the New Jersey and Manhattan docks are the area of operations for the 
Genovese crime family (Herszenhorn 1998; Demeri 2012; NJ Attorney General 2014) and the 
Brooklyn and Staten Island docks, considerably less important than they once were, are covered 
by the Gambino crime family (McShane 2004; Demeri 2012).  To a certain extent, the 
DeCavalcante family also has some smaller loan sharking operations as well, operating through 
the ILA locals in New Jersey (Executive Director, WCNYH 9/28/2012).  As discussed in 
previous sections, organized crime groups do not take hold of entire sectors, instead they plant 
operatives in companies in the ancillary services sector, or as longshore workers.  This activity 
continues to the present day as RICO investigations (Blakey and Goldstock 1980) by federal and 
state authorities over the past twenty years make clear that there is a continued presence of 
corrupt activity by both the Genovese and Gambino families at the Port of New York and New 
Jersey (WCNYH 2011b; WCNYH 2012c; WCNYH 2014; New Jersey Attorney General 2014; 
WCNYH 2015). 
Almost all of the investigations, arrests, and sentences again traditional organized crime 
groups at the PNYNJ are focused on some aspect of racketeering, whether through collusion to 
exploit longshore workers (WCNYH 2011b; WCNYH 2012c; WCNYH 2014; New Jersey 
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Attorney General 2014; WCNYH 2015), running gambling operations (WCNYH 2009), or 
extortion of port employees (Rashbaum 2005).  In addition, two unions were placed under 
federal consent decrees after investigations by the Waterfront Commission and federal 
authorities found that they were rife with organized crime associates forcing rank and file to 
unfair hiring practices and extortion (McShane 2004; Union Democracy Review 2005; New 
Jersey Attorney General 2011; Former Deputy Director Local 1588 12/8/2012; Demeri 2012). 
However, there is almost no evidence of a relationship between traditional organized 
crime operations at the port and the import or export of illicit cargo.  Two primary illicit 
import/export products, drugs and stolen vehicles, rarely involve traditional New York region 
organized crime (New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 2015), and primarily are 
conducted by loose networks of local New York region gangs and overseas facilitators (National 
Drug Intelligence Center 2009c; ONDCP 2015b).  For example, vehicles stolen for export are 
often ordered by overseas associates and, in the most high profile cases in the New York region, 
West African diaspora network members work with local gangs to facilitate thefts, chop up 
vehicles to mask their stolen origins, and then ship them overseas through a variety of masking 
methods (New Jersey Attorney General 2007; NYPD 2012; Lantsman 2013; DHS ICE 2015).  In 
some cases, these groups will set up legitimate companies to assist in illicit import/export 
schemes but those are likely to be in the freight forwarding sector and not in actual port 
operations.  However, smuggling groups do attempt to gain access to individual longshore 
workers to use them to facilitate illicit transport (Southern District of New York 2010). 
As a result, while the PNYNJ does have a higher level of vulnerability as a result of the 
long term presence of organized crime groups, their activities are not related to the import/export 
of illicit cargo.  Instead, their focus on exploiting port workers contributes to poor working 
conditions for drayage drivers and rank and file longshore workers, which can make workers in 
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those sectors more susceptible to criminal network overtures to participate in illicit schemes.  In 
some cases, traditional organized crime groups do have direct linkages to overseas organized 
crime groups such as the N’Drangheta (U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of New York 
2015), which transport drugs into the NY region.  But generally traditional organized crime at 
the PNYNJ straddles an intermediary position where they are not directly involved in smuggling 
operations but can force union members into participation or insert associates into positions with 
specialized access to container operations.  Instead, the historical presence of organized crime at 
the PNYNJ is most visible in manifestations of organizational corruption, where entire 
companies or union locals are controlled by individuals that use them for illicit trafficking or to 
exploit employees. 
7.10F Organizational corruption 
The analysis focuses on whether there are companies or entities that knowingly support 
and assist criminal networks in illicit activities and have some level of ownership or management 
by criminal groups.  At the port, longshore union locals display the greatest level of vulnerability 
due to the historical presence of organized crime, as discussed in the previous section, but in 
varying degrees, there are corrupt practices in other types of organizations at the port.  The 
analysis in this section also focuses not only on corrupt entities that facilitate illicit movements 
but on other types of corruption.  To measure the vulnerability level, I use the operational 
definition in Chapter 5.68 
                                                            
68 A port with a high level of organizational corruption has three different entities with more than two publicly 
documented instances of corrupt public or private employees in the past five years and is coded as 9.  A port with a 
medium level of organizational corruption has two different entities with more than two publicly documented 
instances of corrupt public or private employees, or one entity with more than two documented instances of public 
employee corruption in the past five years and is coded as 6.  A port with a low level of corruption has no 
documented instances of public employee corruption and one entity with more than two instances of private 
employee corruption in the past five years and is coded as 3.  A port without any incidents of private or public 
corruption is coded as 0. 
  
165 
 
By that standard of measurement, the PNYNJ has a high level of vulnerability for 
organizational corruption as evidenced across multiple levels of analysis from the port district 
down to individual companies operating within their economic sectors, including the Port 
Authority (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 2014; Dwyer 2015); freight forwarding entities (State 
of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004; Lantsman 2013); customs brokers (US DOJ 
2007; Courthouse News 2009); drayage entities (US DOJ 2007; Milosheff 2014); and throughout 
the labor sector.  In all of these sectors, management employees or company owners participated 
in corrupt practices and in several instances, assisted criminal networks with shipping illicit 
cargo. 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
U.S. ports rarely display the style of corruption where public seaport agencies are used 
for political purposes with most recent investigations uncovering port authority corruption in 
Mozambique (Sequeria), Liberia (Butty 2015), Nigeria (MACN 2014), and Kuwait (Fattahova 
2015).  The only port agency in the U.S. that has displayed that style of corruption is the Port 
Authority which has been embroiled in a political corruption scandal involving the closure of 
roadways into a city with a political opponent of the New Jersey Governor (Strunsky 2013b; 
Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher LLP 2014).  The PANYNJ’s portfolio (Moss and O’Neill 2014), 
with marine cargo composing 5% of revenue, means that operations are more insulated from the 
lane closing scandal, which was focused on using the transit control authority for political gain or 
retribution.  However, evidence of corruption in the Port Authority management would be 
especially impactful on the decisions on port tenants.  And in that aspect of port operations, the 
Port Authority has shown that it is willing to resort to questionable practices to rid itself of 
unwanted tenants (Robbins 2007; American Stevedoring against Defendants 2013). 
Terminal operators 
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Of the five terminals at the PNYNJ, two have operations across multiple countries.  
While the transport and shipping sector is recognized as a sector highly susceptible to corruption 
(PWC 2014), multi-nationals such as APM Terminals, which has 62 operating port and terminal 
facilities in 38 countries, have robust anti-corruption policy that enforce and develops anti-
corruption risk models in all of the countries where it operates (APM 2014).  Nonetheless, at the 
PNYNJ there have been incidents of corruption at terminal operators where a local manager at 
Maher Terminals solicited bribes to provide favorable contractual terms (FBI 2011b). 
Freight forwarders 
Criminal network control or ownership of a freight forwarder allows for a “no questions 
asked” policy when shipping cargo.  Federal and local authorities note that criminal networks 
specifically establish companies in the New York and New Jersey region to import illicit cargo.  
First, they begin their business by shipping licit cargo with no regulatory or legal concerns.  
After a period of time, once the business practice has been established, they facilitate the 
shipment of illicit cargo (State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004; Former 
Customs Broker, 10/1/2012).  At least one freight forwarding firm has assisted illicit narcotics 
imports as part of a Panamanian drug trafficking organization’s shipments (Southern District of 
New York 2010).  In addition to drug smuggling, freight forwarders at the PNYNJ participate in 
illicit export of stolen vehicles.  In these large export operations, freight forwarders knowingly 
arranged for the vehicles to be loaded into containers and then completed false bills of lading 
mislabeling the container contents (DHS ICE 2014c; DHS ICE 2015). 
Drayage companies 
There is little evidence that the 149 drayage companies operating at the port have 
displayed corrupt activity.  However, owner-operators have been known to participate in the 
transport of illicit cargo at the port, specifically related to counterfeit goods and to thefts of 
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containers (US DOJ 2007; Milosheff 2014).  It is more likely, though, that drayage drivers are 
not witting participants in illicit transport or smuggling schemes, and their vulnerability to 
exploitation is theoretical without a strong pattern of evidence to support active participation. 
Union locals 
There is significant evidence that unions at the port have been, in the past, under the 
control of members or associates of local organized crime groups.  Public sources (WCNYH 
2009; WCNYH 2010; WCNYH 2011; WCNYH 2012; New Jersey Attorney General 2011; New 
Jersey Attorney General 2014) note that associates of organized crime have been in positions of 
power at local unions at the port.  Focusing on the primary unions operating at the port, there are 
numerous examples of significant administrative influence by members of organized crime in 
most of the unions that provide labor to the terminals. 
At the PNYNJ, nine different locals provide different labor services with specializations 
in different type of work and at different terminals.  Certain locals have historically had less 
control by organized crime members, such as Local 920 in Staten Island or Local 824 covering 
the docks in Manhattan.  However, others, such as Local 1233, which provides labor for Port 
Newark and Port Elizabeth, has had top leadership associated with members of organized crime 
and with actual direct membership in the Genovese family (U.S. v. Stephen Depiro 2010; 
WCNYH 2014b; FBI 2015).  Other locals, such as 1804-1, responsible for maintenance and TIR 
duties, also has had significant organizational corruption (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2004; Jacobs 
2007; Strunsky 2013) exacerbating the contractual vulnerability that provides it significant 
power over drayage drivers and by extension port operations. 
However, there has been no evidence that traditional organized crime associates at the 
port are associated with the illicit transport of cargo either into or out of the port.  In almost all 
instances where leadership has been charged, convicted, or sentenced, the charges have been 
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related to extortion and embezzlement of workers in the unions where they had positions of 
power (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2004; Jacobs 2007; U.S. v. Stephen Depiro 2010; Strunsky 2013; 
WCNYH 2014b; FBI 2015 . 
Vulnerability analysis 
Across the five sectors examined in this section, organizational corruption manifests itself 
in two primary areas for differing reasons.  In the freight forwarding sector, organizational 
corruption is present as a result of the underlying structural conditions of the sector, which 
include specialized knowledge and the large size of the sector in the PNYNJ region.  In addition, 
they lack of oversight, other than FMC licensing for some forwarders, and it is not difficult to set 
up a forwarding firm, establish a pattern of legitimate shipments, and then assist the illicit 
transport of cargo (State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation 2004).  Conversely, 
organizational corruption at PNYNJ union locals is much more a factor of the historical presence 
of organized crime despite long standing efforts to prosecute and convict union leadership 
associated with organized crime groups (U.S. V. Stephen Depiro 2010; WCNYH 2014b; FBI 
2015).  No other port in the United States has this level of corrupt activity at management levels, 
and this significantly increases the overall vulnerability of the PNYNJ.  Even without entirely 
corrupt entities or management level corruption, criminal networks can transport cargo through 
individual corrupt employees in legitimate companies. 
7.10G Employee corruption 
The port displays numerous instances of employee corruption, creating an environment of 
deep vulnerability in the primary economic sectors facilitating the movement of cargo through 
the port.  At the PNYNJ, longshore workers have been identified as collaborators with criminal 
networks to facilitate transport of illicit cargo, almost exclusively narcotics, and primarily 
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cocaine (WCNYH 2010c; Southern District of New York 2010; Southern District of New York 
2011; WCNYH 2012d).  This section focuses on detailing a specific incident of longshore 
worker collusion to display how access interacts with other categories to create increased multi 
sectoral vulnerability. 
Longshore worker access  
In 2010, eight PNYNJ longshore workers were indicted and convicted for narcotics 
trafficking (Southern District of New York 2010).  The investigation identified how and where 
access to the port provides a criminal network with strong benefits if they can identify a willing 
port employee as a conspirator.  The employee’s knowledge of where and how to ship the illicit 
cargo, where to place cargo in the yard, and ultimately how to extricate cargo from the yard is 
the incredibly valuable to those importing or exporting illicit goods (Southern District of New 
York 2010).One of the longshore workers, and a confidential witness, were the main recipients 
of cocaine hidden in duffels bags placed in containers.  The primary conspirator identified 
associates of his who he would pay $50,000 to $100,000 to take a duffel bag out of a specific 
container.69  One of the co-conspirators, a pier superintendent with supervisory authority over 
100 longshore workers, had specific access to a computer system that would allow him to 
identify where the containers were on the yard.  However, signaling the level of training that he 
had received in the use of the system, during the wiretapped investigation he disclosed: 
I gotta figure but how I’m going to get the shit, this information out the 
computer….figure out where that m***r is at, where that container, is at…I got a 
computer in my office, I just don't know [how to] work the f****g program.  I got 
the m***g program.  (Southern District of New York 2010) 
 
                                                            
69 Considering that each bag could have up to 50-100 kilograms of product and each kilo was estimated at a 
conservative value of $25,000, the total value of the cocaine in each bag would be between $1.25- 2.5 million. 
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In a later incident, once that individual had identified which container had a hidden duffel 
bag, he asked his brother, another longshore worker, to move the container to a different part of 
the yard where there would be less law enforcement visibility: 
‘Yo Greek (brother of the conspirator, or BC), listen, on the computer, after they 
take it off, it gives the location where it's put.’  (BC) responded, ‘Yeah, I know 
that.  You place that number and it'll tell you where it be.’ (conspirator) stated, 
‘Not even with that just point, right-click it on the crane.  That work in that 
bay…the container.  It gives you the location right, there.  I was f***g with the 
computer.  But…f***g get to it down below.’  (BC) responded, ‘No.  You watch it 
around the pier.  Are you watching?  They're not getting to it 'cause they're slow 
fucking s**t stains.’  (conspirator) then stated, ‘Yeah, they're just f***g slow.  
You're f***d up.’  (BC) then asked, ‘You see anything around? You see any cops, 
Port Authority, do you see any Customs?’  (conspirator) then answered, ‘No.  I'm 
gonna take a ride down now.  I took a ride before.’  BC then stated, ‘We're clear.  
We're pretty clear on it.  Just that when it comes off, punch it in the computer.’  
(Southern District of New York 2010) 
 
The knowledge and access of the longshore workers allowed them to identify containers, 
move containers to specific locations on the port, and inform criminal network operatives as to 
when and how to ship the drugs.  However, what the case demonstrates is a successful trafficking 
operation, networks need to have access to either a group of individuals with privileged positions 
in multiple stages of cargo shipments or have a trusted insider who is willing to support illicit 
movements through the entire life cycle of the movement through the port.  Ultimately, 
vulnerability at a port may be dependent on one individual who has privileged access.  But while 
this may be enough in certain ports, there are other vulnerabilities which augment the effect of 
having a privileged informant.  These include physical vulnerabilities created through poor 
lighting, allowing individuals on or off a port facility, to the increased vulnerability created 
through logistical movements where vessels offload of a large number of containers in a short 
period of time, placing pressure on the customs officers conducting inspections.  
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The last category of vulnerabilities at the PNYNJ, highlight the overall logistical 
vulnerability created by the shipment of large numbers of containers at the port, and how that 
assists networks with inserting illicit cargo into the maritime transportation system. 
7.11 Logistical vulnerabilities 
7.11A Cargo throughput 
The PNYNJ is the largest container port on the East and Gulf Coasts with significant 
growth over the past fifteen years, from 3,050,006 TEUs in 2000 to 5,772,303 in 2014 (PANYNJ 
2014d).  This nearly doubling in cargo reflects in part growing global trade but also the strength 
and attraction of the port as for import and export cargo.  While the absolute amount of cargo 
that moves through port increases vulnerability of the port by creating the impression that 
authorities cannot screen that amount of cargo (Zaitch 2002), the multi-terminal nature of any 
port, and in particular the PNYNJ, masks a more interesting observation. 
In the case described in the previous section, at least one longshore worker complained 
that container had been searched in a ship with only “a hundred moves” (Southern District of 
New York 2010).  He was referring to the 100 containers which were to be offloaded in Port 
Newark/Elizabeth and that, therefore, according to the conspirator, were more likely to be 
searched by CBP.  As vessels are built to house a greater capacity of containers (massification) 
unloading the vessels and having containers offloaded in a timely manner increases the pressure 
on customs officials to inspect the cargo.  Because companies stock goods based on just in time 
principles, and as the cargo capacity of a vessel grows, companies do not adjust their schedules 
to account for greater wait times due to customs inspections when a higher volume of cargo has 
to pass through in the same, short period of time.  Therefore, the vulnerability that the 
conspirator highlights supports using cargo throughput as a measure of vulnerability. 
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7.11B Export cargo vulnerability 
Cargo volumes at the PNYNJ have increased significantly over the past several years, 
however the percentage of export cargo has remained relatively stable at around 30% of all cargo 
volumes (Port Authority 2014D).  In 2015 (Port Authority 2015), there were 3,214,338 import 
TEUs and 1,391,625 exported containers, not counting containers marked as empty which 
constitute a greater portion than filled export containers.  Exports at the PNYNJ place the port in 
a medium level of vulnerability.  Though the level of exports as a percentage is in the 
medium/low range, the absolute number of export containers, and the high number of empty 
exported containers (1.7 million) create a large level of export container shipping which can 
serve to mask illicit shipments.   
7.11C Vessel traffic  
At the PNYNJ, container vessels constitute 41% of all vessels, which is above the 
average of 33% for the top 30 U.S. seaports (MARAD 2013).  The port scores low for the 
vulnerability combined with an above average presence of container vessels and the high level of 
cargo at the port. 
7.12 Discussion 
When coded using the SVF categories in the comparative port analysis, the PNYNJ codes 
a 52 out of 63 with the highest level of vulnerability of the top 30 U.S. seaports.  The analysis in 
this chapter provides further detail of vulnerability across all 21 vulnerability categories to show 
how a confluence of vulnerability has led the PNYNJ to have such a heightened level of 
vulnerability to criminal networks. 
The basis of this dissertation is that any individual vulnerability, whether an individual 
employee assisting a network or heightened vulnerability through a disproportionate amount of 
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cargo traffic does not alone create higher vulnerability at a port.  Instead, through a confluence of 
vulnerability, a port will have heightened vulnerability due to a combination of physical, 
administrative, and logistical vulnerabilities.  The PNYNJ presents a worst case scenario with 
organized crime influence in port operations and labor, a large amount of cargo throughput, a 
large peripheral sector with little regulation, and numerous incidents of employees in companies 
operating at the port and providing port labor participating in illicit trafficking.  What the 
preceding analysis shows is that anecdotal evidence when put to the test in combination with 
primary data sources, public sources, and through qualitative analysis of interviews with 
stakeholders produces a picture turning the anecdotal into the empirical. 
7.12A PNYNJ seaport vulnerability model  
The SVF analysis provides a method to identify how the physical, administrative, and 
logistical structural conditions at the PNYNJ increase vulnerability.  This can be visualized 
through a model that displays the level of vulnerability at the PNYNJ according to the 
vulnerability categories and their relative weight.  See Figure 6.  The model indicates that: 
1. The highest weighted categories at the PNYNJ display maximum vulnerability. 
2. Only five categories display a low level of vulnerability, and only one displays a medium 
level of vulnerability. 
3. Categories which have federal or international standards for security procedures such as 
interagency cooperation, through AMSCs, and physical/administrative procedures, 
through MTSA and SAFE Act standards, display a low level of vulnerability. 
4. Categories have to be considered from the broad level of vulnerability created, such as 
container throughput, to those which cause acute levels of vulnerability, such as 
employee or organization corruption.  Specific port vulnerability assessments will have to 
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qualitatively identify which categories cause the greatest vulnerability to prioritize 
security resources accordingly.  
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7.13B Confluence of vulnerability 
The key determination that can be made from this analysis of the port is that any activity 
that requires the use of a port will take advantage of multiple sets of vulnerabilities.  The case 
described in 7.10G Employee Corruption (Southern District of New York 2010) showed clearly 
how physical, administrative, and logistical vulnerability all contribute to a determination of 
whether a network chooses to use a port.  However, what that case also clearly demonstrates is 
that privileged access through personal connections can also be a heavy determinant of whether a 
port is used for illicit transfers.  The different types of vulnerability serve to make that initial 
decision to use the port a less risky venture for a network and contribute to the “port shopping” 
phenomena described by Shane (2010).  Vulnerabilities in that sense are clearly situated within 
the SCP literature which notes that an individual or group that wants to a commit crime will seek 
opportunities with the least risk and the greatest reward.  Ports at the high end of the 
vulnerability spectrum come closest to the platonic ideal of opportunity for network - low risk 
and a way point in acquiring high rewards. 
At the PNYNJ, a confluence of physical, administrative, and logistical vulnerabilities 
create the conditions that make the port a lower risk and higher reward port for exploitation by 
criminal networks.  Physical vulnerabilities such as the large open access yards and the multiple 
entry and exit points are exploited by networks to insert vehicles or extricate cargo (Southern 
District of New York 2010).  The size of the port itself across two states, multiple municipalities 
and jurisdictions, and the generally low presence of police at the port at any given time allow 
networks to exploit opportunities for physical movement (Former Police Chief WCNYH, 
10/1/2012).  The significant presence of vehicle traffic also contributes as an exacerbating 
vulnerability that criminal elements can and have used (Lantsman 2013).  Administrative 
vulnerability at the port is more nuanced since ports in the United States are subject to 
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requirements under the MTSA for interagency cooperation.  There is an increasing record of 
multi-stakeholder operations (Demeri 2012; Waterfront Commission 2012d; Waterfront 
Commission 2013e; Waterfront Commission 2015).  Relationships which once were poor and 
under-utilized are now stronger and more institutionalized through cooperative mechanisms such 
as the mandatory establishment of AMSCs. 
While official channels for cooperation are undergirded by local and national 
frameworks, other types of vulnerability, particularly through the influence of traditional 
organized crime groups in unions covering waterfront labor, continue to persist despite repeated 
attempts by law enforcement to enforce changes in the labor force (Waterfront Commission 
2014b).  Furthermore, key economic sectors that perform the actual labor for maritime cargo 
shipments display evidence of organized crime and criminal network use for illicit purposes.  In 
some cases, employees are victims with an increased potential for blackmail, and in other cases, 
entities are controlled or co-opted by networks to assist with illicit cargo movements.  Finally, 
the amount of throughput creates the conditions of logistical vulnerability that has been cited by 
networks themselves whether it is in the PNYNJ (Southern District of New York 2010) or other 
high volume ports (Zaitch 2002). 
This analysis examines past evidence of vulnerability, but ports are constantly changing 
in response to economic push and pull factors, complicating factors in the distribution of labor 
and hardware to move cargo, and a host of other factors not least of which is a changing 
workforce.  Those changing conditions will affect the vulnerability of the port and bear a closer 
examination at how the vulnerability of the port may change in coming years. 
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7.12C Vulnerability interactivity 
This analysis focuses on detailed examinations of how the PNYNJ rates on 21 categories 
of vulnerability, but one of the key determinations is that vulnerability at a port is not a function 
of a confluence of individual vulnerabilities but also the interaction between them which 
heightens or lowers the vulnerability of the port. 
At the PNYNJ, the epicenter of vulnerability is the historical presence of criminal 
networks functioning in various areas of port operations.  From this epicenter, incidents of 
employee corruption and companies with ownership associated with criminal networks are more 
likely to be present at the port.  In fact, it is possible to make a hypothetical argument that a port 
with a historical presence of criminal networks in port operations will display increased 
administrative vulnerability because this creates the environment in which criminal activity or 
low level corruption becomes associated with certain port sectors.  Actors in those sectors act 
then according to certain prescribed customs and practices, most of which are benign but some of 
which may support illicit activity at the port. 
The confluence of vulnerability is further heightened by the presence of a large peripheral 
company sector, as measured by the size of the freight forwarding sector.  In a shallow freight 
forwarding sector with few companies, the historical presence of criminal networks will likely 
have less effect than a port with both heightened vulnerability and a large forwarder sector.  A 
large freight forwarder sector creates more opportunities for criminal groups to gain 
organizational control, either through cooptation of a legitimate company or by creating their 
own wholly controlled entity.  A large forwarder sector also decreases the chance that regulatory 
agencies will identify the leadership and organizational associations with criminal networks.  For 
example, the regulatory oversight authority of the Waterfront Commission at the PNYNJ is 
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geographically limited, and at the federal level, the Federal Maritime Commission is limited by a 
lack of resources for oversight (Office of Inspector General 2012). 
Conversely, the lack of vulnerability in certain sectors will likely decrease the likelihood 
of vulnerability in others.  Using the same central vulnerability of historical criminal network 
presence, the lack of that vulnerability will likely reduce the severity of incidents of corruption 
both at the organizational level and at the employee level.  This can be seen at the Port of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach where a lack of historical criminal network involvement in port 
operations likely contributed to the lack of port corruption incidents at the organization and 
employee level (see Section 6.4C Port of LA/LB Vulnerability Assessment).  While the port does 
score high on the SVF, what this demonstrates is that a comparative analysis must be followed 
by a detailed case study to determine the exact level and scope of vulnerability. 
7.12D Changing environment at the PNYNJ  
In recent years, the Waterfront Commission has tried to diversify the longshore 
workforce at the port by recruiting outside of the main channels of hiring (WCNYH 2014c).  
There are practical positive implications for a more diverse workforce, not least of which will be 
that local communities which bear the brunt of the industrial and environmental impact of port 
operations will share in the financial benefits from longshore work.  However, there is also an 
implicit understanding that by disrupting the traditional source of labor at the port, diversifying 
the labor force to include those with no background of influence from traditional organized crime 
groups will assist in breaking the still evident influence that traditional organized crime groups in 
New York have on certain aspects of the unionized labor force (Executive Director, WCNYH 
9/28/2012).  Labor force diversification will likely have strong implications for the determination 
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of vulnerability in the employee and organizational corruption areas and requires close 
observation in the coming years. 
While labor force diversification has strong implications in the area of administrative 
vulnerability, broad changes in the shipping industry will have implications for vulnerability 
across all areas of the port.  The processes of atomization and massification means that larger 
vessels will be waiting at port for longer periods of time and disgorging larger quantities of 
containers (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2012).  Both of these processes are already evident in the 
greater size of vessels and the large peripheral company sector such as freight forwarders at the 
PNYNJ.  It is possible that those vulnerabilities that are affected by atomization will likely 
increase as greater amounts of cargo flow through the port in short time clusters.  Delays are 
already more evident at U.S. ports (Campo-Flores and McWhirter 2015), and enforcement 
agencies may not be able to adapt to regulate a larger amount of traffic with the expectation that 
it will make it to consignees in a reasonable period of time. 
7.13 Conclusion 
Seaport vulnerability is complex and multifaceted, and the PNYNJ is a key example of 
how even U.S. ports are subject to a confluence of vulnerability.  While some vulnerabilities are 
useful for the import of illicit cargo, particularly those in the labor sector, others in the freight 
forwarding sector create opportunities for criminal networks to export illicit cargo.  Conducting a 
case study analysis following a shorter analysis using the 15 categories analyzed in Chapter 6 is 
crucial to truly understand which vulnerabilities create the greatest opportunities for networks. 
At the PNYNJ, administrative vulnerability in specific labor and economic sectors creates 
those opportunities and which are exacerbated by physical vulnerabilities created by open 
structures and large numbers of trucks and peripheral companies.  As the labor landscape shifts, 
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this may change in coming years, and the port will require an updated vulnerability profile.  This 
approach mirrors that taken by federal law enforcement agencies.  This dissertation provides a 
parallel method of examining vulnerability but does not discount the vulnerability of the port to 
infrastructure disruption. In fact, some of the issues that are identified in U.S. Coast Guard and 
CBP vulnerability assessments overlap with those identified in this assessment.  These 
vulnerability assessments are discussed in the following chapter and show how the SVF provides 
a complementary method of assessing port vulnerability in the U.S. and abroad. 
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Chapter 8 – Policy implications 
In the United States, port security is primarily the mandate of the U.S. Coast Guard with 
support from other federal agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, state and local 
agencies.  With a disparate set of port security agencies, the methods to assess vulnerability at 
U.S. seaports focus on a wide variety of threats.  The primary port security assessment 
methodology in the United States was developed by the U.S. Coast Guard and focuses on 
infrastructure destruction and terrorism risks at U.S. ports.  To supplement this assessment 
framework, I demonstrate how an applied integrated theoretical Seaport Vulnerability 
Framework can be used to a theoretical model of criminological vulnerability at a port.  The 
policy implications of an additional tool to determine vulnerability allow stakeholders to focus 
attention on the everyday vulnerability of ports to criminal networks. 
This chapter examines primary assessment frameworks including the U.S. Coast Guard 
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) framework and CBP’s container targeting, 
the limitations of those frameworks, and the policy implications of the SVF for domestic and 
international port security assessment. 
8.1 Port security assessments 
As the previous analysis showed, port security is an interconnected inter-agency process 
with responsibilities spread across numerous organizations with different types of jurisdiction.  
Risk analysis and assessment responsibilities are appropriated similarly to various agencies 
operating in the port security sector.  Assessment is conducted based on multiple levels of 
oversight depending on the country where the port is located. 
At the international level, those countries which are party to the International Ship and 
Port Security Code (ISPS Code), are mandated to conduct port security facility assessments, 
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based on the concept of risk=threat X vulnerability X consequences (ISPS Code).  While ports 
and facilities are subject to port security assessment through the ISPS Code, most countries in 
customs agencies use various forms of risk analysis to target suspect containers in transit (WCO 
2011; WCO 2012).   
8.1A Maritime security policy 
 
At the highest level of maritime security policy in the United States, federal mandates for 
port security are determined by the U.S. Congress, with input from relevant maritime security 
agencies (GAO 2008; 2009; 2010; 2012; 2012b; 2015).  Agencies then develop port security 
rules through internal determinations which are subject to input from the public.  These internal 
rules can have a significant impact on what entails risk and vulnerability in the maritime 
transportation system (GAO 2012c).  As a result the focus of assessments and the primary risks 
focus have a significant impact on national level policy directives and strategic guidance which 
has in past years focused on addressing threats primarily to counter attacks on infrastructure 
which can lead to loss of life, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel 
Security Strategy (DHS 2008) and the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security 
(White House 2012).   
Strategic guidance in the area of crime at U.S. ports is a vestige of the pre-9/11 
environment when law enforcement concerns at ports were broadly addressed in the President’s 
Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports (Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. 
Seaports 2000).  That document broadly outlined the type of criminal activity at U.S. ports and 
provided recommendations, which were quickly overshadowed by the 9/11 attacks.  The attacks 
directed attention away from the daily criminal activity at U.S. ports and towards the terrorist 
black swan events which have yet to occur at any U.S. port. 
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8.1B Funding for port security 
The implications of current Coast Guard and CBP assessment structures for security 
funding cannot be overstated. Simply put, assessments determine which port districts receive 
funding to use towards port security (U.S. DHS 2008b).  The U.S. Coast Guard’s Office of Port 
and Facility compliance in concert with the DHS mandated Maritime Security Risk Analysis 
Model (MSRAM) tool determine the risk and vulnerability of facilities at Coast Guard districts 
and sectors.  This is one of the primary tools used to determine which ports are included in the 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) guidelines.  In the latest iteration of the PSGP for fiscal 
year 201570, the MSRAM tool is used to determine the highest risk ports, and those ports are the 
only ones eligible to receive PSGP funding (FEMA 2014).  Ports that MSRAM determines to not 
be vulnerable to terrorist attacks receive less funding, even though they may actually have a 
higher level of vulnerability to criminal networks. 
8.2 U.S. Assessment structures 
 The two port security assessment structures in the U.S. take a micro-perspective with a 
focus on identifying risk, whether risk of a facility being targeted for attack or a container used 
for illicit smuggling.  While this micro-focus allows both entities that utilize the risk analyses, 
U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, to make operational decisions it de-
focuses attention from the structural underlying conditions at seaports that make them more 
likely to be used by criminal networks.  
                                                            
70 Fiscal years refer to the time period October 1- September 31.  FY2015 therefore refers to October 1, 2014 
through September 31, 2015. 
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8.2A U.S. Coast Guard port security assessment  
At U.S. seaports, the Coast Guard uses the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model 
(MSRAM) to assess the vulnerability of U.S. seaports. MSRAM was developed in 2006 from an 
earlier iteration of the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool (PSRAT), which primarily focused on 
developing a risk analysis model to identify ports vulnerable to terrorist attacks (GAO 2011).  
Like PSRAT, MSRAM is a tool to understand and identify the vulnerability of U.S. seaports to 
terrorist attacks.  The components of MSRAM vulnerability focus on different attack modes on 
regulated port facilities.  As an example of the scale of MSRAM vulnerability analysis across the 
United States, there are more than 30,000 different facilities (Keating, Howard, and Arimoto 
2014), which are defined as targets under the MSRAM, and each targets receives a vulnerability 
analysis to determine vulnerability to an attack (GAO 2011). 
As MSRAM is the primary tool used to determine risk weights for ports, which then are 
classified on a high to low scale in the Port Security Grant Program, the assessment has 
significant financial impacts on the level of port security funding ports receive (GAO 2011).  
Since the MSRAM measures risk as a function of Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence, the 
most risky facilities are those which have the highest vulnerability and on which an attack will 
have the highest level of consequence (USCG).  Consequences are therefore weighed in favor of 
physical and infrastructure destruction.  This produces a “risk index number” assessment profile 
of port and their regulated facilities that favor mitigation and financial outlays to reduce the 
supposed impact of terrorist attacks or attacks against physical infrastructure (Cooper 2009).  As 
a result, this form of assessment does not fully capture the vulnerability of the port to criminal 
networks as their activities aim to exploit the system, not to cause damage or loss of life. 
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8.2B CBP cargo risk analysis 
Since 9/11, CBP has instituted numerous safeguards to identify suspect cargo entering 
and exiting the United States.  CBP conducts container security through a multi-layered 
approach, which focuses on targeting containers before they reach the United States through 
trusted company initiatives such as the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism program 
(O’Connell 2009; U.S. General Accounting Office 2012) or stationing CBP officers at large U.S. 
export ports overseas through the Container Security Initiative (Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Inspector General 2010).  Therefore, the primary method of vulnerability 
assessment is through individual risk targeting of container shipments through U.S. ports of 
entry.  To conduct these risk analysis, CBP uses the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that 
incorporates data from multiple systems to develop a risk summary for inbound and outboard 
cargo.  To assist in targeting, CBP instituted the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier 
Requirements (known as the 10+2 rule), which is a summary of specific information that must be 
included on a shipping manifest and entered into the ATS (Importer Security Filing and 
Additional Carrier Requirements).  In addition to data requirements, CBP mandates the 24 hour 
rule, which states that maritime shipment data must be entered more than 24 hours before cargo 
is scheduled to arrive in the United States (Congressional Budget Office 2016). 
However, while the risk targeting system creates sorting conditions to identify high risk 
shipments, an analysis conducted in 2015 by the Government Accountability Office found that 
less than one percent of all shipments between 2009 and 2013 were identified as high risk and of 
those, CBP could not even provide disposition data on the outcomes of the inspection of high 
risk cargo (GAO 2015).  In addition, CBP’s targeting units apply waiver criteria inconsistently 
and in other cases, incorrectly document the reasons for waivers (GAO 2015). 
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The ATS is considered a premier risk analysis methodology and is used as the basis for 
CBP assessments (Grover 2016).  The issues highlighted above underscore that even risk 
methodologies at the individual container level are not fool-proof if the agencies carrying them 
out do not have procedures in place to disseminate data and track outcomes (Grover 2016). 
8.2C Limitations of current structures 
Despite the significant policy focus on port security in the United States, the current 
assessment structures that provide the framework for determining vulnerability have two primary 
limitations, a lack of interagency coordination and an over focus on physical threats to 
infrastructure. 
8.3A Lack of interagency coordination  
Interagency coordination is a key component of port security and has repeatedly been 
highlighted in policy documents from the Interagency Commission on Crime at U.S. Seaports 
(2000) to the SAFE Port Act through the National Strategy on Global Supply Chain Security 
(White House 2012).  However, the determination of risk at U.S. ports, through the primary 
security funding opportunity (PSGP) does not take into consideration CBP’s perspective on 
container cargo security and targeting strategy (FEMA 2015).  When ports submit projects for 
review and approval the process provides space for interagency coordination to identify projects 
for funding but the agencies involved in that process are noted only as the U.S. Maritime 
Administration, Transportation Security Agency (which administers the TWIC program), and 
FEMA.  CBP which has a clearer understanding of which ports in the U.S. are destinations for 
illicit cargo is not part of the overall federal review structure (FEMA 2015).  This is further 
indication that the assessment methodology for the PSGP is not focused on cargo security and 
specifically identifying how U.S. ports are utilized by networks for illicit trafficking.  However, 
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as the smuggling networks that use the PNYNJ make clear, considerations of vessel size, the 
number of cargo shipments, and the physical security at the port itself are considerations that a 
group will take into account when determining how to use the port for illicit movement. 
In addition, Department of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), which undertakes investigations of illicit trafficking networks is likewise not included in 
the review process.  While CBP can provide perspective on trafficking methodologies, HSI’s 
focus on network structures is a key addition to identify which networks how use ports, 
informing mitigation procedures for the physical and administrative security.  
  By excluding these two key agencies in the determination of port security funding in the 
PSGP process, key insights and considerations are left out of the determination process. Ports 
with physical threats skew greater in the receipt of security funding, while ports with greater 
administrative vulnerability may not receive increased funds required to address those 
vulnerabilities.   
8.3B Focus on physical threats 
The majority of threat scenarios examined under the MSRAM assessment structure are 
heavily skewed towards threats to physical infrastructure where the consequences, vulnerabilities 
and mitigation strategies are better understood and more easily quantifiable (Keating, Howard, 
and Arimoto 2014).  Likewise, in the ISPS Code assessment structure because of the emphasis 
placed on immediate consequences, loss of human life, and the national and symbolic value of a 
threat scenario, the more commonplace occurrence of criminal network use of port facilities does 
not rate as high.  However, this is most unfortunate in consideration that the types of scenarios 
that receive high scores and high vulnerability of facilities to impacts are black swan events that 
rarely occur and have not occurred in the U.S. in recent memory. 
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8.4 Policy recommendations  
Under the MSRAM assessment structure, the SVF provides a framework for what would 
likely constitute only a handful of threat scenarios in the overall MSRAM structure, which has an 
estimated 100,000 attack scenarios (Keating, Howard, and Arimoto 2014).  This is purposeful 
considering the impact of the movement of illicit trade worldwide, most recently was estimated 
at between 8% and 15% of global gross domestic product (Buchanan and Chavarria 2015) with 
narcotics trafficking at roughly $750 billion to $1 trillion, counterfeit goods at $650 billion, and 
environmental crime at $20-40 billion.  If this figure is to include money laundering, then it rises 
to an astonishing $3 trillion compared with a legitimate global trade figure of about $10-12 
trillion (Organization of American States 2012). 
The SVF is designed to provide an alternative set of vulnerability categories to examine 
seaports and to augment the current assessment structures that view port security through the lens 
of counterterrorism.  By developing a seaport vulnerability model, port security stakeholders can 
identify additional areas of vulnerability in their port and target security resources accordingly.  
This will hopefully refocus the attention to the daily vulnerabilities at ports that make them 
attractive not as targets for infrastructure destruction, but rather as conduits for illicit trade.  
While not all of the vulnerability categories in the SVF may be applicable to current assessment 
structures, performing an SVF vulnerability assessment may provide an alternative picture of 
port vulnerability.  When used in concert with MSRAM assessments, the SVF provides a more 
holistic view of seaport vulnerability.  For example, ports which score high in the SVF may not 
be those with significant physical assets or targets but which may function as significant conduits 
of illicit cargo.  The Port of Apra in Guam, a port that has received almost no PSGP funding in 
previous years, has a heightened level of SVF vulnerability.  Even small increased investment in 
port security at Apra may have significant positive impacts.  On the other hand, one of the most 
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vulnerable ports based on MSRAM assessments and the SVF, the PNYNJ, has had high levels of 
investment through PSGP funding and yet continues to display the multi-faceted confluence of 
vulnerability described in detail in Chapter 7.  This is in part due to the complexity of the port 
structure, the ingrained use of port and maritime entities by criminal networks, and the 
exploitation of some of those entities by organized crime, which exposes the somewhat narrow 
focus of current port security policy.  
The SVF can assist not only port security stakeholders in understanding the comparative 
vulnerability of their own relative to other ports in the U.S., and around the world, but also assist 
U.S. government agencies in determining which seaports to work with on port security foreign 
assistance projects. The State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a wide ranging partnership program which works with domestic 
U.S. criminal justice agencies and port security agencies to assist U.S. foreign partner agencies 
(U.S. Department of State/Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
2015).   The State Department currently partners with the PortMiami (U.S. Department of State 
2013), Port of San Diego (U.S. Department of State 2015) and the Port of Long Beach (U.S. 
Department of State 2015a).  Port security agencies at these ports, including their law 
enforcement organizations, such as the Port of San Diego Harbor Police Department, PortMiami 
security division and Miami-Dade County Seaport Operations Bureau, and the City of Long 
Beach Police Department port security division have provided trainings for U.S. partners from 
countries as varied as Jamaica, Pakistan, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
While the foreign assistance requirements of the State Department are varied, by 
developing partnerships with domestic U.S. ports, the Department can project best practices at 
U.S. seaports to countries overseas.  The SVF can assist the State Department to determine 
which seaports to work with, and the disaggregation of the SVF provides a method to identify 
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which port security agencies may have greater experience dealing with issues of concern. For 
example, if the U.S. receives a request to support an overseas port that has a cargo theft problem, 
the SVF can be used to identify which seaports in the U.S. have the same problem to engage with 
law enforcement agencies at the port to identify how they address the problem.  Likewise, the 
Department can proactively use the SVF to conduct vetting of seaports before deciding which 
ports to develop partnerships with.  
8.4A International comparative assessment 
 
Though the SVF provides an additional method to assess vulnerability at U.S. ports it is 
also relevant for international comparative port security analysis.  It is designed to be able to 
provide a baseline measurement of vulnerability using public sources, either through media 
accounts or through data from aggregator institutions at the national or international level, such 
as the UN Comtrade database which compiles international trade data.  The SVF can be used to 
build a comparative measure of port vulnerability across ports from multiple countries on a 
regional or international basis.  This has already been conducted for ports of convenience for 
IUU (Petrossian, Marteache, and Viollaz 2014), but by using the SVF, researchers can create 
baseline vulnerability assessments to inform detailed studies of crimes which occur at or use port 
facilities.   
8.6 Conclusion 
The current port security assessment structures, the USCG MSRAM and CBP’s ATS, do 
not pay sufficient attention to the use of seaports by criminal networks.  The Seaport 
Vulnerability Framework developed in this dissertation and applied to the top 30 container ports 
in the United States and in a case study at the PNYNJ provides an additional assessment 
structure that when used in concert with other assessment tools, contributes to a holistic view of 
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seaport vulnerability.  In addition, the SVF can be used to assist the Department of State Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement in identifying which U.S. seaports to work with 
to provide international foreign assistance to. overseas port security partner agencies. 
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Chapter 9 Limitations and future directions for research 
There are several primary limitations in this dissertation which affect the conclusions 
gained from the comparative port analysis and case study analysis of the Port of New York and 
New Jersey (PNYNJ).  Detailed discussion of data quality and limitations for each vulnerability 
category are in Chapter 3, while this final section focuses on the broader limitations of the study.   
9.1 Sample size 
The sample size of the comparative port analysis, while attempting to capture the primary 
set of container shipping ports in the United States, does not factor in other characteristics which 
may be important for understanding seaport vulnerability.  For example, a different sample set 
could focus on the largest cruise ship ports in the United States and would have to factor into the 
analysis other vulnerability measures such as the quantity of passengers passing through the port, 
the average level of passengers per vessel, and others which would have to be developed from a 
pilot study at a large cruise ship port.   
9.2 Data reliability  
The number of data sources used in the Seaport Vulnerability Framework is a significant 
limitation.  Where possible, I used the same data source to measure baseline levels of 
vulnerabilities to provide a level of reliability.  However, a number of vulnerabilities use 
disparate data for measurement.  A key example of this is the vehicle traffic vulnerability, using 
daily truck traffic as a proxy.  There is no single repository for this type of data and widely 
disparate data sources were used to identify that statistic. In some cases, it was impossible to 
identify that information required, and ports do not publish this type of data as it can be used in 
economic determinations of port productivity or efficiency by competitors.  Also, in some ports, 
truck traffic may not be an adequate full proxy for vehicle traffic to the port, particularly those 
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which are embarkation ports for cruise ships which often have a large amount of private vehicle 
traffic not captured in the truck traffic daily measure, such as Port of Miami. 
9.3 Port crime data  
As with certain ports where it was not possible to identify daily truck traffic, the dark 
figure of crime at ports, a general concern in criminological research, must be considered a 
general limitation of the study.  The only figures which I was able to obtain to provide a measure 
of illicit activity across ports were CBP narcotics seizures at U.S. maritime ports of entry; 
however this is highly sensitive data not released for publication and cannot be referenced in this 
study.  Even with this data, seizures do not provide a true picture of the criminal network use of 
the maritime transportation system (Werb et al. 2011; Willis et al. 2011; Wern et al. 2013), since 
differing levels of interagency resources at seaports and informant networks have a great impact 
on the level seizures.  Ports without that may be significant conduit points of illicit cargo yet 
have no official seizures. 
In other cases, research identified other tantalizing leads which could not be fully 
examined due to a lack of data.  For example, during research at the PNYNJ, an interesting 
relationship between daily container shipping and criminal network choice structuring was 
highlighted by a criminal conspirator in wiretap transcripts.  Clusters of container offloads on a 
yearly, monthly, daily, terminal and vessel basis all become valid measures of determining 
vulnerability from the broad (annual) to the granular (vessel) level.  Unfortunately shipping 
terminals consider TEU data proprietary information since it can be used in negotiations with 
port authorities for subsidies and other economic incentives, and data at the vessel level, such as 
average number of offloads per vessel, is not available. 
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9.4 Data quality  
Both the comparative vulnerability analysis and the PNYNJ case study uses data that is 
not recent.  This was most often the case with the vehicle traffic vulnerability.  But in some 
cases, this was also present in the measurement for illicit import/export market where part of the 
factor for that vulnerability included suspect vehicle data from 2003 to 2008.  Vulnerability 
measurements in this study relied on public data sources to identify evidence of vulnerability, 
triangulated across multiple sources where possible.  However, in some ports data was dated, and 
this necessitates updating of the SVF on a periodic basis.  This is consistent with other 
vulnerability assessment frameworks such as MSRAM, which require re-assessment every few 
years.  In addition, even in ports with current public sources, as described in detail in Chapter 3, 
the limitations of using public sources are manifold and have to be weighed carefully in the 
determination of vulnerability in a port. 
9.5 Considerations for further research  
 
Despite the limitations highlighted above following the comparative analysis, a number 
of propositions of heightened vulnerability bear further discussion for refinement in future 
comparative analyses. 
Container vessel calls:  Not only did the top ten most vulnerable ports not receive a high score 
on this vulnerability, they displayed an average score that was lower than the remaining 20 ports, 
with an average of .9 for the top ten ports and 1.9 for the remaining 20.  The proposition states 
that ports which do not have a have a high level of container ship traffic will be more vulnerable 
due to less experience in managing container vessel security.  Instead, it appears that ports with 
high levels of container ship traffic are more vulnerable when measured across the other 
vulnerability categories.  It may be that the ports in the top ten as some of the highest container 
  
196 
 
shipping ports in the country are more vulnerable because they have so much container shipping, 
the experience of their law enforcement agencies be damned, something implied by drug 
traffickers interviewed by Zaitch (2002).  However this does not explain why other high 
container shipping ports such as Houston or Savannah do not score in the top ten.  One of the 
factors, which may explain this is that ports which have high levels of container shipping, as 
opposed to bulk or other vessels, are serving larger consumer regions, which has implications on 
the size of the illicit market in the region as well.  Further research should examine in further 
detail the relationship between the types of vessels that call at ports and their vulnerability to 
criminal networks. 
Interagency cooperation:  While this is a key vulnerability to measure in port regions, U.S. 
ports do not register heightened vulnerability in this area due to the mandated federal law for 
AMSCs.  In other ports around the world, this is likely of greater concern, but for the 
measurement schema under the SVF, it registered no score for any port in the sample.  From 
experience working in federal agencies, interagency cooperation is a strong area of concern, but 
to develop comparative measures across specific units of analysis such as seaports, is beyond the 
scope of this study.  Case study analysis at a specific seaport should be conducted to identify 
more granular levels of vulnerability in this category. 
Vehicle traffic:  While the level of vehicle traffic is an important consideration of vulnerability, 
most ports in the United States registered for a high level of vulnerability.  Further research 
could identify where heightened levels of vehicle traffic are a vulnerability because of interaction 
with other vulnerabilities, such as decreased levels of physical or administrative security 
procedures. 
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Appendix A: Port security initiatives 
 
Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
One of the primary container security programs, C-TPAT creates expedited relationships 
between private companies and CBP. Containers from companies and agents in the C-TPAT 
program are generally exempt from in-depth screening and are expedited through the supply 
chain.  This program is designed to create institutional cultures that incorporate security concerns 
directly into their business operations71. However, critics have noted that its success has been 
measured by the number of companies in the program and not by its security effectiveness 
(O’Connell 2009; U.S. General Accounting Office 2012). 
 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Another key program, the CSI operates in up to 53 seaports worldwide (U.S. CBP 2009), 
and was implemented to inspect containers for suspicious material before they reach U.S. ports 
(Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 2010). Despite its broad 
geographic reach, standard operating procedures differ widely across participating seaports and 
contribute to decreased security effectiveness (Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Inspector General 2010).  
 
Safe Freight Initiative (SFI) 
SFI is a CBP program which was designed following recommendations from the 9-11 
Commission. The SFI attempts to screen 100% of outbound cargo from a few select international 
ports for radiological and nuclear material (U.S. General Accounting Office 2012).  As of 2009, 
these included two phases of deployment. One set of ports deployed scanning equipment to 
capture data on all containers bound to the United States72. Three other ports have an initial 
deployment to learn how to integrate the new technology with port operations and commerce 
flow73: Port Salalah in Oman, Port of Singapore, and Port Busan in Korea (Gamman Terminal).  
However, following a CBP review which noted that at Singapore and Busan, South 
Korea a maximum of only 5% U.S.-bound containers were screened, the 100% screening 
requirement has been pushed back to July 2014 (U.S. General Accounting Office 2012).   
SAFE Framework74 
Concurrent with the U.S. led container security initiatives discussed above, worldwide 
container and port security initiatives have also been developed post 9-11.  One of the largest and 
most comprehensive efforts was led by the WCO beginning in 2007 and is known as the SAFE 
Framework (WCO 2012). It consists of four primary directives (WCO 2011; 2012): (1) 
harmonizing advance electronic cargo information requirements; (2) employing risk 
management approaches to security; (3) at the request of one nation the sending nation's 
Customs administration will perform an outbound inspection of high-risk containers and cargo; 
(4) and the SAFE Framework defines benefits that Customs agencies will provide to businesses 
that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best practices.  However physical security 
at ports is not fully addressed under this framework. 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code) 
                                                            
71However, the program is open to mainly U.S. and Mexican companies and does not fully incorporate overseas 
entities that may be the origin of greater amounts of suspicious goods (Thibault et al. 2006). 
72 Port Qasim, Pakistan; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; and Southampton, United Kingdom 
73 Port Salalah, Oman; Port of Singapore; and Port Busan (Gamman Terminal), South Korea 
74 See Appendix A for participating countries 
  
198 
 
To address security at seaports, in 2004 the member states of the Safety of Law at Sea 
convention (SOLAS) adopted the ISPS code (Goulielmos&Anastasakos 2005). The code set 
mandatory security requirements (Part A) for port authorities, governments and shipping 
companies75, in addition to providing non-mandatory best practices recommendations (Part B).  
As a result of this double faceted implementation approach there are varied levels of compliance 
at seaports worldwide (Goulielmos and Anastasakos 2005).  In some developed economies such 
as Sweden, implementation of Part A of the code has been sporadic and difficult due to weak 
links in the transportation system and the complexity of even those seaports (Wengelin 2006).  In 
the developing world, efforts have been made by countries in Africa, the Black Sea area and 
Latin America to invest resources to achieve ISPS compliant seaports, and benefits have been 
realized from these investments, including reduced theft and pilferage and increased customs 
revenues (Kruk and Donner 2008).  
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operates the International Port Security 
Program, where USCG officers visit foreign ports to determine whether their security practices 
meet ISPS standards and provide advice and assistance on security best practices (GAO 2010).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
75 These recommendations including creating port security plans; training staff to carry out drills and exercises; 
identifying security related technology; creating effective measures to monitor and control access to facilities; and 
implementing security communication systems. 
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Appendix B: Small vessel (panga) interceptions  
 
Table 11: Panga interceptions 
Date 
# of 
Vessels 
Type of 
Cargo 
Quantity 
(pounds, bales, 
individuals) Location Nearest port Reference 
1/16/2014 1 Migrants 18 Manalapan  Fort Lauderdale 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-16-
000000/smuggler-lands-migrants-then-flees-bahamas 
3/12/2014 1 Migrants 7   fort Lauderdale 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-12-000000/us-
border-patrol-arrests-human-smugglers-florida-1 
3/26/2014 1 Migrants 10 
Dania Beach 
Station Fort Lauderdale 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-26-
000000/smuggling-event-under-investigation-fort-lauderdale 
12/26/201
4 1 drugs n/a 
Hutchinson 
Island Fort Lauderdale 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-12-15-000000/border-
patrol-agents-encounter-maritime-smuggling 
1/15/2014 1 Migrants 11 Palm Beach 
Fort Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-15-000000/border-
patrol-arrests-bahamian-smuggler-11-migrants 
11/21/201
1 1 Marijuana 4500 Gulfport, MS 
Gulfport, New 
Orleans 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-11-24-050000/gulf-
coast-taskforce-seizes-sailboat-4500-pounds 
  
 
 
2
0
0
 
1/4/2012 1 Marijuana 2,500 pounds 
Deer Creek 
road beach 
Hueneme, Los 
Angeles, Long 
Beach 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-01-04-050000/cbp-us-
border-patrol-agents-arrest-ten-following 
3/9/2010 1 Marijuana 2448 pounds 
Santa Rosa 
Island 
Los Angeles, 
Long Beach, 
Hueneme 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-09-050000/cbp-
marine-agents-seize-more-1-ton-marijuana-santa 
1/31/2012 1 Marijuana 2,575 pounds 
Point Dume 
State Beach 
Los Angeles, 
Long Beach, 
Hueneme 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-01-31-050000/three-
mexican-nationals-arrested-following 
7/27/2012 1 Marijuana 6600 
Las Flores 
Beach 
Los Angeles, 
Long Beach, 
Hueneme 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-27-040000/us-
border-patrol-agents-interdict-drug-smuggling-boat 
7/12/2012 1 Migrants 19 Boot key Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-12-040000/border-
patrol-agents-apprehend-19-cuban-migrants 
2/26/2015 1 Migrants 10 
west 
ofBahamas Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-02-26-000000/cbp-air-
and-marine-apprehend-migrants-near-miami 
2/23/2010 1 Migrants 5 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-02-23-050000/miami-
sector-border-patrol-agents-intercept-migrants 
2/16/2012 1 Migrants 12 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-30-040000/cuban-
smuggler-us-citizen-boat-operator-sentenced 
3/30/2012 1 Migrants 2 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-09-11-040000/us-
border-patrol-nabs-bahamian-smuggler-sentenced-36 
  
 
 
2
0
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3/30/2012 1 Migrants N/a 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-30-040000/cbp-
jacksonville-air-branch-foils-maritime-human 
4/11/2012 1 Marijuana 423 pounds 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-28-
040000/bahamian-sentenced-18-months-incarceration 
5/6/2012 1 Migrants 14 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-11-14-
050000/bahamian-national-sentenced-7-years-alien-smuggling 
6/30/2012 1 Migrants 2 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-11-07-
050000/bahamian-sentenced-three-years-after-smuggling-two 
6/12/2013 1 Migrants 11 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-06-12-040000/haitian-
aggravated-felon-sentenced-6-months-prison 
1/14/2014 1 Migrants 11 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-15-000000/border-
patrol-arrests-bahamian-smuggler-11-migrants 
1/16/2014 1 Migrants 17 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-01-16-
000000/smuggler-lands-migrants-then-flees-bahamas  
3/12/2014 1 Migrants 7 
west Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-12-000000/us-
border-patrol-arrests-human-smugglers-florida-1 
12/15/201
4 1 Migrants N/a 
West Palm 
Beach, FL 
Palm Beach, Fort 
Lauderdale, 
Miami 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-12-15-000000/border-
patrol-agents-encounter-maritime-smuggling 
  
 
 
2
0
2
 
10/11/201
2 1 cocaine 1452 
south coast 
PR ponce 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-10-11-040000/cbp-
and-coast-guard-intercept-go-fast-vessel-1452 
12/3/2013 1 Marijuana 723 
south coast 
PR ponce 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-12-03-000000/cbp-
seizes-10-bales-cocaine-reaching-southern-puerto 
3/5/2014 1 Marijuana 2432 
south coast 
PR Ponce 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-03-05-000000/cbp-
intercepts-go-fast-vessel-38-bales-cocaine 
5/26/2009 1 Migrants 24 Encinitas San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-05-26-040000/24-
arrested-early-morning-maritime-smuggling-attempt 
6/9/2009 1 Migrants 22 Del Mar San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-06-09-040000/border-
patrol-nabs-22-illegal-immigrants-california 
7/18/2009 1 Migrants 11 
Torrey Pines 
State Park San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-06-18-040000/border-
patrol-thwarts-3-smuggling-schemes-arrest-44 
7/19/2009 1 Migrants 20 
south Ponto 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-07-17-040000/20-
mexican-nationals-arriving-smuggling-boat-nabbed 
8/21/2009 1 Migrants 23 
Carlsbad State 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-08-21-040000/border-
patrol-agents-intercept-23-illegal-aliens 
10/2/2009 1 Migrants 21 
Carlsbad State 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-10-02-040000/border-
patrol-arrests-21-carlsbad-state-beach 
  
 
 
2
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10/13/200
9 1 Migrants 6 La Jolla San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-10-13-040000/2-
suspected-smugglers-nabbed-sea-la-jolla-coast 
11/10/200
9 1 Migrants 24 
Cardiff By the 
Sea San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-11-10-050000/border-
patrol-air-and-marine-coordinated-effort 
12/2/2009 1 Migrants 22 Leucadia  San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-12-02-050000/cbp-
stops-boat-calif-coast-22-illegal-immigrants 
1/19/2010 1 Migrants 15 
Torrey Pines 
State Park San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-01-19-050000/cbp-
halts-deadly-illegal-immigration-attempt-torrey 
3/3/2010 1 Marijuana 997 pounds Mission Bay San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-03-050000/cbp-
stops-2-smuggling-sea-attempts 
3/3/2010 1 Migrants 17 Leucadia  San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-03-03-050000/cbp-
stops-2-smuggling-sea-attempts 
4/11/2010 1 Migrants 8 Ocean Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/san-
diego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling 
4/12/2010 1 Migrants 5 Mission Bay San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/san-
diego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling 
4/13/2010 1 Migrants 11 
San Onfore 
Nuclear 
Generating 
Station San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/san-
diego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling 
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4/14/2010 1 Migrants 23 
Marine 
Beach, Camp 
Pendleton San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/san-
diego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling 
4/15/2010 1 Migrants 8 Swami Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-15-040000/san-
diego-cbp-agents-thwart-fifth-maritime-smuggling 
4/19/2010 1 Migrants 20 Ponto Beach  San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-04-19-040000/joint-
maritime-enforcement-efforts-stops-smuggling  
6/2/2010 1 Migrants 12 Dog Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-06-02-040000/boat-
14-million-marijuana-nabbed-us-border-patrol 
7/5/2010 1 Marijuana 1398 pounds San Diego San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-06-040000/three-
failed-smuggling-attempts-sea-yield-34-illegal 
7/6/2010 1 Migrants 15 
Oceanside 
Harbor San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-06-040000/three-
failed-smuggling-attempts-sea-yield-34-illegal 
7/6/2010 1 Migrants 13 
Pendleton 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-06-040000/three-
failed-smuggling-attempts-sea-yield-34-illegal 
7/19/2010 1 Migrants 22 
Oceanside 
Harbor San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-07-19-
040000/smuggling-attempt-thwarted-calif-coast 
7/31/2010 1 Migrants 23 La Jolla San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-08-04-040000/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agents-stop-2-illegal 
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9/1/2010 1 Migrants 20 
Carlsbad State 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-09-01-040000/cbp-
arrests-20-maritime-smuggling-attempt-carlsbad 
9/1/2010 1 Migrants 4 Point Loma San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-08-04-040000/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agents-stop-2-illegal 
10/5/2010 1 Migrants 21 
San Luis 
Obispo Place San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-05-040000/cbp-us-
border-patrol-agents-spoil-maritime-smuggling  
10/15/201
0 1 Migrants 21 
Carlsbad State 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-
releases/all?field_date_release_value[min][date]=&field_date_release_value[ma
x][date]=&field_newsroom_type_tid_1=All&body_value=panga&page=1  
10/18/201
0 1 Migrants 7 n/a San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-18-040000/us-
customs-and-border-protection-cbp-agents-disrupt 
10/18/201
0 2 Migrants 4 
Imperial 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-18-040000/us-
customs-and-border-protection-cbp-agents-disrupt 
10/18/201
0 1 Migrants 13 
Torrey Pines 
State Park San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-10-18-040000/us-
customs-and-border-protection-cbp-agents-disrupt 
2/8/2011 1 Migrants 17 
Camp 
Pendleton San diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-08-050000/border-
patrol-disrupts-maritime-smuggling-attempts 
2/14/2011 1 Migrants 18 
San Onofre 
State Park San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-14-050000/cbp-us-
border-patrol-stops-north-county-maritime 
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2/23/2011 1 Migrants 11 
Pendleton 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-23-050000/cbp-us-
border-patrol-stops-maritime-smuggling-attempt 
3/1/2011 1 Marijuana 399 
Del Mar 
beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-03-01-050000/border-
patrol-nets-boatload-drugs-north-county 
4/1/2011 1 Migrants 6 Black's Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/san-
diego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several 
4/4/2011 1 Migrants 15 Solana Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/san-
diego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several 
4/4/2011 1 Marijuana 740 Dana Point San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/san-
diego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several 
4/4/2011 1 Migrants 4 Shelter Island  San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/san-
diego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several 
4/5/2011 1 Migrants 16 
La Jolla, 20 
miles west San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-04-07-040000/san-
diego-maritime-unified-command-foils-several 
6/13/2011 1 Marijuana 1543.04 
Near Camp 
Pendleton San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-06-13-040000/agents-
stop-925k-marijuana-calif-maritime-smuggling  
8/12/2011 1 Marijuana 741 
Near Camp 
Pendleton San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-08-12-
040000/maritime-law-enforcement-partners-foil-drug-smuggling 
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11/15/201
1 1 Marijuana 1460 
Carlsbad State 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-11-15-050000/us-
border-patrol-agents-thwart-maritime-drug 
6/13/2012 1 Marijuana 4087 pounds 
Deer Creek 
Beach  San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-06-13-040000/us-
border-patrol-agents-seize-24m-narcotics-land-and 
7/12/2012 1 Migrants 6 Point Loma San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-17-
040000/multiple-dhs-agencies-san-diego-collaborate-intercept 
7/15/2012 1 Migrants 21 
Torrey Pines 
State Park San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-17-
040000/multiple-dhs-agencies-san-diego-collaborate-intercept 
7/16/2012   migrants 1 
Imperial 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-07-16-040000/us-
border-patrol-agents-intercept-maritime-smuggling 
8/14/2012 1 Migrants 15 Ocean Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-14-040000/us-
border-patrol-agents-arrest-15-failed-maritime 
9/4/2012 1 Migrants 12 
Oceanside 
Harbor San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-09-04-040000/us-
border-patrol-agents-arrest-12-mexican-nationals 
2/5/2013 1 Marijuana 1196.8 pounds 
Crystal Cove 
State Park San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-02-05-050000/us-
border-patrol-prevents-two-drug-smuggling-attempts  
2/12/2013 1 Marijuana 2938 pounds 
Ponto State 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-02-12-050000/us-
border-patrol-agents-seize-more-4-million-worth 
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6/13/2013 1 Migrants 20 
Newport 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-06-13-040000/us-
border-patrol-agents-thwart-smuggling-attempts 
8/7/2013 1 Marijuana 38 bales La Jolla San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-08-07-040000/cbp-
stops-panga-more-4-million-marijuana-california 
11/14/201
3 1 Marijuana 878 Del Mar San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-11-14-000000/cbp-
san-diego-stop-maritime-drug-smuggling-event 
11/22/201
3 4 Marijuana 297 
Imperial 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-11-22-000000/cbp-
stops-several-kayaks-california-coast-loaded 
12/20/201
3 1 Marijuana 1500 pounds 
95 miles SW 
of SD San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2013-12-20-000000/cbp-
and-coast-guard-stop-1500-pound-marijuana 
2/24/2014 1 
Methamphe
tamine-  540.5 pounds 
Oceanside 
Harbor San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-02-24-000000/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agents-stop-boat-oceanside 
5/2/2014 1 Migrants 2 
Imperial 
Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-05-02-000000/illegal-
aliens-rescued-open-water-after-abandoned-jet 
6/13/2014 2 Marijuana 130 bales 
International 
waters- 160 
miles SW of 
SD San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-06-13-000000/cbp-
and-uscg-net-more-ton-marijuana-southern 
8/27/2014 1 Migrants 20 Del Mar San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-08-27-000000/cbp-
office-air-and-marine-nets-20-illegal-aliens 
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9/24/2014 1 Migrants 15 
Mission 
Beach, CA San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-09-26-000000/cbp-
san-diego-nets-15-illegal-aliens-southern 
2/9/2015 2 Migrants 4 
Coronado 
Silver Strand 
State Beach San Diego 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-02-09-000000/four-
illegal-aliens-jet-skis-intercepted 
6/2/2010 1 Marijuana N/a 
Windandsea 
beach San diego  
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2010-06-02-040000/boat-
14-million-marijuana-nabbed-us-border-patrol 
2/8/2011 1 Migrants 14 Tijuana River San Diego  
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-08-050000/border-
patrol-disrupts-maritime-smuggling-attempts 
5/2/2011 1 Migrants n/a Ponto Beach  San Diego  
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-05-02-040000/federal-
agents-thwart-maritime-alien-smuggling 
8/24/2012 1 Marijuana 2357 pounds 
Catalina 
Island 
San Diego, Long 
Beach, Los 
Angeles 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-08-24-040000/seven-
charged-after-cbp-stops-attempt-smuggle-more 
5/20/2014 1 Migrants 17 
Santa Catalina 
Island 
San Diego, Long 
Beach, Los 
Angeles 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-05-20-000000/agents-
foil-human-smuggling-event-near-catalina 
1/19/2015 1 Marijuana n/a 
Santa Catalina 
Island 
San Diego, Long 
Beach, Los 
Angeles 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2015-01-19-000000/cbp-
helicopter-deploys-warning-shots-stop-panga-boat 
2/1/2011 1 Migrants 8 
Calafia State 
Beach 
San Diego, Los 
Angeles, Long 
Beach 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2011-02-01-050000/us-
border-patrol-foils-maritime-smuggling-attempt 
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8/10/2009 1 Migrants 22 
Torrey Pines 
State Park San Digo 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-08-10-040000/22-
mexican-nationals-boat-nabbed-san-diego-coast 
5/7/2012 1 cocaine 339.5 dorado pr San Juan 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2012-05-07-040000/cbig-
ccsf-law-enforcement-authorities-seize-154-kilos 
4/2/2014 1 Marijuana 3912 n/a San Juan 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-04-02-000000/cbp-
hsi-seize-3912-pounds-cocaine-north-coast-puerto 
4/14/2014 1 Marijuana 3373 n/a San Juan 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-04-04-000000/cbp-
hsi-seize-428-million-cocaine-shipment-southern 
8/22/2009 1 Marijuana 132 
Bellingham 
WA seattle, Tacoma 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2009-08-22-040000/cbp-
marine-unit-halts-smuggling-attempt-canadians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2
1
1
 
 
  
212 
 
Appendix C- Vessel calls  
 
Developed from U.S. Maritime Administration statistics on vessel calls at U.S. seaports 
(MARAD 2013) 
Figure 7: Vessel calls by port and type of vessel 
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Appendix D: Seaport study sample  
 
Developed from 2013 NAFTA Regional Container Traffic Survey 
Table 12: Seaport study sample (AAPA 2013) 
Port (State/Province)  Container Traffic 2013 
Los Angeles/Long Beach 14,599,145 
New York/New Jersey 5,467,345 
Savannah 3,034,010 
Oakland 2,346,460 
Hampton Roads 2,223,532 
Houston  1,950,071 
Tacoma  1,886,678 
Charleston  1,601,366 
Seattle  1,574,994 
San Juan (Fiscal Year) 1,269,902 
Honolulu (Fiscal Year) 1,078,341 
Port Everglades (Fiscal Year)  927,544 
Jacksonville (Fiscal Year)  926,810 
Miami (Fiscal Year)  901,454 
Anchorage 705,230 
Baltimore  705,230 
New Orleans  451,058 
Philadelphia 367,499 
Wilmington (DE)  329,200 
Wilmington (NC)  260,363 
Palm Beach (Fiscal Year) 254,664 
Mobile   224,614 
Gulfport  209,665 
Boston 195,303 
Portland (OR)  178,451 
Apra (Guam) 169,816 
Freeport 107,394 
Hueneme 99,334 
San Diego 98,651 
Kahului (Fiscal Year) 82,785 
Top 30 ports capture 99.3% of 
total U.S. container traffic 44,226,909 
    
2013 Total U.S. Container 
traffic  44,532,000 
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Appendix E: Seaport Vulnerability Framework Dataset (10 most vulnerable ports)  
 
Table 13: Seaport Vulnerability Framework Dataset (10 most vulnerable ports) 
SVF Data 
Matrix 
Port Security 
Container 
Dollars  
Open structure (Google Maps) Spatial Concentration of CRAVED goods  Peripheral companies 
(forwarders.com) 
LA/LB 285327103/1459
9155= $19.54 
per 2013 
container 
 
Both ports features multiple access points 
for multiple terminals, and port 
warehouse areas 
(GoogleMaps) 
CES location is within 5 minutes of the Port of 
LA/Long Beach within 3 miles 
(http://www.pricetransfer.com/centralized-
examination-station.html) 
694 forwarders in LA/Long 
Beach area= 7,868,582 (LA 
2013) + 6,730,573 (Long 
Beach 2013)= 14599155 
694/14599155 X 10000= 
.47 
NY/NJ 292384478/5,52
9,908 = $52.87 
per 2013 
container 
 
a) multiple entrances. Some terminals are 
essentially open access, such as PNCT 
GoogleMaps) 
b) major roads are near almost every 
terminal- i.e. the I-95 borders the three 
major terminals in Elizabeth and Jersey 
City 
c)every terminal has an open container 
yards -physical observation of the Port of 
NY/NJ, 4 separate trips as part of 
WCNYH work 
a) Four CES centralized CES locations at the 
port that handle high value cargo. 
B) Several CES locations are within the port 
C) numerous warehouse companies in the port 
region house high value goods 
http://www.panynj.gov/port/centralized-
examination-stations.html 
within 3 miles 
Forwarders 
487 forwarders listed in 
NY  
135 in NJ.  
622 total 
460,825 Avg. TEUs per 
month  
NYNJ score for freight 
forwarders= 13.49 
149 drayage companies 
servicing NYNJ 
NYNJ score for drayage 
companies= 3.23 
Hampton 
Roads-
Norfolk 
52466462/22235
32 = $23.59 per 
2013 container 
Multiple entry/exit points in both Norfolk 
International Terminals and Newport 
News Marine Terminal (GoogleMaps) 
The Newport News Marine Terminal facility is a 
U.S. Customs-designated port of entry, and the 
full range of customs functions is available to 
customers, including bonded storage areas. 
(http://www.portofvirginia.com/facilities/newpo
rt-news-marine-terminal-nnmt/) 
(16/185294) X 10000= .8 
Charleston 55829741/16013
66= $34.86 
Port of Charleston is composed of 5 
terminals (Wando Welch, North 
Charleston, Columbus Street, Union Pier, 
and Veterans) , within one mile of large 
public access highways, and with the 
container serving terminals with open 
CES location is not on the port.  High value 
goods may be stored at warehouses on the port 
(http://www.port-of-
charleston.com/Cargo/Logistics/WarehouseData
basePDF.pdf) 
 
87/133447 X  10000= 6.5 
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yards. (http://www.port-of-
charleston.com/Cargo/Facilities/charlesto
n/terminals/terminals.asp 
ATS Logistics. is the CES located 14 miles from 
the port 
http://scbiznews.com/news/automotive/48702 
San Juan 25971259/12699
02= $20.45 per 
2013 container 
Five of the Port of San Juan's eight cargo 
terminals are located in the Puerto Nuevo 
district, and three are located in the 
Guaynabo municipality.  (GoogleMaps) 
 
To reach the five terminals at Puerto 
Nuevo there are multiple entry points, 
with a main entrance and at least two 
other side entrance. A major expressway 
JFK 2 is directly adjacent to the port. 
N/A 46/105285 X 10000=4.36 
Port 
Everglades 
26073293/92754
4= $28.11 per 
2013 container 
The main terminal Port Everglades 
Terminal has one entrance. 
The two smaller terminals including Holt 
breakbulk terminal have multiple entry 
/exit points directly into Ft. Lauderdale  
(GoogleMaps) 
http://www.hostterminals.com/port/port-
everglades-dry-bulk-yachts-project-
containerized-cargo-shipping-fort-
lauderdale-fl/ 
 
http://www.fitpev.com/aboutus.php 
CES station is located with IWS 3400 
Macintosh street directly near the port within 3 
miles 
697/ 77295 X 10000= 90 
Miami 42410430/90921
7= $46.64 per 
2013 container 
PortMiami is located on an island, with 
one primary overland entrance. Recently a 
tunnel was built but is heavily monitored 
with CCTV. (GoogleMaps) 
http://www.shiplilly.com/white-
papers/PortMiami-Tunnel-The-New-
Standard-in-Transportation-
Infrastructure.pdf) 
CES Location at the port  within 3 miles 
http://www.cipsmiami.com 
1500 Port Blvd 
Miami, FL 33132 
697 forwarders/75768 avg. 
monthly teu X 10,000=91 
Baltimore 47131517/67785
6= $69.53 per 
2013 container 
1a) Multiple entry/exit points due to 
multi-terminal set up throughput the 
Baltimore harbor 1b) ports are near 
multiple public access roads including I-
95 c) containers at Dundalk and SeaGirt 
terminals 1c) containers out in the open 
(GoogleMaps) 
The Port of Baltimore has a CES location 
operated by a private warehousing firms, Banks, 
within 3 miles of the main container terminal 
http://beltslogistics.com/warehouse%20locations
.htm 
92/56488 X 10000=39 
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New Orleans 135445306/451,
058 = $300.28 
1) Primary section has numerous entry 
exist points along the Clarence Henry 
Truckway, with numerous unguarded 
entry points along the railway entrances 
along the wharfs. 
Port of NOLA is OPEN STRUCTURE 
(GoogleMaps) 
There is one CES facility directly located on the 
seaport facility at Napoleon Avenue 
54 forwarders/ 299869  X 
10^3= 1.8 
Apra  8292047/169816
= $48.82 per 
2013 container 
Only container terminal has one access 
road in. Containers are kept in open 
access yard. 
(GoogleMaps) 
No public record of a CES.  In the 2012 Annual 
Plan a Customs Inspection Station is noted as 
something that would be ideal for future 
construction.  However as Apra is the only 
container port in the territory it likely does 
contain a variety of valuable CRAVED products 
due to lack of space elsewhere on the island for 
storage. 
19/14151 X 10000=13 
http://www.cargoyellowpa
ges.com/guam_freight_for
warders_cargo_agents.html 
 
 
SVF Data Matrix Truck traffic  Intermodal connections  SCP techniques  Throughput  
LA/LB 22,466 daily truck trips/ 39997= 
56.7http://www.polb.com/econo
mics/stats/yearly_teus.asp; 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/
maritime/stats.asp; 
http://www.polb.com/civica/file
bank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=337
1 
a) Multiple railway connections, 
through on-dock rail, and the 
Intermodal Container Transfer 
Facility (ICTF) (Near-dock) 
b) Half of TEUs are moved by 
rail, due to heavy hinterland 
movement of cargo 
c) Burbank Airport, LAX 
d) and a heavy short haul 
trucking presence (56.7) 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/
facilities/rail_intermodal_yards.a
sp 
http://www.polb100.com/publica
tions/railguide/index.html 
Target Hardening: yes 
Access Control: yes TWIC 
Screen exits: no 
Extend guardianship: no 
Natural Surveillance: yes 
Reduce anonymity: yes  
Use of place managers: no 
Formal surveillance: yes 
Conceal targets: yes 
Remove targets: yes 
 
Port of LA-Implements the security 
infrastructure plan to guide the development 
and integration of security systems 
throughout the port, including waterside 
surveillance, closed-circuit television and 
camera systems, radar and sonar sensors, 
geographic information systems, access-
control card readers, and coordinates the 
14599155 
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
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vehicle radio-frequency identification 
program. 
http://2013.nationaluasi.com/files/pdf/Auto
matic%20License%20Plate%20Reader%20
6.6.13.pdf 
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/DR
AFT%20POLA%20E-
MAP_July%202014.pdf 
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/Board/200
7/October/101807_item1.pdf 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
NY/NJ Drayage sector 
16000 estimated truck drivers 
enter the PNYNJ 
Avg. Daily TEU (2012)= 15,150 
NYNJ score for drayage 
drivers=   105 
 
(PANYNJ 2012; PANYNJ 2014 
B; PANYNJ 2014 C) 
 
http://www.panynj.gov/press-
room/press-
item.cfm?headLine_id=1640 
a)3 railroads service PNYNJ 
b)2012 railway lifts= 433,481 
(7.8% of all import/export 
TEUs); excising empty 
containers the total railway lifts 
is 10.09% 
c) Three major international 
airports (LaGuardia, JFK, 
Newark) 
d) Large trucking industry 
confirmed 
 
http://www.panynj.gov/port/inter
modal-rail.cfm 
Absence of: 
(1) Natural Surveillance: (a) adequate 
lighting is available for all sections of the 
seaport (b) employees who come forward 
with information are protected from 
retaliation by management and other parties. 
(2) Use of place managers: reward programs 
for employees 
(3) Formal surveillance: CCTV 
 
1) Observation at the port, and case file 
evidence of car thefts from the port support 
the lack of adequate lighting in all areas of 
the port 
2) rewards program is through the WCNYH 
which is not viewed as a neutral arbiter by 
the majority of the labor work force 
3) In several instances of vehicle theft from 
off of the port, the CCTV was inoperable 
and not monitored by the security workforce 
(Lantsman 2013) 
 
 
5,529,908  
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
Hampton Roads-
Norfolk 
4000/6091 X 100= 65 
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinep
ubs/sr/sr298bronzini.pdf 
 
SPECIAL REPORT 298:  
a) 2 railway connections, 
Norfolk Southern and CSX  
b) 28 percent of the cargo 
leaving the port does so by rail, 
68 percent by truck  
and 4 percent by barge 
Target Hardening: yes (seals) 
Access Control: yes TWIC 
Screen exits: no 
Extend guardianship: yes (police tipline) 
Natural Surveillance: yes 
Reduce anonymity: yes (TWIC) 
2223532 
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NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
  
 
 
2
2
4
 
DRIVING AND THE BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT:  
THE EFFECTS OF COMPACT 
DEVELOPMENT ON  
MOTORIZED TRAVEL, 
ENERGY USE, AND CO2 
EMISSIONS  
Relationships Between Land Use 
and Freight and  
Commercial Truck Traffic in 
Metropolitan Areas  
Michael S. Bronzini  
George Mason University 
c) Norfolk International Airport 
 
http://www.vtrans.org/resources/
On-Dock_Rail.pdf 
 
http://operations.usace.army.mil/
nav/11OctWEDA/12_Oct_2011
_Greg_Edwards.pdf 
Use of place managers: yes (Police have a 
tip line) 
Formal surveillance: yes 
Conceal targets: yes 
Remove targets: yes (bonded warehouses) 
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/10
554251/va-port-authority-to-impove-cctv-
access-control 
 
http://www.portofvirginia.com/stewardship/
community/virginia-port-authority-police-
force/ 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
Charleston 10920/ 4387 X 100=248 
South Carolina DHEC Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) for the Proposed Marine 
Container Terminal at the 
Charleston Naval Complex 
Appendix J Existing Roadway 
Traffic Study for North 
Charleston Study Area, Section. 
2005;5:42. [10920 daily trips, 
63%trucks(6879)] 
http://www.porteis.com/informat
ion/articles/2005_10_16.htm. 
 
Svendson et al. (2014) 
Assessment of Particulate Matter 
Levels in Vulnerable 
Communities in North 
Charleston, South Carolina prior 
to Port Expansion. Environ 
Health Insights. 2014; 8: 5–14. 
a) CSX and Norfolk Southern 
both have service to the Port of 
Charleston; 
b) About 25 percent of 
Charleston’s port containers 
arrive/depart by rail.  
c Large presence of trucks at the 
port as evidenced by quantity of 
visiting vehicles 
http://sccommerce.com/sites/def
ault/files/document_directory/Po
rt_of_Charleston_-
_Container_Movements_and_Tr
affic_Mitigation_Measures_Wil
bur_Smith_Associates_2002.pdf 
 
Target Hardening: yes 
Access Control: yes  TWIC 
Screen exits: yes, random searches (Pate et 
al. 2008) 
Extend guardianship: yes 
Natural Surveillance: yes  
Reduce anonymity: yes TWIC 
Use of place managers: yes (see Port 
security training course on SCPS website) 
Formal surveillance: yes 
Conceal targets: yes 
Remove targets: yes 
Identify property: yes 
 
YMS provides real-time data on the location 
of each piece of equipment—where a 
chassis is, which box goes on the chassis, 
which  
boxes are booked to each ship scheduled, 
where each box is, and all the data 
associated with the movement of that 
equipment 
 
 Vehicles are randomly inspected to 
determine if they have dangerous materials 
1601366 
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
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or unqualified persons. Also, longshoremen 
are expected to park in a lot away from the 
dock and take buses to their work area (see 
more detailed discussion of shuttle buses). 
 
SCPA was awarded over 25 million dollars 
for physical security enhancements on the 7 
grant rounds. The enhancements include: 
Access  
Control, Fencing, and Lighting, CCTV, a 
Central Monitoring Center and a Marine 
Patrol Boat 
 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/nlssa/portpo
lice.pdf 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
 
http://www.port-of-
charleston.com/Port_Police_Training/Port_
Police_Training_English/009_background_
cont.htm 
San Juan 3479 
http://www.app.gobierno.pr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/Puerto_
Rico_Highway_Transportation_
Authority_Upcoming_P3_Projec
ts.pdf 
 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/docu
ments/Marine_Highway_Corrid
ors13_Sep_10.pdf 
No railway connections to the 
port. There is an international 
airport in San Juan. 
Target Hardening: Yes 
Access Control: yes- TWIC 
Screen exits: no 
Extend guardianship: N/A 
Natural Surveillance: yes Bright Light 
Systems’ recent projects included a retrofit 
of 140 x 1,000W high-pressure sodium 
fixtures with its BLP1000 LEP high mast 
fixture for Horizon Lines at the Port of San 
Juan, Puerto Rico. Horizon Lines has 
reduced its lighting costs by 50% while 
providing a superior quality light for 
increased safety and security, says Mr 
Chalmers.  
http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/port-
operations/planning-and-design/no-
lightbulb-moments 
Reduce anonymity: yes- standard practice 
1269902 
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Use of place managers: yes- standard 
practice 
Formal surveillance: yes 
Conceal targets:yes- standard practice 
Remove targets:yes- standard practice 
Identify property: yes 
 
https://hbsmicrosites.honeywell.com/NR/rd
onlyres/011C8397-1F08-4C1F-8344-
0415339ECA17/49809/PortofSanJuan.pdf; 
 
http://caribbeanbusinesspr.com/prnt_ed/san-
juan-ports-100-percent-cargo-inspections-
expensive-with-few-results-7577.html; 
 
FEMA Environmental Assessment 
Environmental Assessment 
Horizon Monitoring and Surveillance 
Facility 
Puerto Nuevo Port Complex, San Juan, 
Puerto Rico 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
Port Everglades 2000/2541=78 
http://www.dot.state.fl.us/planni
ng/economicstimulus/ellerdrive/
ellerdrive-application.pdf 
a) The intermodal center 
connecting Florida east Coast 
Railway was only completed 
July 2014 and has yet to take a 
significant portion of containers 
b) n/a 
c) Ft. Lauderdale International 
Airport is in the port district  
d) high presence of trucking at 
the port 
 
http://www.porteverglades.net/e
xpansion/ship-to-rail/ 
Target Hardening: yes- standard practice 
Access Control: yes TWIC 
Screen exits: yes 
http://www.porteverglades.net/about-
us/security/ 
Extend guardianship: no 
Natural Surveillance: 
yes.http://www.porteverglades.net/about-
us/security/ 
Reduce anonymity: yes TWIC 
Use of place managers: NO 
Formal surveillance: yes- 
http://www.porteverglades.net/about-
us/security/ 
Conceal targets: yes- standard practice 
Remove targets: yes- standard practice 
Identify property: yes- standard practice 
927544 
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
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FEMA Environmental Assessment 
Miami 4,480 trucks daily/2491=179 
http://www.portofmiamitunnel.c
om/project-overview/project-
overview-1/ 
High level of truck traffic 
because PortMiami does not 
have a fully functioning rail 
connection yet. 
PM is currently in the process of 
developing a railway access to 
the mainland. It will be one line, 
the Florida East Coast railway. 
http://www.miamidade.gov/port
miami/images/aerial-intermodal-
rail-map.pdf 
http://www.miamidade.gov/port
miami/rail-restoration.asp 
Target Hardening: yes 
Access Control: yes 
http://www.miamidade.gov/portmiami/id-
cards.asp 
Screen exits: no- because of heavy cruise 
ship use of the port there are many more 
daily private vehicle entries and no exit 
searches 
Extend guardianship: yes through Americas 
Waterways Watch program  
Natural Surveillance: yes 
http://www.aimu.org/Port/miami2013.pdf 
Reduce anonymity: no- many private 
vehicles enter and exit port for cruise ship 
boarding despite PORT SECURITY 
STANDARDS - COMPLIANCE 
PLAN F.S. 311.12 (2001) 
Use of place managers: no 
Formal surveillance:yes 
http://www.miamidade.gov/portmiami/secur
ity-enhancements.asp 
Conceal targets: yes 
Remove targets: n/a. no warehousing on 
port 
Identify property: yes 
 
 
At the Port of Miami, officials reported on a 
very useful awareness-raising program  
called America’s Waterway Watch (AWW). 
AWW is a combined effort of the Coast 
Guard and its Reserve and Auxiliary 
components, enlisting the active 
participation of those who live,  
work or play around America's waterfront 
areas. Coast Guard Reserve personnel 
concentrate on connecting with businesses 
and government agencies, while Auxiliarists 
909,217  
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
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focus on building AWW awareness among 
the recreational boating public. AWW is a 
nationwide initiative  similar to the well-
known and successful Neighborhood Watch 
program that asks community  
members to report suspicious activities to 
local law enforcement agencies. AWW is a 
public  outreach program, encouraging 
participants to simply report suspicious 
activity to the Coast  Guard (Pate et al 2008) 
 
In Miami, fencing has been added to 
separate cruise terminals from cargo 
areas(Pate et al 2008) 
 
In Miami, upon the arrival or departure of a 
cruise ship, Metro-Dade Police officers 
conduct a thorough search of the cruise 
terminal and turn it over to private security 
during the boarding process. In accordance 
with Florida law, sworn officers maintain 
perimeter security.  
All provisions are scanned for explosives. 
Also, Metro-Dade officers have intensified 
their  random patrols throughout the port, 
have added more check points, and have 
also intensified their attention to the entry 
gates and beneath the bridge leading to the 
port  
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
Baltimore 2000/1857= 107 
 
3,000 average daily/ 1857=161 
 
10,000 truck vehicles average 
daily/1857 (avg, daily 
containers)= 538 
 
Multiple (2) Railway 
connections ( CSV and Norfolk 
Southern connections), and 
between 10 and 25% of cargo is 
moved by rail, BWI airport is 
within the region 
 
http://www.cbre.us/o/baltimore/t
eams/industrial-specialty-
Target Hardening: yes 
Access Control: yes 
Screen exits: yes 
Extend guardianship: yes 
Natural Surveillance: yes 
Reduce anonymity: yes 
Use of place managers: yes 
Formal surveillance: yes 
Conceal targets: yes 
677856 
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
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http://www.cbre.us/o/baltimore/t
eams/industrial-specialty-
commercial-real-
estate/Pages/transportation.aspx; 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
2011-07-17/news/bs-md-dirty-
trucks-20110717_1_dirty-trucks-
new-trucks-air-quality 
commercial-real-
estate/Pages/transportation.aspx 
Remove targets: yes 
Identify property: yes 
 
http://www.gohs.maryland.gov/trans_securit
y_accomplishments.html 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
New Orleans 2132/ 821 TEUs per day (2012)= 
259 . Overvalued due to weight 
of vast amount of bulk cargo  
that comes in which requires 
substantial truck movements for 
the size of the port.  
 http://portno.com/trucks 
 
a) 
http://portsoflouisiana.org/docu
ments/port_profiles/NewOrleans
.pdf 
b) 10,000 TEUs yearly ( 2007 
estimate)/ 258,000 TEUs 
(2007)= 3.8% of containers are 
transported via rail 
Access Control: yes 
Screen exits: no evidence 
Extend guardianship: no evidence 
Natural Surveillance:  yes 
Reduce anonymity: yes 
Use of place managers: yes (HPD Training 
includes annual certifications: 
http://0192200.netsolhost.com/HPD/Acaddi
v.htm) 
Formal surveillance: yes 
(http://portno.com/construction-projects) 
Conceal targets: yes 
Remove targets: yes 
Identify property: yes 
 
http://portno.com/construction-projects 
http://0192200.netsolhost.com/HPD/Acaddi
v.htm 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
451,058 
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
Apra  N/A No railway connection, but there 
is an international airport in 
Guam 
Target Hardening: yes- standard practice 
Access Control: yes- security access gates 
Screen exits: no 
Extend guardianship: no evidence of this in 
the public record 
Natural Surveillance: no - See Annual 2013 
Port report "The entire facility must have 
lighting, to serve as a deterrent, improve 
visibility of cameras, and aid security 
officers. Lighting should be installed around 
the exterior perimeter, interior perimeters, 
and within the facility 
169816 
 
AAPA 2013 
NAFTA Regional 
Container Survey 
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Reduce anonymity: yes TWIC 
Use of place managers: - no evidence in 
public record 
Formal surveillance: - no Port Annual 
Report 2013 "The Port has video cameras 
installed throughout the terminal facilities, 
and they are not 
maintained. Additionally, the existing 
camera system does not provide complete 
coverage of the terminal.  
Conceal targets: yes- standard practice 
Remove targets: yes- standard practice 
Identify property: yes- standard practice 
 
http://www.portguam.com/docs/news-
releases/2013/master-plan-update-2013.pdf 
 
 
 
SVF Data 
Matrix 
Container 
Vessel Calls  Interagency Cooperation  Illicit import/export market  
Sectors with history of 
criminal involvement  
LA/LB 59% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
 
 (MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports  
In Long Beach, the police department has 
established a Harbor Unit that works closely 
with non-commissioned security personnel 
from the port. In Los Angeles, the Port Dive 
Operations Group (PDOG), made up of 
certified divers from the Coast Guard, the 
FBI, the Los Angeles Port Police, the Los 
Angeles Fire Department, the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Office, and the Long Beach Fire 
Department, is available to respond to critical 
incidents. In addition, the group meets 
quarterly to discuss training and operational 
issues. And the Sea Marshals Unit at the Port 
of Los Angeles (comprised of divers from the 
Coast Guard and the Los Angeles Port Police) 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-
2008=37.41% 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-
2008=.0.92% 
 
Between March 2013 - March 2015 
there have been 158 incidents of cargo 
theft in the LA/LB hinterland area 
defined as a 75 mile radius from the 
ports. 
No documented records in 
Lexis-Nexis 
No cases in CBP media release 
No cases in ICE news release 
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conducts joint dive operations to protect ships 
in transit and inspect critical infrastructure.  
 
Area Maritime Security Committee: 
Broad Representation of Public & Private Port 
Partners 
 Develop Area Maritime Security Plan 
 Conduct Security Exercises 
 Implement Port Risk Management & 
Mitigation Plan 
 Vet Annual Port Security Grant 
Applications 
 
(Pate et al. 2008); 
http://2013.nationaluasi.com/files/pdf/Securin
g%20the%20Largest%20Port%20Complex%2
0in%20the%20Nation%206.4.13.pdf; 
http://polb.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.ph
p?file=polb_1af5da4d3d37131270ec31cb4f7c
620f.pdf; 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
 
Both ports are in an HIDTA county 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/d
mas/Los_Angeles_DMA-2011(U).pdf 
 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
In fiscal year 2011, CBP at Los 
Angeles/Long Beach Seaport seized 
61 vehicles and 49 engines heading 
overseas. Of that total: 24 were stolen, 
73 were undeclared, seven were 
undervalued and six had fraudulent 
documents. Total value of fiscal year 
2011 seizures is $1.8 million. 
 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/08
/business/la-fi-port-smuggling-
20110408; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-11-13-
050000/cbp-intercepts-144-tons-
stolen-copper-headed-asia; 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fed
eral-jury-convicts-los-angeles-
businessman-and-his-firm-role-major-
customs-fraud; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-04-03-
040000/cbp-officers-recover-20-
stolen-high-end-vehicles 
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NY/NJ 41% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
New York / New Jersey Area Maritime 
Security Committee; 
 
Among many initiatives, the port authority 
leads the area maritime security committee 
effort in the development and implementation 
of a port-wide risk management plan. This 
plan focused on heightened collaboration, 
particularly in interagency communications, 
maritime domain awareness, waterborne risks, 
resiliency and intelligence sharing. 
 
The Port Authority also increased information 
sharing on an international level through an 
initiative to exchange ideas and enrich 
relationships with foreign ports on security 
and emergency management issues; some of 
these relationships have matured into formal 
sister port agreements. 
http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2014/10/securin
g-the-global-supply-chain/ 
 
https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AM
SC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
 
http://www.marinelink.com/news/homeland-
security309891 
 
Cooperation is significantly higher between 
the Waterfront Commission and other relevant 
port security agencies at the PNYNJ, 
following 2009 WCNYH Executive Director, 
9/28/2012 
a1)According to the National Drug 
Threat Survey in 2013 45% of law 
enforcement agencies in New York 
and New Jersey report a high 
availability of heroine; 27% report 
cocaine availability; 0% report 
methamphetamine availability; 72% 
controlled prescription drugs 
 
Furthermore DEA STRIDE statistics 
for NY show 1122 seizures of cocaine 
in 2007 with an average weight of 
1.985 kilograms  
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-
2008=34.03% 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008=. 88% 
 
166 incidents Freight Watch 
International Route Analysis March 
2013-2015 
 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
a) A variety organized criminal 
groups operate in the NY/NJ 
area, including Italian 
American groups, West Africa 
DTOs, Caribbean DTOs, 
Russian organized crime and 
Balkan organized crime groups. 
The longshore labor force 
traditionally has been the 
purview of Italian American 
organized crime groups from 
the five families.   While the 
labor force has declined in 
recent years the longitudinal 
control of the labor force 
particularly for hiring 
longshoreman for certain shifts 
has continued. 
(3) This level of influence has 
been present for decades up 
until the present.   
 
See Port of NY/NJ for case 
study and documented evidence 
Hampton 
Roads-Norfolk 
52% of all 
vessels called 
The MIRT is the first organization of its kind 
in the United States, and unique to any port. 
The concept of a coordinated maritime 
 
Late Sunday night, special agents and 
officers with U.S. Immigration and 
No documented records in 
Lexis-Nexis 
No cases in CBP media release 
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are container 
vessels 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
response team originated in 1984 when Bill 
Burket, now MIRT Director, attended a Coast 
Guard hosted Train-the-Trainer course for 
marine fire fighting.  Up to this point, 
Hampton Roads had never seen a 
collaborative response team capable of 
responding to a fire or hazardous materials 
release in a port environment.  Combining 
efforts with the Virginia Maritime 
Association, Coast Guard Sector Hampton 
Roads (then MSO Hampton Roads), and the 
Navy Fire Fighting School, the Maritime 
Incident Response Team was established. 
 
 Virginia, the Joint Harbor Operations Center 
involves representatives of the Coast  Guard 
and the Navy co-locating in one Coast Guard 
facility, sharing intelligence information and  
coordinating operations. Focus is on Naval 
personnel but officers keep watch over ports, 
roads, and rail in the port district. 
Law enforcement services are provided by the 
Virginia Port Authority Police Department. 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's 
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), 
Virginia Port Authority, and other federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies 
today announced the launch of the Hampton 
Roads Border Enforcement Security Task 
Force (BEST), which is dedicated to security 
at the Port of Virginia. 
The Hampton Roads BEST is comprised of 
officers and agents from 10 federal, state and 
local agencies — responsible for identifying, 
interdicting and investigating a wide variety of 
maritime-related crime including trade fraud, 
cargo theft, and the illegal smuggling of 
Customs Enforcement's (ICE) 
Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast 
Guard's Investigative Service, 
Chesapeake Region – all members of 
the Hampton Roads BEST, boarded 
the vessel, which originated from 
Asia. 
 
During the search, special agents and 
officers discovered approximately the 
two kilograms of cocaine and two 
kilograms of heroin concealed within 
the ceiling of a common lavatory. 
 
The narcotics were seized by CBP. No 
arrests have been made and no crew 
members are suspected of being 
involved. The investigation, which is 
being conducted by BEST, is ongoing. 
 
In the two weeks prior, BEST seized 
approximately 35 kilograms of cocaine 
at the Port of Norfolk in separate drug 
smuggling ventures. On July 27, the 
task force seized 32 kilograms of 
cocaine off of a vessel arriving into the 
Port of Norfolk. On Aug. 4, the task 
force seized three kilograms of 
cocaine from a container vessel that 
was due into Hampton Roads. 
 
April 2011 The first early success of 
the BEST came in April 2011 with the 
seizure of 55 kilograms of cocaine 
found in a vessel that transited the 
Panama Canal and docked at the Port 
of Virginia. 
 
No cases in ICE news release 
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drugs, persons, currency and weapons 
smuggling.   
In 2010 the Virginia Port Authority police cut 
it's workforce to move from sworn law 
enforcement police officers towards a 
majority of contract non-sworn officers. 
 
The port region also has a highly collaborative 
AMSC. 
 
http://samehr.com/images/downloads/Presenta
tions/coast_guard_hampton_roads.pdf 
http://www.portofvirginia.com/stewardship/m
aritime-incident-response/; 
http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/824
66-virginia-port-authority-doing-away-with-
most-of-police-force 
http://dls.virginia.gov/GROUPS/ports/MEETI
NGS/092408/USCG.pdf 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
2 incidents of cargo theft March 2013-
2015 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-
2008=43.13% 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 1.1% 
Charleston 64% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
The Port of Charleston has the Charleston 
Harbor Operation Center (CHOC), commonly 
known as Project SeaHawk. SeaHawk is a 
multi-million–dollar, multi-agency, 
coordinated pilot effort, under the auspices of 
the U.S. Attorney. The purpose of SeaHawk is 
to create a unified law enforcement and 
intelligence operation to deter and prevent acts 
of terrorism. This includes managing a joint 
operations center to track maritime and other 
transportation operations in the Port of 
Charleston, establishing an interoperable 
system for data sharing and intelligence 
gathering, and providing a test bed for 
innovative concepts, initiatives, and 
equipment related to port security. All 
SeaHawk members meet daily to allocate 
resources to the most appropriate assignments. 
An intelligence unit combines intermodal 
transportation and harbor security data—
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
In 2005   border agents seized 2,038 
pounds of illegal drugs at the Port of 
Charleston. In 2006, the figure 
dropped to 629 pounds. In 2007, it was 
down to 1 pound, according to the S.C. 
office of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection. (2007). 
 
Mexican criminal groups smuggle 
marijuana into South Carolina from 
Mexico through the Southwest Border 
area, using the interstate highway 
system, mostly in private vehicles. 
Interstate 40 is a major transit route for 
Mexico-produced marijuana destined 
No documented records in 
Lexis-Nexis 
No cases in CBP media release 
No cases in ICE news release 
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including video camera feeds, radar, and 
thermal imaging—along with information 
about crews and cargo, to assess potential 
threats. A marine unit is involved with 
escorting vessels, providing security training, 
reaching out to community members, and 
boarding suspicious vessels.  
 
The Port of Charleston has developed its Port 
Emergency Information Center for collecting 
and distributing information to port 
stakeholders concerning status of emergencies 
and what is required to reopen the shipping 
channel. The Port of Charleston has a Port 
Operations Emergency Center for working 
with affected agencies to coordinate responses 
to emergencies. The Port has also developed a 
Marine Fire Fighting Protocol to train local 
fire fighters on how to fight fires on the 
waterfront.  
 
Charleston AMSC. This AMSC was created 
by building up the Maritime Association of 
the Port of Charleston, a trade association 
created to promote the interests of the Port of 
Charleston in 1926. The Captain of the Port 
turned to this group to serve as the core of the 
AMSC. Officials of the Coast Guard and other 
federal and local agencies have joined the 
association and use the regular meetings as 
one way of sharing information with 
stakeholders. 
An important aspect of this particular AMSC 
is that it has a separate intelligence 
subcommittee made up of members who have 
security clearances. 
 
 Charleston has Project Seahawk, which has 
an intelligence unit that builds awareness of 
threats to the port.All SeaHawk members 
for South Carolina. Local distributors 
also transport Mexico-produced and 
Caribbean-produced marijuana into 
South Carolina from Atlanta via 
Interstates 85 and 20, and from Florida 
via the I-95 corridor. 
 
4 incidents of cargo theft 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-
2008=29.24% 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 
1.28% 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2010-06-12-
040000/cbp-and-uscg-intercept-
stowaways-charleston; 
 
http://www.thestate.com/2007/04/15/3
6265/drug-trafficking-scs-mexican-
connection.html#storylink=cpy 
  
 
 
2
3
6
 
meet daily to allocate resources to the most 
appropriate  assignments. An intelligence unit 
combines intermodal transportation and 
harbor security data— including video camera 
feeds, radar, and thermal imaging—along with 
information about crews  and cargo, to assess 
potential threats. A marine unit is involved 
with escorting vessels, providing security 
training, reaching out to community members, 
and boarding suspicious vessels. 
 
Law enforcement is provided by the South 
Carolina Ports Authority Police Department. 
Terminal leasees can hire their own private 
security guards. The Port of Charleston is also 
the location for Operation Seahawk, a 
partnership of 47 federal, state, and local 
agencies under the leadership of the U.S. 
Attorney, which has received significant 
funding to conduct joint anti-terrorism efforts. 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06933t.pdf 
 
http://proceedings.ndia.org/7490/Beeson.pdf 
 
http://ocean.floridamarine.org/acp/chacp/Docu
ments/ACP/Charleston_ACP_Jan_2011_Revi
sion.pdf 
San Juan 40% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
The Coast Guard recognizes that providing 
maritime security in the Caribbean region 
requires the close coordination of area 
responders. The scenario involved in this full-
scale exercise will challenge participants to 
make difficult decisions, carry out essential 
functions and maintain a common operating 
picture during a port security incident. 
Interagency coordination and communication 
will play key roles in the exercise’s success, 
Law enforcement reporting, seizure 
data, and price information all indicate 
high levels of cocaine availability in 
the region.19 The DEA San Juan 
District Office reports that problems 
attendant to high levels of cocaine 
availability and trafficking include 
violence, crime, and murder. 
 
The PR/USVI HIDTA region is 
located along established drug 
October 2013 ten longshoremen 
and the co-owner of a freight 
forwarding company were 
indicted for drug trafficking 
through the Port of San Juan 
over the course of several 
years. 
 
https://www.justice.gov/archive
/ndic/pubs27/27510/finance.ht
m 
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as well as enhance readiness for future 
incidents. 
Participating agencies and industry 
organizations will include Department of 
Homeland Security,  Coast Guard Sector San 
Juan, Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team, 
Federal Bureau of Investigations, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency,  Customs 
and Border Protection, Puerto Rico National 
Guard 22nd Civil Support Team, Puerto Rico 
Center for Disease Control San Juan Station, 
Transportation Security Administration, 
Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands Area 
Maritime Security Committee, US Virgin 
Islands Territorial Emergency Management 
Agency Fusion Center, North and South Coast 
Harbor Safety and Security Committees, 
Salvation Army, Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 
Municipality of Ponce, Ponce Police 
Department, Puerto Rico Fire Department, 
Puerto Rico State Emergency and Disaster 
Management Agency, Ponce Office of 
Emergency Management,  Luis Ayala Colon 
Inc., Total Petroleum, Puma Energy, Sea Star, 
Horizon Lines, Inc. and BT Asphalt. 
 
There are significant law enforcement effort 
ongoing in PR to deal with smuggling and 
trafficking. These include: 
 
The Caribbean Air and Marine Branch 
(CAMB) — 
A combination of six aviation assets and 10 
midnight express interceptors (law 
enforcement fast boats) used to combat drug 
smuggling in the field. 
In Fiscal Year 2011, CAMB seized 10,250 
pounds of narcotics and $2.1 million in 
currency. 
 
trafficking routes in the eastern  
Caribbean between South America and 
the CONUS. Most of the cocaine 
smuggled into the HIDTA continues to 
be transported from South America via 
cargo in maritime vessels or by courier 
aboard commercial aircraft into the 
Dominican Republic.72 Dominican 
DTOs, under the ultimate operational 
control of Colombian DTOs, 
coordinate drug shipments from the 
Dominican  Republic to Puerto Rico 
using privately owned boats, such as 
yolas, yachts, and other vessels longer 
than 30 feet equipped with hidden 
compartments, and noncommercial 
aircraft. 
 
Working jointly with the U.S. Coast 
Guard and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, HSI closed the fiscal year 
with an unprecedented number of 
seizures, including 21,831 pounds of 
narcotics and 37,958 illegal weapons 
and ammunition. This represents a two 
percent increase in narcotics seizures 
and a 118 percent increase in illegal 
weapons and ammunition seizures 
compared to the previous fiscal year. 
The federal agencies seized 13,992 
pounds of cocaine, 7,747 pounds of 
marijuana and 86 pounds of heroin. 
 
HSI seized 167,771 pieces of 
counterfeit and pirated goods during 
fiscal year, a 144 percent increase 
compared to the 68,482 items seized 
by HSI in fiscal year 2012. The total 
manufacturer’s suggested retail price 
 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releas
es/operation-waterfront-nets-
10-arrests-drug-trafficking 
 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cg
i/viewcontent.cgi?article=2456
&context=ndlr 
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Caribbean Border Interagency Group (CBIG) 
— 
A union of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection’s (CBP) Caribbean Air and Marine 
Branch, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) , the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rico Police Joint 
Forces of Rapid Action (FURA) to disrupt the 
flow of illegal aliens and contraband into the 
Caribbean. 
This effort effectively cut illegal immigration 
in Puerto Rico by 80 percent 
 
Operation Sea Wall— 
A joint USCG, CBP, Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and the Dominican 
Republic Navy counter drug operation 
targeting primary flow into South Hispaniola 
arrival zones and secondary flow from 
Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico 
Together, these agencies provide air 
surveillance, offshore patrol, interdiction 
forces  and coastal surface interdiction. 
Since May 2012, Operation Sea Wall has 
resulted in the interdiction of more than 7000 
kilograms of cocaine and the arrest of 29 
suspected smugglers; a 300% increase over 
the previous 12-month period. 
In September 2012, the DHS Operation 
Caribbean Guard (OCG) was implemented to 
intercept illegal weapons, drugs and money, 
flowing to and from Puerto Rico. There are 
six separate efforts underway to support OCG, 
which focus on the inspection of cargo, mail, 
vessels and persons both traveling to and from 
Puerto Rico. 
CBP is currently reviewing flight operations, 
including unmanned aircraft systems 
of goods seized in fiscal year 2013 is 
estimated to be more than $18 million. 
 
FY2013 During this time, CBP 
officers seized 20,339 pounds of 
narcotics in PR and USVI area 
FY2012 During this time, CBP 
officers seized 18,083 pounds of 
narcotics and arrested 21 people 
wanted for crimes, including murder, 
rape, assault, and robbery and denied 
entry to more than 1,477 people 
attempting to illegally enter the U.S. 
through an air or sea port of entry in 
our area; 
FY 2011 8750 lbs of cocaine PR and 
USVI ports 
 
10/23/2013  
During the inspection of containers 
arriving on board the maritime vessel 
M/V Hansa Regensburg from 
Caucedo, Dominican Republic, CBP 
officers selected a container for 
secondary scrutiny. Inside CBP 
officers found two bags, containing 
brick shaped size objects that later 
tested positive for cocaine and heroin, 
respectively. The estimated value of 
the seized cocaine is $1,240,800 and 
the heroin is $192,500. 
 
2/23/2015 Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) field operations 
officers seized Sunday 222 pounds 
(100.5 Kilos) of cocaine inside a 
duffle bag concealed inside a container 
arriving from Caucedo, Dominican 
Republic.  
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deployments from stations in Florida to the 
Puerto Rico region, to determine the most 
effective use of flight hours to support OCG 
efforts. 
 
Operation Unified Resolve—U.S. Coast 
Guard’s District 7 is allocating additional 
resources and capabilities needed to deter, 
detect and disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 
in the region, targeting the flow of drugs, 
weapons, money, and migrants. 
 
High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(HIDTA) — 
This Office of National Drug Control 
classification is a union of DHS components 
(CBP, ICE, USCG, and USSS) that focuses on 
disrupting drug trafficking on and around 
Puerto Rico. 
When combined with the Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Security Taskforce 
(OCDETF), this makes the Caribbean 
Corridor Strike force, an initiative aimed at 
stopping South American based drug 
trafficking organizations that move multi-
kilogram loads in the Caribbean. 
 
Operation Community Shield —An ICE HSI 
initiative that counters organized violent street 
gangs, which are responsible for most violent 
crime in Puerto Rico. 
 
Border Enforcement Security Taskforce 
(BEST) —  Collaboration between CBP, 
USCG, ATF, Puerto Rico Police Department, 
San Juan Police Department, Colombian 
national police, Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 
and Puerto Rican treasury focused on securing 
the Puerto Rican border. 
 
9/27/2013 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) officers seized 
Thursday 54 pounds (24.35 kilos) of 
cocaine inside a container at the San 
Juan seaport. 
 
5/23/2013 Last Friday, during inbound 
inspections of passenger vehicles 
arriving from the Dominican Republic 
onboard the M/V "Caribbean Fantasy" 
ferry, a CBP canine alerted to the 
potential presence of narcotics in a van 
with Puerto Rico cargo license plates. 
An x-ray of the vehicle confirmed the 
alert to CBP officers. 
 
After a thorough search, CBP officers 
found 199 pellets of cocaine with a 
weight of approximately 2.8 kilos (6.2 
pounds) inside the vehicle. 
 
12/13/2012 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers discovered a duffel 
bag containing 9 bricks of cocaine 
inside a container in the Port of San 
Juan late Tuesday afternoon. The 
bricks weighed 22.9 pounds with an 
estimated street value of $249, 120. 
 
8/31/2012  - U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers seized last night 
three duffel bags filled with 70 cocaine 
bricks found inside a container 
arriving to the Port of San Juan from 
the Dominican Republic. 
 
6/29/2012 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) seized Thursday 73 
kilograms (161 pounds) of cocaine and 
six kilograms (13.23 pounds) of heroin 
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The Caribbean Air and Marine Operations 
Center (CAMOC) —   A state-of-the-art law 
enforcement radar surveillance used to 
counter airborne drug smuggling. 
 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speec
hes/120621ayala.pdf; 
 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg79507/html/CHRG-
112hhrg79507.htm 
concealed within two bags inside a 
container arriving from Caucedo, 
Dominican Republic. 
 
4/30/2012 Yesterday, while 
performing inspectional duties on MV 
CFS Paradero, arriving from Rio 
Haina, Dominican Republic, CBP 
officers assigned to the San Juan 
Seaport selected various containers for 
additional examination. Using 
available technology, they detected 
anomalies in two of the containers. 
 
When the containers were physically 
inspected, two bags, believed to 
contain narcotics, were found inside 
each container. On one of the 
containers the two bags contained a 
total of 32 packages that when field 
tested proved positive for cocaine, 
with an approximate weight of 35 
kilograms (77 pounds). 
 
On the second container, 60 packages, 
with an approximate weight of 67 
kilograms (148 pounds), also tested 
positive for cocaine. 
 
4/27/2012 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers seized last night 
two gym bags with cocaine and heroin 
inside a container arriving from the 
Dominican Republic. 
 
2/23/2012 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers seized 240 pounds 
of cocaine found inside four duffle 
bags discovered within a container 
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arriving from a foreign destination last 
night at the San Juan Port of entry. 
 
During inbound inspection of 
incoming containers on board the M/V 
MAERSK RAVENA, arriving from 
Caucedo, Dominican Republic, CBP 
officers selected a container for 
thorough inspection. 
 
8/30/2011  In four different incidents 
this weekend, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection seized 190.476 kilos 
(419.93 pounds) of cocaine and 4.54 
kilos of heroin (10.14 pounds). 
 
In San Juan, during the inspection of 
the vessel M/V Sydney Express 
arriving from Caucedo, Dominican 
Republic, CBP officers referred a 
ship's container for secondary 
inspection after noticing a discrepancy 
in the arrival manifest and a container 
seal. 
 
10/15/2010 On Oct. 15, while 
performing inspectional duties on a 
vessel arriving from Caucedo, 
Dominican Republic, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) officers 
with the use of non-intrusive 
inspection equipment discovered 55 
kilos of cocaine in a cargo container. 
 
No cargo theft incidents found 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
  
 
 
2
4
2
 
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= N/A 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= N/A 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2014-01-14-
000000/cbp-seizes-78-pounds-
cocaine-inside-container; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2014-01-17-
000000/cbp-intercepts-cocaine-san-
juan-seaport; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2014-01-28-
000000/cbp-puerto-rico-and-us-virgin-
islands-fy2013-review; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2013-10-23-
040000/cbp-seize-cocaine-and-heroin-
san-juan-and-mayaguez; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2015-02-24-
000000/san-juan-cbp-seizes-222-
pounds-cocaine-inside; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2015-01-30-
000000/cbp-san-juan-field-operations-
seize-325480-hidden; 
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http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2013-09-27-
040000/cbp-seizes-54-pounds-
cocaine-inside-container; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2013-05-15-
040000/cbp-hsi-discover-narcotics-
smuggling-ventures; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2013-02-13-
050000/cbp-puerto-rico-and-us-virgin-
islands-fy2012-review; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-12-13-
050000/cbp-san-juan-discovers-duffel-
bag-containing-9-bricks; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-08-31-
040000/san-juan-cbp-finds-3-cocaine-
filled-duffel-bags; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-06-29-
040000/cbp-san-juan-finds-cocaine-
and-heroin-inside; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-04-30-
040000/san-juan-cbp-seizes-102-kilos-
cocaine-two-separate; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-04-27-
040000/san-juan-cbp-seizes-cocaine-
and-heroin-inside-vessel; 
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http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-02-23-
050000/cbp-puerto-rico-seizes-240-
pounds-cocaine-inside; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2011-12-27-
050000/cbp-integrated-puerto-rico-
and-us-virgin-islands-2011; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2011-08-30-
040000/cbp-seizes-cocaine-heroin-
and-currency-mayaguez-and; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2010-10-15-
040000/san-juan-seaport-cbp-officers-
seize-55-kilos-cocaine 
Port Everglades 59% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
Port Everglades--Daily security meeting. A 
daily meeting is convened involving 
representatives of the Broward County 
Sheriff’s Office, the port authority 
management, the Coast Guard, the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, and others 
concerned about port security to discuss 
potential security threats and to coordinate 
responses.  
 
In Port Everglades the Broward County 
Sheriff’s Office created a Harbor Unit to focus 
on the port, and the number of officers 
assigned to this unit has been greatly 
increased. The Sheriff’s Office has also 
created a Domestic Preparedness Unit and a 
Terrorism Unit, both of which are available to 
the port. Also available to Port Everglades is a 
“Trident Team” of divers 
from the Coast Guard, the Broward County 
Sheriff’s Office, the Broward County Fire 
Miami has high levels of seizures of 
narcotics due to its role as a heavy 
importation port for narcotics. In 2010 
the Miami Border Enforcement 
Security Taskforce has led or taken 
part in investigations resulting in over 
140 other arrests and the seizure of 
more than 11,000 pounds of cocaine, 
more than 8,000 pounds of marijuana, 
more than 3,000 ecstasy pills, more 
than $175,000 in cash, 19 vehicles, 16 
weapons, and more than 1,400 rounds 
of ammunition. 
 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
 
" To date, the investigation has 
resulted in the indictment and 
conviction of nearly a dozen 
former King Ocean Services 
employees who worked at Port 
Everglades and numerous drug 
traffickers who received the 
narcotics from the port that 
were being smuggled aboard 
cargo ships owned or operated 
by King Ocean Services" 
 
In 1997 longshoreman at Port 
Everglades many had criminal 
records 
 
1999 14 port workers indicted 
for drug smuggling 
 
In 2000, a former 
longshoreman union local 
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Department, the Fish and Wildlife 
Commission, and the Department of 
Homeland Security. The Trident Team has 
been created to inspect risk-prone ships and 
facilities.  
 
The Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) 
has a contract to provide law enforcement 
services on the port premises. In addition, the 
BCSO has recently contracted to provide 
broader security services, including access 
control,  taking the place of a private security 
firm. Tenants contract with their own private 
security firms to provide security within their 
designated areas. 
 
In Port Everglades the Broward County 
Sheriff’s Office created a Harbor Unit to focus 
K8 on the port, and the number of officers 
assigned to this unit has been greatly 
increased. The Sheriff’s Office has also 
created a Domestic Preparedness Unit and a 
Terrorism Unit, both of which are available to 
the port. Also available to Port Everglades is a 
“Trident Team” of divers from the Coast 
Guard, the Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 
the Broward County Fire Department, the Fish 
and Wildlife Commission, and the Department 
of Homeland Security. The Trident Team has 
been created to inspect risk-prone ships and 
facilities. 
 
(Pate et al. 2008) 
https://www.uscg.mil/d7/SectMiami/planning.
asp 
 
For stolen vehicles, between 2003-
2008 the NICB registered an average 
of 30.9% of vehicles per year as non 
confirming with their registry. The 
NCIC registered just over 1% on 
average per year (the general rate 
across most seaports). 
 
93 incidents of cargo theft March 
2013-2015 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= 
40.77% 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 
0.83% 
 
Port Everglades experiences multiple 
seizures evidencing its role as an 
importation port for illicit narcotics: 
 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/cbp-officers-port-
everglades-seize-154-pounds-cocaine 
 
leader was sentenced for a drug 
importation scheme running 
since 1985. 
 
http://articles.chicagotribune.co
m/2000-11-
07/news/0011070095_1_drug-
smuggling-teamsters-million-
in-drug-proceeds 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/
08/26/us/at-us-ports-drug-
smuggling-is-fast-becoming-
an-inside-job.html 
 
http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/1998-03-
07/news/9803060569_1_comm
issioners-and-port-port-s-
problems-port-everglades 
 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/
PressReleases/140124-01.html 
Miami 69% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
Interagency operational center for port 
security in Miami.   Joint Harbor Operations 
Center (JHOC) involves representatives of the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy co-
Miami has high levels of seizures of 
narcotics due to its role as a heavy 
importation port for narcotics. In 2010 
the Miami Border Enforcement 
No evidence of criminal 
network presence in port 
operations, however cargo theft 
at the port is considered 
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(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
locating in one Coast Guard facility, sharing 
intelligence 
information, and coordinating operations.  
 
Port of Miami/Port of Everglades (Project 
Hawkeye). 
 
Ex. of interagency cooperation: 
 
The Miami Division of the FBI has been 
actively participating in the Area Maritime 
Security Committee and holds a seat on the 
Executive Steering Committee. This 
committee is a United States Coast Guard 
initiative, which brings together members of 
the law enforcement community with 
executives of the various maritime industries. 
One of the pilot projects being worked on by 
the Miami Joint Terrorism Task Force is the 
"Manning Agency Screening Initiative" which 
provides limited database checks on the 
agencies providing the staff members to cruise 
lines operating globally. At present the 
"manning agencies" providing the staff for the 
various cruise lines are not screened by any 
United States law enforcement agency and are 
merely licensed to do business in their 
respective countries 
 
Miami has a Maritime Safety and Security 
Team 
Each MSST has about 75 active-duty 
personnel. Each MSST unit has six trailerable 
boats, making them capable of deploying by 
ground, air and sea.  They also have three 
Physical Security Teams along with two 
canine handling teams. The MSSTs are able to 
augment local Sea Marshal operations with 
their unique training and capabilities. Each 
unit consists of two teams which can be 
Security Taskforce has led or taken 
part in investigations resulting in over 
140 other arrests and the seizure of 
more than 11,000 pounds of cocaine, 
more than 8,000 pounds of marijuana, 
more than 3,000 ecstasy pills, more 
than $175,000 in cash, 19 vehicles, 16 
weapons, and more than 1,400 rounds 
of ammunition. 
 
Officers discovered more than 178 
pounds of cocaine during an 
enforcement boarding on Nov. 1.  
2014 The street value of the narcotics 
is approximately $2,424,000. 
 
A total of 40 sacks of marijuana were 
found. The drugs have a street value of 
approximately $4 million, making it 
the largest find for the Miami seaport. 
CBP officers have intercepted 
shipments of about 3,800 pounds 
during previous seizures. 
 
 On May 29 2013 , Customs and 
Border Protection officers at the 
Miami Seaport discovered 
approximately 459 pounds of cocaine 
hidden in a container at the Port of 
Miami. While inspecting containers at 
the Miami seaport CBP officers 
identified suspect suspicious boxes in 
a container which a CBP canine 
subsequently alerted to for the 
presence of narcotics 
 
May 2010, During routine 
examinations, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection officers at the 
Miami Seaport discovered and seized 
organized.  The Longshore 
sector displays evidence of 
historical criminal network 
influence. 
 
http://www.aimu.org/Port/mia
mi2013.pdf 
 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/182
e70f0-271d-11e0-80d7-
00144feab49a.html#axzz4JCz
WWWM0 
 
http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/1986-06-
26/news/8602070510_1_port-
commissioner-port-everglades-
criminal-activity 
 
https://www.justice.gov/archive
/usao/nye/pr/2005/2005jul6.htm
l 
  
 
 
2
4
7
 
deployed separately or together and are 
capable of being deployed within 12 hours of 
notification and can be operationally ready 
within four hours upon arrival in any given 
point(Pate t al 2008) 
 
NOTE: FS 311.12 establishes minimum 
standards for training and certification of 
contract security guards performing security 
duties at Florida's seaports. 
Conflict/Inefficiency: The state standards for 
training and certification of Class D or 
Class G guards serving on commercial 
seaports does not include the subjects required 
for training of personnel with specific security 
duties identified in the federal 
regulation. (Transworld 2010) 
FLorida ports are in effect over-regulated due 
to the presence of FS 311.12 and the MTSA 
2004 which have complementary and double 
regulations in a variety of areas such as 
transportation cards, security officer training 
and other areas (Transworld 2010). 
 
http://www2.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/bald
012704.htm; 
 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
109publ347/pdf/PLAW-109publ347.pdf; 
 
http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments
/20071128132421-56346.pdf 
 
https://www.uscg.mil/d7/SectMiami/planning.
asp 
 
92 cartons of counterfeit merchandise 
on Monday, March 8. The cartons 
contained belts and sunglasses, which 
infringed on trademarks recorded with 
CBP and were estimated to have a 
MSRP value of $5,233,200. The 
shipment originated in China and was 
destined for central Florida. 
 
2009, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers seized 598 pounds 
of cocaine that had been concealed 
within a hydraulic cylinder that 
weighed more than 11,000 pounds. 
The container had been selected for a 
routine examination by a CBP officer. 
2009  U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers at the Miami 
seaport on Friday seized 97 parcels 
containing sunglasses and reading 
glasses with infringing trademarks of 
brands such as Christian Dior, XOXO, 
Chanel, D&G and Burberry. 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
93 incidents of cargo theft  
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= 
30.94% 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
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Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 
0.95% 
 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/101
2/101201miami.htm; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2014-11-03-
000000/cbp-seizes-24-million-worth-
cocaine-miami; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2013-03-07-
050000/customs-and-border-
protection-officers-seize-4300; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2012-06-13-040000/us-
customs-and-border-protection-seizes-
73-million; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2010-03-24-
040000/miami-cbp-seizes-counterfeit-
designer-merchandise; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2009-12-23-
050000/cbp-miami-airport-intercepts-
cocaine-hidden-hydraulic; 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-
media-release/2009-10-28-
040000/cbp-miami-seizes-fake-
sunglasses-worth-77-million 
Baltimore 20% of all 
vessels 
Baltimore’s Maritime Tactical Operations 
Group 
According to the HIDTA 2009 report 
for the Baltimore/Washington region, 
seizures of MDMA, Crack Cocaine 
At least two cases of warehouse 
owners scheming to steal 
imported expensive metals. 
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container 
vessels. 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
(MTOG)- The continued engagement and 
activity of AMSC 
Baltimore’s MTOG has fostered significant 
improvements in local law enforcement 
agency cooperation. Efforts to improve joint 
tactics, training, equipment and 
communications have paid off in planning and 
executing maritime security operations for the 
frequent NSSE occurring in the National 
Capital Region. 
 
Completed the Maryland Maritime Strategic 
Security Plan (MMSSP) to coordinate 
protective efforts of Maryland’s maritime 
environments. This plan is the result of an 
unprecedented collaboration between federal, 
State, local maritime law enforcement 
agencies and private sector partners. In 
August 2010, the State, Coast Guard, and 
Charles County produced the MMSSP to 
coordinate and improve responses to natural 
and man-made disasters and terrorist attacks. 
Partners are continuing to build out and 
implement shared security goals. The model 
for the plan may be applied to other 
environments with similar over- and under-
lapping jurisdictional issues (e.g. rail, 
highways, etc.). 
Since 2007, the Maritime Tactical Operations 
Group (MTOG) has secured at least $2.6 
million in federal Port Security grants to 
purchase five response/patrol vessels, 
nighttime infrared detection, gamma ray page 
radiation detection and additional maritime 
tactical equipment for state and local patrol 
agencies. The MTOG was created in 2005 to 
coordinate state and local first responders in 
maritime incidents, develop common training 
protocols, and standardize equipment across 
departments. Seventeen agencies currently 
and Heroin are increasing and the Port 
of Baltimore is a known entry point. 
 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/p
ubs27/27486/transprt.htm#Figure2 
 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
20 cargo thefts March 2013-2015 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
According to CBP officers in the Port 
of Baltimore seized less than one 
pound of cocaine in fiscal year 2012, 
and nearly 22 pounds in 2011 (1 
seizure only). During 2007, CBP 
officers seized a combined 526 pounds 
of cocaine in three incidents, the last 
year of significant CBP cocaine 
seizures in Baltimore. 
 
2013 seized 386 lbs cocaine 
 
Counterfeit goods investigations target 
Baltimore area and port for 
importation. According to their guilty 
pleas, from 2008 to 2010 the 
defendants conspired to smuggle 
counterfeit Coach handbags 
manufactured in China and elsewhere 
into the United States for sale. Part of 
the sales proceeds were returned to 
manufacturers and middlemen in 
China to pay for additional counterfeit 
goods. 
 
 
According to their plea 
agreements, Purbaugh and 
Trainum opened Bear Creek 
Warehouse Company in 2006. 
Their primary customer was an 
international mining company 
that shipped cargo containers of 
nickel to the Port of Baltimore 
from its mines outside the 
United States, then stored the 
nickel in the Bear Creek 
Warehouse. Beginning in 2006, 
Purbaugh and Trainum began 
removing the mining 
company's nickel from the 
warehouse, setting it aside to 
sell later. In June 2006, 
Purbaugh approached a co-
conspirator to sell the nickel in 
Pittsburgh, Pa. The co-
conspirator contacted the owner 
of a Pittsburgh scrap metal 
company who agreed to 
purchase the nickel from the 
co-conspirator. 
 
From 2006 through 2011, 
Purbaugh sold the co-
conspirator a total of 80,000 
pounds of nickel worth 
approximately $1 million. 
Purbaugh arranged the delivery 
of the nickel with the co-
conspirator and the scrap metal 
dealer. Purbaugh then arranged 
for his driver, who lives near 
Pittsburgh, to drive a truck to 
the warehouse, which Trainum 
then loaded with the stolen 
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participate, including MSP, MDTA, NRP, and 
marine units from a number of local and 
federal entities. MTOG members completed 
their fifth Basic Maritime Operations Course 
in 2010 and to date have trained 125 officers 
in standardized training, which helps create a 
more prepared and efficient patrol force to 
prevent and respond to security incidents. 
 
https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AM
SC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
 
http://www.mpa.maryland.gov/content/port-
security.php 
 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/GSB
PP/docs/CDMR/MIST_Port_of_Baltimore1.p
df 
According to the 72 count indictment, 
the defendants contacted individuals, 
who unbeknownst to them were ICE 
undercover agents, to import and clear 
shipments of counterfeit products into 
the United States without payment of 
the required federal taxes and customs 
duties. The defendants acted as 
manufacturers, brokers, middlemen 
and distributors of counterfeit Nike, 
Coach and Gucci shoes, Cartier wrist 
watches and Coach handbags, 
typically manufactured in Malaysia 
and China. These goods were shipped 
to the Port of Baltimore to be "cleared" 
through U.S. Customs for sale in the 
United States. 
 
More recently the port has had an 
increased number of narcotics 
seizures: 
 
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2011/02/
13/another-major-drug-bust-at-port-of-
baltimore/ 
 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-
12-24/news/bs-md-port-cocaine-
seizure-20131224_1_cocaine-seizure-
customs-agents-steve-sapp 
 
http://www.wbaltv.com/news/feds-
seize-147-pounds-of-cocaine-at-port-
of-baltimore/34721070 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= 
33.18% 
nickel. Each load typically 
contained 6,000 pounds of 
nickel and the shipments took 
place at least twice a year. The 
co-conspirator paid Purbaugh in 
cash, which he divided with 
Trainum. 
 
In another case, The indictment 
alleges that from Sept. 7 to 10, 
2010, Alan Verschleisser 
attempted to sell the stolen 
nickel by contacting various 
buyers, including 
representatives in Australia and 
New York, and on Sept. 8, 
2010, had his administrative 
assistant send an email, using 
her personal Google "gmail" 
account, to an individual in an 
effort to sell approximately 20 
tons of the stolen nickel. 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/relea
ses/final-co-conspirator-
sentenced-prison-stealing-26-
million-metal-imported-port 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/relea
ses/indictment-charges-2-
baltimore-men-theft-metal-
worth-over-26-million 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/relea
ses/baltimore-warehouse-
owners-plead-guilty-scheme-
steal-1-million-nickel-
imported-port 
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2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 
0.74% 
New Orleans 6% of all 
vessels called 
are container 
vessels 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
Sector NOLA COTP used HSIN as the 
primary method of communicating with port 
partners and stakeholders during the War of 
1812 Celebration, Hurricane Isaac, Super 
Bowl XLVII as well as multiple Type II and 
III oil spill responses. Because port partners 
have HSIN 
accounts and special permissions to access 
protected event sites, security information is 
well protected. HSIN allows each event 
participant to post their individual plans and 
documents. Sharing information in this 
manner helps promote a common operating 
picture. HSIN also provides interactive video 
conferencing and streaming, facilitating 
maritime domain awareness for port partners.  
 
Port of NOLA Harbor Police. Port police 
force of 56 officers, Access control is the 
responsibility of private security hired by the 
port. Tenants hire their own private security 
firms to maintain security in their leased 
spaces (Pate et al 2007) 
Labor is not regulated by any specific entities.  
There is lack of communication purely based 
on lack of interoperability of communication 
systems between CBP and other entities 
 (Pate et al. 2008) 
 
https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AM
SC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
 
a1) Cocaine seized through Gulf Coast 
HIDTA initiatives in 2010 totaled 
1,339 kilograms—a 58 percent 
increase from the more than 846 
kilograms seized in 2009 
For example, in July 2009, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection 
officers seized 994 pounds of powder 
cocaine commingled with bags of 
Colombian coffee aboard a cargo 
vessel in the Port of New Orleans. The 
vessel was laded in Panama. 
 
Vessels traveling from source 
countries on a weekly basis with cargo 
to the Port of New Orleans are another 
major threat. In the past, these vessels 
have had parasitic containers attached 
to the exterior hull, where narcotics 
are harbored. The advantage of 
smuggling narcotics in containerized 
shipments lies 
within the volume of cargo arriving at 
the port every day and the current 
capacity of CBP inspectors to inspect 
only a small percentage. 
 
Gulf Coast HIDTA 2014 Threat 
Assessment- http://arc-
associates.net/yahoo_site_admin/asset
s/docs/2014_Threat_Assessment_Final
.35124838.pdf 
 
Lexis-Nexis searches of 
organized crime, maritime, and 
port relationships in the NOLA 
does not have a history of OC 
involvement in port labor 
sectors, nor is it a significant 
longitudinal market for illicit 
goods. Narcotics are primarily 
supplied through land based 
routes (Gulf Coast HIDTA 
2011) 
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https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/20
07/09/25/E7-18886/area-maritime-security-
committee-new-orleans-vacancies 
 
http://infragardlouisiana.com/officers-
directors/ 
 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-494R 
Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP). (2015) High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
Program Counties 2015 
 
a2) NICB hits at the Port of NOLA are  
a signficant portion of all inputted 
entries, 39.8% however in 2008 only 
211 vehicles were entered through the 
NICB check system, as NOLA is an 
insignificant vehicle throughput port. 
Furthermore Louisiana and NOLA 
have a  theft rate near the national 
average. 
 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pu
bs40/40386/product.htm#Transportati
on 
 
3  cargo thefts March 2013-2015 
Freight Watch International Route 
Analysis March 2013-2015 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= 
24.92% 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= 
0.92% 
 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/d
mas/Gulf_Coast_DMA-2011(U).pdf 
Apra  42% of all 
vessels are 
Does have  Area Maritime Security Committe 
Present and Guam was designated a Strategic 
Port in 2009: 
 
According to the Guam FY 2009 – 
2012 Drug Control, Violent Crime and 
No evidence of this in the 
public record  
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container 
vessels. 
 
(MARAD) 
2013 Vessel 
Calls in U.S. 
Ports 
 
The designation of strategic port brings with it 
many challenges not only for the Coast Guard, 
but also for all those with a stake in port 
operations.  For this reason each strategic port 
is mandated to form a Port Readiness 
Committee which brings together 
representatives of the 10 federal agencies and 
local port stakeholders.  The PRC was 
established formally this past January when 
stakeholders met for the first time to begin 
dialogue on strategic concerns associated with 
facilitate both defense and commercial 
supplies through the same port.  The 
committee is chaired by the captain of the port 
and includes more than 40 local, federal, and 
Department of Defense agencies. 
 
in 2013 After thorough multi agency planning, 
a $1.5M Port Security Grant was awarded to 
AMSC Guam to purchase mobile X-ray 
screening vehicles. This equipment will 
increase the capacity to screen in-bound 
containers in the commercial port of Guam by 
90%  
 
The Port of Apra 2013 Annual Report notes 
"The PAG security staff lacks enough officers 
and asks security staff to work additional 
hours to meet the security needs of the Port. 
Finally, retention of security staff is difficult. 
The PAG offers a good package of training 
programs; however, often the trained officers 
move to other security/law enforcement 
positions (outside of the Port). " 
Retaining officers is a key vulnerability is a 
self described need for more officers.   
 
http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/1444
903/Sector-Guam-establishes-Port-Readiness-
Criminal Justice Systems 
Improvement Strategy  
"Drugs are smuggled and transported 
into Guam through the airport, mail, 
and seaports. The majority of the 
drugs being seized continue to be 
transported through the Guam 
International Air Terminal (GIAT) and 
seized from passengers, air freight 
cargo and baggage. Of all drugs 
seized, crystal methamphetamine is 
the most prevalent intercepted drug. 
Guam is a destination for illicit 
products such as drugs, but most 
appear to be transported via Air not by 
maritime methods.  Guam is not a 
significant entry point for other types 
of narcotics. 
 
http://www.guamlegislature.com/Mess
_Comms_30th/Doc.%2030GL-09-
0670%20From%20Bureau%20of%20
Statistics%20&%20Plans%20submitti
ng%20the%20FY%202009%20Edwar
d%20Byrne%20Mem.%20Justice%20
Assistance%20Grant%20Program..pdf 
 
NO cargo theft incidents identified 
 
2003-2008 NICB Average 35.27%.  
Seaports are already above the overall 
average of 33.76%  
Port NICB Average 2003-2008= N/A 
 
2003-2008 NCIC Average .87% 
Seaports are above overall average 
.65% 
Port NCIC Average 2003-2008= N/A 
 
However "Guam enforces its 
own Customs, Excise and 
Quarantine laws and 
coordinates with the US 
Customs, Immigration and 
Border Enforcement 
authorities. There is a 
jurisdictional coordination issue 
here, as no export license is 
required for exports to the 
USA, but these are required for 
exports to or imports from other 
destinations. This permits 
possible staging via Guam or 
the CNMI of goods to be 
moved to Asia, with reduced 
risk of detection prior to export. 
This is the ‘low risk port of 
origin’ gambit. Guam is not 
recognized as a high risk 
destination for exports from the 
USA. Neither is it recognized 
as a high risk origin for goods 
imported into Asian 
jurisdictions." 
 
http://www.asiapacificdefencer
eporter.com/articles/159/Border
-security-Transnational-Crime-
in-Micronesia-Part-1 
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Committee-in-response-to-strategic-port-
designation-; 
 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMS
C%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
 
http://www.portguam.com/docs/news-
releases/2013/master-plan-update-2013.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
SVF Data Matrix Organizational Corruption Employee Corruption 
LA/LB San Diego Customs Brokers Association and his corporation have 
been sentenced for their role in a multimillion dollar commercial 
fraud scheme to evade paying import duties on goods they imported 
into the United States. 
 
The sentencing is the result of a four-month wiretap investigation led 
by special agents with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's 
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration's (FDA) Office of Criminal Investigations 
(OCI); and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB). 
 
According to the court records, Chavez and other co-conspirators 
procured foreign goods, such as Chinese-made apparel and cigarettes 
manufactured in India, that were transported via ship to the Port of 
Long Beach. Before the goods entered the U.S., Chavez directed other 
members of the conspiracy to prepare fraudulent paperwork and make 
erroneous entries into a government database so it appeared the goods 
were being transshipped to Mexico and not subject to customs duties. 
However, instead of transshipping the goods to Mexico, the 
merchandise was delivered to warehouses in Southern California and 
eventually sold in the U.S. for less than similar items offered by their 
law-abiding competitors. 
3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for corruption, 
including a supervisory officer arrested in 2012  on charges of 
accepting bribes to allow others, including his ex-wife, to 
smuggle goods into the United States so they could avoid paying 
duties and taxes. 
 
Port of LA Port Police Chief, Ronald Boyd, was arrested and 
indicted for corruption in April 2015 
 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1210/121025losangeles.htm; 
 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/254967-arellano-
letter-regarding-sentencing.html; 
 
https://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2015/chief-of-los-
angeles-port-police-named-in-federal-corruption-case 
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3 CBP officers were convicted of corruption 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ex-head-san-diego-customs-
brokers-association-sentenced-evading-duties-millions-worth 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/head-san-diego-customs-brokers-
association-pleads-guilty-running-100-million-customs 
NY/NJ a)From July 2011- July 2012 according to the WCNYH reports there 
were 34 instances of documented corruption and illicit activites on the 
part of PNYNJ employees, and related individuals (i.e. drayage 
industry and other tangential industries) 
b) July 2010-July 2011= 33 instances of documented corruption and 
illicit activities on the part of PNYNJ employees, and related 
individuals (i.e. drayage industry and other tangential industries) 
1) 
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2012_Annual_
Report.pdf; 
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2011_Annual_
Report.pdf 
See case study for more in depth analysis  
a) In 2012 at least 8 individuals were indicted in a case relating to 
racketeering and theft of intra state commerce originating at the 
PNYNJ.   In 2011 8 individuals, longshoremen, were arrested for 
conspiring and moving narcotics through the PNYNJ. 
 
3 CBP officers arrested or reprimanded for corruption at the Port 
of NY/NJ, airport included. One aided a freight forwarding 
company to circumvent procedures to import cargo 
1) 
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2012_Ann
ual_Report.pdf; 
http://www.waterfrontcommission.org/docs/WCNYH_2011_Ann
ual_Report.pdf; 
 
http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/person/location/state/ny
/#all 
See case study for more in depth analysis 
Hampton Roads-
Norfolk 
In 2007 a 54-count indictment identified longshoremen Vernon 
Brooks, 34, and David Jones, 51, both of Chesapeake. They are 
accused of assisting in the off loading of drugs - both cocaine and 
heroin - at local port terminals. 
 
Also named in the indictment is truck driver Ronald Evans, 40, of 
Elizabeth City, who had access to the port. He is accused of driving 
other suspects in and out of the port as they retrieved the drugs. 
 
http://hamptonroads.com/node/213521 
 
http://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/drug-ring-called-biggest-
ever-at-local-terminals/article_ce5ecade-175e-5285-b119-
bf785973a358.html 
In 2007 a 54-count indictment identified longshoremen Vernon 
Brooks, 34, and David Jones, 51, both of Chesapeake. They are 
accused of assisting in the off loading of drugs - both cocaine and 
heroin - at local port terminals. 
 
Also named in the indictment is truck driver Ronald Evans, 40, of 
Elizabeth City, who had access to the port. He is accused of 
driving other suspects in and out of the port as they retrieved the 
drugs. 
 
http://hamptonroads.com/node/213521 
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Charleston In 2010 2 CBP officers at the Port of Charleston were sanctioned for 
the use of government computer systems to illicitly check on 
coworkers, neighbors and other unauthorized usage. 
 
http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/person/location/station/port 
In 2010 2 CBP officers at the Port of Charleston were sanctioned 
for the use of government computer systems to illicitly check on 
coworkers, neighbors and other unauthorized usage. 
 
In 2007  a 54-count indictment identified longshoremen Vernon 
Brooks, 34, and David Jones, 51, both of Chesapeake. They are 
accused of assisting in the off loading of drugs - both cocaine and 
heroin - at local port terminals in Hampton Roads Virginia. The 
same drug conspiracy was also charged with moving narcotics 
through the Port of Charleston. 
 
Oscar “Dread” Baptiste of East Hartford, Conn., is charged with 
importing more than 500 grams of cocaine, according to a news 
release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Baptiste, a Panamanian 
emigrant, faces a maximum prison sentence of 40 years and fine 
of $5 million. 
 
Baptiste was arrested July 28 in Connecticut, according to court 
documents. 
 
In 2010, an informant told authorities that Baptiste asked him 
about smuggling drugs through the Port of Charleston, according 
to a criminal complaint filed in the case. Baptiste told the 
informant he needed help “ripping” cocaine from containers 
coming from Panama. 
 
From August 2010 until February 2011, the informant and 
Baptiste arranged the details through an email account created by 
law enforcement, according to the complaint. 
 
Scored 6 because narcotics were moved through Charleston but 
no evidence of longshoreman involvement at Port of Charleston. 
Except for attempted longshore collusion which was disrupted by 
law enforcement in the Baptiste case. 
 
http://scbiznews.com/news/government/37526/. 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Unpublished/134223.U.pd
f 
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http://www.postandcourier.com/archives/port-drug-smuggler-
gets-years-in-prison/article_66ef6b44-9e06-57f3-ad90-
97d2ff21d204.html 
 
http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/person/location/station/
port-charleston/#all 
San Juan October 2013 ten longshoremen and the co-owner of a freight 
forwarding company were indicted for drug trafficking through the 
Port of San Juan over the course of several years. 
 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/operation-waterfront-nets-10-
arrests-drug-trafficking 
 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pr/news/2013/10252013.html 
 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/drug-trafficking-organization-
operating-san-juan-seaport-indicted-conspiracy-import 
October 2013 ten longshoremen and the co-owner of a freight 
forwarding company were indicted for drug trafficking through 
the Port of San Juan. 
 
The individuals charged conspired and coordinated the purchase 
of kilogram quantities of cocaine and heroin from sources in 
Colombia and Dominican Republic. The drugs were placed inside 
containerized cargo vessels that were scheduled to arrive in the 
seaport in San Juan, Puerto Rico.  Once in Puerto Rico, 
longshoremen and other individuals working for private 
companies, providing services at the San Juan port, would use 
their employment credentials and privileges to gain access inside 
the containerized cargo vessels and secure areas inside the seaport 
to retrieve the controlled substances and deliver them to others 
waiting outside the seaport.  Some of the drugs smuggled were 
distributed in Puerto Rico and some were further transported to 
the continental United States for eventual resale. 
 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/operation-waterfront-nets-10-
arrests-drug-trafficking 
 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pr/news/2013/10252013.html Juan 
over the course of several years. 
 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/drug-trafficking-organization-
operating-san-juan-seaport-indicted-conspiracy-import 
Port Everglades To date up to 2011, the investigation has resulted in the indictment 
and conviction of nearly a dozen former King Ocean Services 
employees who worked at Port Everglades and numerous drug 
traffickers who received the narcotics from the port that were being 
smuggled aboard cargo ships owned or operated by King Ocean 
Services" 
 
http://www.dea.gov/divisions/mia/2014/mia012414a.shtml 
Port Everglades employees are named in an indictment of 
Colombian drug smugglers who utilized Port Everglades to 
offload cocaine loaded on to vessels that offloaded at the port 
 
" To date, the investigation has resulted in the indictment and 
conviction of nearly a dozen former King Ocean Services 
employees who worked at Port Everglades and numerous drug 
traffickers who received the narcotics from the port that were 
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In an earlier incident in 2003, a company falsified documentation to 
hire security guards for Port Everglades. 
 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2003-03-
25/news/0303250185_1_port-everglades-victor-lauderdale 
being smuggled aboard cargo ships owned or operated by King 
Ocean Services" 
 
In 2015 a port worker conspired in a federal sting operation to 
assist in extricating narcotics from a container. 
 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/crime/fl-port-everglades-drug-
arrests-20150501-story.html 
 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-port-everglades-
cocaine-santeria-20151130-story.html 
 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/140124-01.html 
 
 
Miami 2 port security officers arrested for theft (2013) 
7 longshoreman arrested for facilitating drug transfers (2010) 
Between 2005-2012 8 CBP officers in Miami, were arrested for 
various charges, primarily drug trafficking 
 
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/PortMiami-Security-Officers-Stole-
Passengers-iPads-Sold-Them-on-Craigslist-Police-223627831.html 
https://ijis.get-
traction.com/traction#/single&proj=Public&rec=4444&brief=n 
 
http://bordercorruption.apps.cironline.org/ 
In 2010 ICE agents arrested 10 individuals in a 3 year long 
operation in which ILA Longshoreman assisted in the important 
of cocaine from Panama, Colombia and Jamaica. 7 longshoreman 
were involved. 
 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1012/101201miami.htm 
 
7 longshoreman arrested for facilitating drug transfers (2010) 
 
Baltimore Milton Tillman, Jr. and Milton “Moe” Tillman, III were arrested by 
the FBI for no show jobs at the Port of Baltimore, 2010 
 
two different warehousing firms had corrupt practices including 
organizing thefts of metals and other material from customers 
 
 
http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba031710.htm 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/final-co-conspirator-sentenced-
prison-stealing-26-million-metal-imported-port 
 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/indictment-charges-2-baltimore-
men-theft-metal-worth-over-26-million 
 
CBP officers in the Port of Baltimore seized less than one pound 
of cocaine in fiscal year 2012, and nearly 22 pounds in 2011. 
During 2007, CBP officers seized a combined 526 pounds of 
cocaine in three incidents, the last year of significant CBP 
cocaine seizures in Baltimore. 2005 was 155 kgs  
 
On Dec. 18, 2010, CBP was involved in the arrest of three 
crewmen from the Royal Caribbean ship Enchantment of the 
Seas, who attempted to smuggle more than 2.2 pounds of heroin 
and more than one pound of cocaine into the United States. 
 
On Jan. 8, 2011, a CBP narcotics detector dog sniffed out 1 
pound, 8 ounces of cocaine and 14 ounces of heroin hidden in an 
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https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/baltimore-warehouse-owners-
plead-guilty-scheme-steal-1-million-nickel-imported-port 
equipment locker on board the Royal Caribbean ship 
Enchantment of the Seas. No arrests were made in the case. 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/local/2012
_news_releases/december_2012/12032012_2.xml; 
http://www.wtop.com/index.php?sid=174021&nid=25 
New Orleans No documented records in Lexis-Nexis 
No cases in CBP media release 
No cases in ICE news release 
 
No documented records in Lexis-Nexis 
No cases in CBP media release 
No cases in ICE news release 
 
2 cases of CBP corruption 
Wanda Hopkins, 47, was sentenced in February 2006 to nearly 
eight years in prison for selling cocaine and using a gun while 
trafficking drugs. She and her husband were arrested for selling 
cocaine and using a gun while trafficking drugs. They were 
caught transporting more than 250 grams of cocaine to Louisiana 
from Texas. She flashed her badge to arresting officers, who 
found a marijuana cigarette and tracts of cocaine in her 
credentials. 
Former Customs and Border Protection Officer Marian Riley 
pleaded guilty to criminal information related to fraud against the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. At sentencing, 
she was ordered to pay $30,676.72 in restitution. Riley 
participated in the department's Good Neighbor Next Door 
program, which allows law enforcement officers to purchase 
eligible homes in revitalization areas for a 50 percent discount on 
the list price. Program participants were required to occupy the 
property as their sole residence for three years. Riley purchased a 
home through the program, but during a three-year period, she 
falsely certified that she occupied the home as her sole residence. 
Apra  Six Port Authority of Guam employees were fired in 2012 for abuse 
of office and corruption. 
 
http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=40595:video-1-year-later-still-no-findings-in-
alleged-port-scam&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156; 
 
http://www.kuam.com/story/20376084/2012/12/18/six-port-authority-
of-guam-employees-terminated; 
 
Six Port Authority of Guam employees were fired in 2012 for 
abuse of office and corruption. 
 
http://www.pacificnewscenter.com/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&view=article&id=40595:video-1-year-later-still-no-findings-
in-alleged-port-scam&catid=45:guam-news&Itemid=156; 
 
http://www.kuam.com/story/20376084/2012/12/18/six-port-
authority-of-guam-employees-terminated; 
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http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2012/may/05-17-14.htm http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2012/may/05-17-14.htm 
 
No cases in CBP media release 
No cases in ICE news release 
No incidents of CBP corruption identified 
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Appendix F: 2015 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Counties 
Red circles highlight ports which are in HIDTA counties. Charleston is not located in an HIDTA county and is green.  
 
     
Figure 8: 2015 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Counties 
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Appendix G: Analyses of low vulnerability seaports (bottom 67th percentile) 
 
Port of Jacksonville (JAXPORT) – 27 
The Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) is an independent state government agency 
(Pate et al. 2008).  The port has three primary terminals (the Blount Island Marine Terminal, the 
Talleyrand Marine Terminal, and the Dames Point Marine Terminal) and the JAXPORT Cruise 
Terminal and rates 13th in the U.S.  for container throughput.  JAXPORT is a landlord port and 
rents its facilities to private tenants.  The port has a contract with the Jacksonville Sheriff s 
Office for law enforcement but has its own security department that provides access control and 
non-law enforcement security services (Port of Jacksonville).  As with other landlord ports, 
tenants hire their own security services to provide services for leased properties.   
Physical 
 JAXPORT scores at mid-level for the open structure of the port with two terminals with 
island access, and one of those terminals with nearby public road access and multiple entry/exit 
points.  At JAXPORT terminals employees must park outside and take a bus to the port itself as 
no personal vehicles are allowed on the pier in the JAXPORT, reducing vulnerability.  The port 
does not have an on-site CES nor is there evidence of warehousing on-site holding CRAVED 
cargo.  The port does display a significant amount of vehicular traffic and scores high in this 
vulnerability and despite a low presence of rail traffic with one railway utilizing the port, the port 
scores high for intermodal connectivity because of the high level of truck use at the port.  
Administrative 
 The port registers a score for an illicit import/export market and for jurisdictional gaps. 
The port region displays 31 cargo thefts in the period of March 2013-2015, and is identified by 
the ONDCP as being located in a HIDTA county (2015).  In addition, the port is responsible for 
70% of Puerto Rico’s import and export traffic, which is not subject to the same inspection 
procedures as non-domestic cargo, however Puerto Rico is a significant transshipment point for 
illicit narcotics including cocaine and heroin.  However, paradoxically despite being an identified 
export vehicle port used by criminal networks (Lantsman 2013), the port does not register an 
above average NICB or NCIC hit rate.  The port does register on employee corruption, with the 
former director of the port arrested and sentenced for corruption charges in 2011 (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 2013). 
Logistical 
 The port has scores low for vulnerability due to cargo throughput of  926,000 TEUs in 
2013. 
Port of Savannah - 26.5  
The Georgia Ports Authority (GPA), a quasi-state agency, operates the Port of Savannah 
as an operating port.  The POS has the largest single-terminal container facility in the U.S. and 
has capitalized on this to become the third largest container port in the U.S. and a major port for 
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imports from South and Central America and the Caribbean and exports to Asian countries 
(Georgia Ports Authority).  Law enforcement is provided by a standalone GPA Port Police.  
Previously to 1988 the GPA did not have sworn law enforcement component but the extra 
security costs were passed along to the users of the port through surcharges on cargo throughput.   
Port Police Officers are certified through the Georgia Peace Officers Standards & Training 
(POST) Council as Certified Law Enforcement Professionals and are empowered with the same 
authority and arrest powers as any other police officer in the State of Georgia (Pate et al. 2008). 
Physical 
 The Port of Savannah primarily displays physical vulnerabilities of open structure, 
CRAVED goods presence, and a large vehicular daily presence, though a low presence of freight 
forwarders in the local area.  As one of the largest ports in the United States, and the second 
largest on the East Coast, ports of this size are often spread out over a large number of facilities 
and display the open structure that increases vulnerability in this area.  The port also has an on-
site CES at the primary container terminal, Garden City Container Terminal.  However this 
significant container throughput does not manifest itself in an overly large presence of freight 
forwarders, but there is a heavy intermodal presence, again presented as a benefit for efficient 
cargo movements. 
Administrative 
 The port’s primary administrative vulnerability is the presence of a large illicit 
import/export market.  Atlanta is a major hub for transshipment of a variety of narcotics to the 
northeast coast markets, and for onward shipment to Europe. The Port of Savannah (in addition 
to Charleston and Wilmington NC) are identified as a possible transshipment point for cocaine 
from Colombia by the DEA and recent significant CBP seizures indicate that this is still likely 
the case (DEA 2005; US CBP 2014 May 8), though the port is not located in an HIDTA 
(ONDCP 2015).  The port displays an above average level of both NICB and NCIC hits 
reflecting in part the significant vehicle exports through the port for onward travel to Africa and 
the Middle East.  In addition, the port has a low but significant enough level of cargo thefts to 
score for this vulnerability (10 incidents identified since March 2013). 
Logistical 
 As the fourth largest port in the U.S. the Port of Savannah scores high for logistical 
vulnerability due to the heavy throughput, with 3.3 million TEUs in 2013. 
Port of Palm Beach (FL) – 26 
The Port of Palm Beach is landlord port governed by a Board of Commissioners composed of 
five members elected at large by the voters within the Port of Palm Beach District for 
overlapping four-year terms of office (Port of Palm Beach A; Port of Palm Beach B).  The port 
has a non-unionized labor force and is a significant distribution point for commodities to the 
Caribbean for containerized, dry bulk, liquid bulk, breakbulk, roll on/roll off and heavy-
lift/project cargoes and ranks 21st in container throughput.  The Port relies on contract security 
for gate and access control and contracts with the Riviera Beach Police Department for law 
enforcement services (Port of Palm Beach District 2015). 
Physical 
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 The port displays an open structure with two access roads, from the north and south side 
of the port while containers held in open access yards. The port has CRAVED cargo with a 
warehouse on-site functioning as the CES and a heavy presence of daily vehicular traffic 
(U.S.CBP 2012 October 3).  The location of the port in South Florida places it in the midst of a 
heavy freight forwarder community and leads to a high vulnerability score for peripheral 
companies, especially for the level of container throughput at the port.  
Administrative 
 The two primary administrative vulnerabilities for the port are the presence of an illicit 
import/export market as evidenced through the ports location in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 
2015) and a high level of cargo theft in the port hinterland region, with 99 thefts since March 
2013 (FreightWatch International).  The port also rates higher than average for jurisdictional 
vulnerability as the port does not have a sworn police force and must rely on local law 
enforcement for port security enforcement, the Riviera Beach Police Department which provides 
two uniformed officers (Corcoran 2013).   
Logistical 
 The port is rated low with a relatively low throughput, however the port does provide 
60% of all cargo for The Bahamas, and significant issues with illicit exported firearms indicate a 
heightened vulnerability for the port to be an export point for illicitly trafficked firearms (Port of 
Palm Beach; U.S. State Department 2014). 
Port of Houston – 24 
The Port of Houston is the sixth largest container port in the U.S. and carries significant 
bulk cargo such as grain, steel, petroleum products, and finished goods.  The port is a limited 
operating port with terminal operations operated by the Port of Houston Authority which 
manages the port’s public facilities, and through partnerships with private companies that operate 
along the Houston Ship Channel which is 26 miles in length from Houston to Galveston Bay.  
This is one of the most significant areas in the U.S. for petroleum production and chemical 
processing and considered a significant safety hazard.  As a result of the number of security 
targets in this area, the port receives significant funding to secure these areas reflected in the 
PSGP outlays for the port district.  The primary container terminals are Barbours Cut and 
Bayport with six general cargo terminals for bulk materials. 
 The port has its own police department though access control is performed by a private 
security contractor, while tenants also have to hire their own private security firms (Pate et al. 
2008).  All the Port Police Officers are certified Peace Officers in the State of Texas, requiring 
ongoing training and certifications (Port of Houston).  Furthermore, the port has the Houston 
Ship Channel Security District (HSCSD), a public/private partnership of the major facilities that 
make up the port terminals and industry in the area of the Houston Ship Channel.  It undertakes 
assessments of the public and private facilities along Houston Ship Channel facilities and 
supports funding of security initiatives on behalf of its constituent stakeholders (Deepening Port 
of Houston). 
Physical 
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 The port’s primary vulnerabilities are physical with a large open structure considering the 
spread out structure of the port along the Houston River channel, however the CES is not located 
on the terminal or the port (World Trade Distribution Inc.).  The port does have a heightened 
level of peripheral companies for the level of traffic, but not in the highest category of 
vulnerability, though there is a high level of daily vehicular traffic at the port (Port of Houston 
Authority). 
Administrative 
 The port scores in two administrative vulnerability categories.  The port displays the 
presence of an illicit import/export market. The Houston area HIDTA identifies the Port of 
Houston as a possible transit point for illicit cargo, primarily narcotics, and poses a viable threat 
to the HIDTA region--a threat that has increased since the development of the Bayport Container 
Terminal which increased the ports container handling operations. Like many large ports, the 
Port of Houston links the city and region with 1,053 ports in 203 countries; these links make the 
port vulnerable to drug smuggling (NDIC 2009; The Guardian 2009). However, as with most 
ports, the scope of maritime smuggling is a significant intelligence gap.  In the Port of Houston 
region this is in part, because of the numerous remote locations along the Houston HIDTA 
coastline in which drug smugglers can conduct their activities with little risk of detection.  The 
port is considered to be a possible point of smuggling but there is little public evidence of the 
port being utilized more than other more easily and less visible areas in the region, such as along 
the Inter-coastal Waterway and the coastline.  Paradoxically the proximity of the port to the land 
border with Mexico, means that the port is less likely to be utilized for illicit inbound shipments, 
though it has been used an export port for illicit narcotics bound for Europe and Asia (The 
Guardian 2009).  In addition, to its recognition as an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015), the port 
region also has significant cargo thefts with 36 reported thefts March 2013-2015 (FreightWatch 
International). 
 The port does not display significant organization or employee corruption, with one 
incident of corruption in a Houston stationed CBP officer, slightly raising its vulnerability in this 
area (United States of America v. Rizman Saeed 2008). 
Logistical 
 The Port of Houston is one of the largest ports in the U.S. and in this category is rated 
with the highest level of vulnerability. 
Port of Oakland - 23.5  
The Port of Oakland is the 4th largest container terminal in the U.S. and the 3rd largest in 
California and is the primary import/export port for northern California with 99 percent of the 
containerized goods destined for the region.  The port has eight container terminals with two 
intermodal rail facilities.  Union Pacific and BNSF railroad facilities are located adjacent to the 
center of the marine terminal area to provide an efficient movement of cargo between the marine 
terminals or transfer facilities (Cannon 2006).  The Port of Oakland does not have a standalone 
police force and contracts with Alameda County Sheriff’s Office for port security services 
(Alameda County Sheriff’s Office). 
Physical 
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 The Port of Oakland’s primary vulnerabilities are due to its physical layout, with an open 
structure, multiple entrance/exit points, and open container yards.  The port also has a CES 
within a quarter mile of the port leading it to have a heightened vulnerability for CRAVED 
goods.  Truck traffic estimates at the port range widely but at the low end of the estimate with 
2,000 trucks a day (Swedberg 2007), the port scores at a medium level of vulnerability while the 
high estimate of 10,000 trucks provides a significantly higher score (Prakash 2013). The port was 
scored in between mid and high for this vulnerability. 
Administrative 
 The port does not score highly for administrative vulnerabilities. Primarily it is located in 
a significant illicit import/export market, with an above average NICB score, though with few 
reported cargo thefts in the area.  The port is located in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015), but 
according to the NDIC (2011) a “lack of actionable intelligence makes it difficult for CBP to 
determine the level and extent of drug trafficking at Ports of Oakland and San Francisco. Though 
of what is known there is not a significant quantity of illicit narcotics moving through the port. ” 
Instead narcotics are primarily moved across the southern border and to the extensive narcotics 
markets of the Bay Area.   Furthermore, the port does not have a dedicated police force, and is 
not staffed on a 24 hour basis like most other ports in the U.S. and has not built a centralized 
center for surveillance over the port (Kane 2014) leading to jurisdictional vulnerability as its law 
enforcement needs must be contracted out to local law enforcement agencies.  However, there is 
no evidence of vulnerabilities such as organizational or employee corruption, nor is there any 
evidence of a historical presence of criminal networks in port operations. 
Logistical 
 The Port of Oakland is one of the largest ports in the U.S. with throughput of 2.3 million 
TEUs yearly. 
Port of Tacoma – 23 
The Port of Tacoma is an independent municipal organization governed by the Port of 
Tacoma Commission as a limited operating port (Pate et al. 2008).  The port handles more than 
70 percent of cargo destined for or from the central and eastern regions of North America and 
more than 70 percent of the marine cargo moving between the lower 48 states and Alaska and 
ranks 7th in container traffic with no passenger traffic.  Most facilities are leased to tenants that 
provide their own private security but the port also operates some facilities.  The port has an 
armed non-sworn patrol force, Port Security Department and relies on the Tacoma Police 
Department for law enforcement (Pate et al. 2008).  The Port Security Department consists of 
approximately 61 employees, including one Chief and one Director (Port of Tacoma).  Port 
Security Department employees receive training from the Tacoma Police Department academy.  
Tenants that own or lease property provide their own access and control measures, and Port 
Security personnel cannot access these areas without permission of the individual tenants (Pate et 
al. 2008).  As in all ports, according to the MTSA tenants are required to draft facility security 
plans and provide those to the USCG however there are no formal arrangements to share plans 
with Port Security personnel (MTSA 2002; Pate et al. 2008).  
Physical 
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 Similar to other low-mid vulnerability ports, the Port of Tacoma primarily scores for 
vulnerability in the physical layout with an open structure, presence of CRAVED goods, a large 
vehicular presence at the port, and strong intermodal connections.  The port has six terminals 
with at least two entrances due to the location of the terminals across two port peninsulas with 
containers housed in open yards on the terminals. The port does not have a CES on-site but 
multiple warehousing firms at the port house high value CRAVED cargo (Port of Tacoma).  The 
port has two railway connections, BNSF and Union Pacific Railroad, with 20 percent of import 
containers trans-loaded to 53-foot domestic boxes for rail shipment to points inland (Port of 
Tacoma B). 
Administrative 
 The primary vulnerability at the Port of Tacoma is that it is in an illicit import/export 
market. Tacoma and Seattle are identified as HIDTA counties (ONDCP 2015) and are also in a 
significant narcotics producing region, marijuana, in addition Tacoma is one of the top five 
destination cities for heroin (National Drug Intelligence Center 2010).  The port likewise 
displays an above average hit rate for both NCIC and NICB hits.  The port also displays 
jurisdictional vulnerability.  While the port has an armed, non-sworn patrol force, it must rely on 
the Tacoma Police Department for law enforcement. In instances where a tenant or a port 
employee notices suspicious activities, Port Security is called as the first response. However, in a 
situation where a crime has been committed, tenants and port personnel call the Tacoma Police 
Department for official police assistance. The port received a score in this vulnerability due to 
the lack of a sworn police force on the port and reliance on the Tacoma PD for any official police 
assistance.  Furthermore, the Port Security Service is unionized within the same union as the 
longshore labor force, potentially creating conflicts of interest (Gillie 2013). 
Logistical 
 The port is a mid-level vulnerability port with nearly two million TEUs in 2013. 
Port of San Diego – 23 
The San Diego Unified Port District is a special government entity formed in 1962 by an 
act of the California legislature in order to manage San Diego Harbor.  The Port of San Diego is 
one of 17 commercial ports designated a “controlled port,” with special access controls due to 
security reasons (Bondareff and Contras 2012).  It is an operating port, with a dedicated police 
department, the San Diego Harbor Police Department, responsible for the San Diego Bay, the 
San Diego International Airport, and all Tidelands around the bay, throughout all five member 
cities of the Port District (Port of San Diego).    
Physical 
 The port’s primary vulnerabilities are physical with an open structure, high volume of 
daily truck traffic at the port, and a high level of peripheral companies in the region relative to 
the size of the cargo throughput.  However the port does not have CRAVED goods as there is no 
evidence of a CES nor does the trade profile of San Diego include high value cargo with 
principal inbound cargoes such as perishables and refrigerated commodities, fertilizer, cement, 
breakbulk commodities, and forest products (including newsprint, cut paper and cut sheet stock) 
and primary export cargoes include refrigerated cargo, breakbulk and bulk commodities. Dole 
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Fresh Fruit Company is a tenant of the terminal, importing about 2 billion bananas a year, but 
this is not a CRAVED commodity (Port of San Diego). 
Administrative 
 The primary administrative vulnerability is that the port is located in a heavy illicit 
import/export market.  San Diego is a heavy import narcotics district but primarily through the 
land border reflected through its listing as an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015), and through the 
use of small vessels which make drug drops along the coast between San Diego and Los 
Angeles76. The Port of San Diego itself is not noted for narcotics seizures as there are multiple 
other means available to import narcotics in the region.  However, the heavy presence of Latin 
American and Eurasian transnational organized crime groups in the region makes the port a 
vulnerable component in the transportation chain in the San Diego region.  In addition, cargo 
thefts are present in elevated numbers in the region, with 13 reported from March 2013-2015 
(FreightWatch International). 
Logistical 
 The Port of San Diego is a low throughput container port with under 100,000 TEUs 
yearly. 
Port of Boston – 22 
  A small port with the 24th largest container volume in the U.S., the Port of Boston is the 
main maritime port managed by the Massachusetts Port Authority (Pate et al. 2008).  
MASSPORT is not a state agency though law enforcement at the port is provided through Troop 
F of the Massachusetts State Police and MASSPORT Police which are stationed at the port.  The 
port’s primary terminal, Conley Terminal, is operated by MASSPORT and handles all 
containerized traffic at the port (MASSPORT B), while the port also has an automobile terminal 
capable of handling 70,000 vehicles a year, privately owned petroleum and liquefied natural gas 
terminals, which supply more than 90% of Massachusetts' heating and fossil fuel needs, and a 
private operated cruise terminal (MASSPORT C).  Troop F is a distinct component of the 
Massachusetts State Police and includes numerous specialized assets such as a dedicated 
Detective Unit, Bomb Squad, Community Services Unit, and Marine Unit.  In addition, the troop 
also maintains State Police K-9 Teams are maintained on site at Logan Airport (MASSPORT). 
Physical 
 The ports primary vulnerabilities in this category are the large number of peripheral 
companies, the level of daily truck traffic (Boston Globe 2013), and the level of intermodal 
connectivity but the port does not have a CES on-site. 
Administrative 
 The Port of Boston primarily rates highly in two areas. It has a heightened score as an 
illicit import/export market but rates only for having a significant local narcotics market 
(ONDCP 2015) and not a large cargo theft environment.  While, Boston is a consumer drug 
                                                            
76 See Appendix B for a list of all small vessel, or panga, interceptions and seizures. The Port of San Diego is the 
nearest port for 68% of identified panga interceptions from 2009-present. 
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market it is primarily supplied by distributors from Lowell, MA, Lawrence, MA and New York 
City.  The Port of Boston is identified as vulnerable due to the volume of commerce, but that is 
low compared to other ports along the eastern seaboard.  According to the HIDTA most narcotics 
are known to be supplied through the southeastern seaboard inbound ports such as Miami, NYC, 
and Savannah (NDIC 2011 B).  In addition, for employee corruption, there is evidence of 
employment fraud within the longshore community but no evidence related to the facilitation of 
illicit maritime transportation (Zezima 2006). 
Logistical 
  A low throughput port, Boston rates at the low end of logistical vulnerability, with near 
200,000 TEUs yearly. 
Port of Philadelphia – 21 
 The Port of Philadelphia is operated by the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority (PRPA). 
The PRPA is a Pennsylvania state and owns six terminals on the Delaware River in the 
Philadelphia area.  These terminals are leased to private operators while PRPA provides 
maintenance, marketing, and other services.  The port is primarily a break bulk port, with just 
38% of all cargo in 2006 containerized, leading it to have a low throughput.  The primary 
container port, Packer Avenue Marine Terminal handles the vast majority of containerized traffic 
at the port with seven lift cranes and utilizing an automated gate system (PRPA 2007).  The port 
does not have a dedicated law enforcement agency but does have a Security Division which 
handles non-sworn officer security functions and fulfills the primary security role. 
Physical 
 The port’s primary container terminal, Packer Avenue Marine Terminal, has one primary 
entry/exit point, through an automated gateway system, however the terminal is located directly 
adjacent to residential areas and near large public access roadways such as I-95, increasing the 
port’s vulnerability.  The CES is not located near the primary terminals, and is roughly 17 miles 
from the primary container terminal leading to a low CRAVED score, considering that the 
majority of cargo transiting through the port is bulk cargo (U.S. CBP May 13 2013).  However 
the port has a significant freight forwarder presence, partially a result of the proximity to the 
import/export area of NY/NJ.  Truck traffic at the port creates a moderate level of vulnerability 
relative to container traffic, and rail connectivity is significant with three rail lines leading to a 
high level of intermodal vulnerability.  
Administrative 
 The primary vulnerability in this category is that the port scores moderately for illicit 
import/export market. The port is in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015) though maritime methods 
are not identified as a primary method of drug imports for the region, while the port is located in 
a significant region for cargo theft with 69 incidents between March 2013-2015 (FreightWatch).  
In addition, the lack of a dedicated police force for the port increases the jurisdictional 
vulnerability of the port, despite the presence of a Division of Security which itself is the result 
of the requirements under the MTSA.  
Logistical 
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 The port scores low in this vulnerability with 367,000 TEUs in 2013. 
Port of Freeport (Texas) – 20 
  The Port of Freeport is an operating port and an autonomous governmental entity 
authorized by an act of the Texas Legislature in 1925.  The port is governed by a Port 
Commission, with commissioners serving six-year staggered terms and who are elected by local 
residents.  The port ranks 27th in container traffic and is primarily a bulk cargo port.  The port 
has a separate security division and also works with the Freeport Police Department, Brazoria 
County Sheriff’s Department, and Texas Department of Public Safety officers who enforce local, 
state and some federal laws within the Port and have arrest authority (Port Freeport). 
Physical 
 Primary vulnerabilities at the Port of Freeport are peripheral company access with the 
Houston area freight forwarding community having ready access to Port of Freeport, and 
considering the level of cargo, this heightens the level of vulnerability.  The port also has a 
heightened level of vehicle traffic and an intermodal landscape that increases vulnerability, with 
50,000 railway car transits yearly and with a heightened level of daily vehicular truck traffic 
(Port Freeport B), though there is only one connecting railway, Union Pacific (Texas Department 
of Transportation 2005).  
Administrative 
 The primary administrative vulnerability at Freeport is the location of a significant illicit 
import/export market. As Freeport is just 30 miles from Houston, it has a similar illicit import 
and export market conditions.  In addition, the port has a heightened level of jurisdictional 
vulnerability as security services are outsourced to a private company, Sunstate Security, without 
a dedicated port police (Port Freeport B). 
Logistical 
 Freeport has a low level of container throughput indicating a low level of vulnerability 
due to throughput. 
Port of Seattle – 20 
The Port of Seattle is a municipal corporation of the City of Seattle and operates as a 
limited operating port, leasing some facilities to private tenants and operating others (Port of 
Seattle; World Port Source B).  The port is one of the largest container and breakbulk ports in the 
U.S. ranking 9th in container throughput.  The port has a dedicated police department, Port of 
Seattle Police Department which is the primary law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction 
of the Port of Seattle.  The Port of Seattle Police is a certified law enforcement agency with 
sworn officers and is accredited with the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CALEA), one of the only port police agencies with CALEA accreditation.  The Port 
Police has multiple units to address the wider set of responsibilities that it must manage 
including the airport and resident communities within the Port of Seattle.  These units include a 
dive team, boat team, bomb disposal unit, crisis negotiation team, criminal investigations unit, K-
9 unit, and a special response/tactical team (Port of Seattle B).  In addition to the Port Police, the 
  
271 
 
Port of Seattle also has a security department with responsibility for port security and tenants 
hire their own private security guards (Pate et al. 2008).  
Physical 
 The primary vulnerabilities at the Port of Seattle are the open structure, a heavy daily 
presence of vehicular traffic, and a high level of intermodal connectivity with two terminals with 
on-dock rail access and 20% of all cargo moved by rail transit.  CRAVED cargo is primarily not 
kept at the port, but in the warehousing areas in the industrial section south of the port, while the 
CES is located in Fife, Washington nearly 40 miles from the port (Mercer Logistics). 
Administrative 
 The port does not display significant administrative vulnerabilities with no evidence for 
administrative vulnerabilities except for the presence of an illicit import/export market with 
Seattle located in an HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015) and with an above average rate of NICB 
and NCIC hits. 
Logistical 
 The port has a mid-level of vulnerability with cargo throughput of 1.2 million TEUs 
yearly. 
Port of Hueneme – 20 
 The Port of Hueneme is primarily an agricultural export port in central California and 
services the central valley region as well as being the only deep-draft port between Los Angeles 
and San Francisco along the California coast.  The port is a landlord port owned and operated by 
the Oxnard Harbor District, created in 1937, as an independent special district and political 
subdivision of the State of California (Port of Hueneme).  In addition to the port’s agricultural 
import/export operations, the Port specializes in handling automobiles, bulk cargo, and provides 
significant support and supplies for the offshore oil industry and is 28th in overall container 
traffic (CalTrans Office of System and Freight Planning 2012).  Security at the port is 
multifaceted.  The District has several specialized Memoranda of Understanding with local 
public safety agencies, including the Ventura County Fire Protection District for fire services, the 
Cities of Port Hueneme and Oxnard for police service at District.  The Port Hueneme Police 
Department performs regular patrols of District properties under a municipal services contract.  
In addition, District “wharfingers” oversee the activities of the wharf and are utilized as internal 
port security officers in addition a contract service company that provides access control at the 
main gate (Ventura County Grand Jury 2008).  
Physical 
 The port has two primary physical vulnerabilities with a large presence of peripheral 
companies due to its proximity to the Los Angeles region and a heightened level of vehicular 
traffic for the size of the container cargo at the port. Hueneme is primarily an agricultural port of 
export for the California central valley and handles a low throughput of container cargo. 
Administrative 
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 The primary vulnerability for the Port of Hueneme is its location in an illicit 
import/export market in the greater Los Angeles region though the port is not located in an 
HIDTA county (ONDCP 2015). Therefore, measures for cargo theft increase the cargo theft 
scoring for the port.  The port also rates a slightly elevated vulnerability with a lack of a 
dedicated port police though the presence of Naval Base Ventura County and the Coastal Trident 
Program established by the Port of Hueneme and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Asymmetric Warfare as a comprehensive training and exercise program for the Port of Hueneme 
alleviates jurisdictional vulnerability.  This program has developed into a regional maritime 
security and response program, enabling operational evaluation of leading-edge technology 
systems, with participation by approximately 90 organizations and departments (Port of 
Hueneme 2014). 
Logistical 
 The port handles less than 100,000 TEUs yearly and rates low in logistical vulnerability. 
Port of Portland – 18 
 The Port of Portland is a limited operating port with four main marine terminals along the 
Columbia River and is governed by the nine-member Port of Portland Commission which sets 
port policy (Port of Portland).  The port is located along the Columbia-Snake River and extensive 
barge operations services the grain and agricultural producers along the eastern banks of the 
Snake River and Willamette Valley in central Oregon.  The port has one significant container 
terminal, Terminal 6, which is operated under a 25 year lease by ICTCI, a Philippines based 
terminal operating company.  The port is 25th largest for container traffic but is in danger of 
losing significant traffic through a combination of labor disputes between the ILWU and ICTCI 
and the withdrawal of Hanjin, the largest container service, constituting the bulk of container 
traffic to Asia and Hapag-Lloyd, the only direct connection to Europe (The Oregonian 2015; The 
Oregonian 2015 B).  To provide law enforcement for these facilities, the Port of Portland has a 
dedicated police department, Port of Portland Port Police which historically had jurisdiction only 
over the airport but in 2009 the Oregon Legislature expanded authorities to cover all of the Port 
of Portland facilities including the marine terminals (Oregon Legislative Assembly 2009). 
Physical 
 The port’s primary vulnerabilities are in this category with a heightened vulnerability for 
open structure, with four terminals, with multiple access points and the port near public access 
roads but no major highways are near the port. While containers are kept in open access yards 
most of the cargo at Portland is bulk and ro-ro, thereby decreasing the level of vulnerability for 
open structure.  The port has a high level of peripheral companies and daily vehicle traffic 
increasing levels of vulnerability in those areas. 
Administrative 
The Port of Portland Police Department is primarily the department for the international 
airport and not for the marine terminals, only recently granted jurisdiction over the marine 
terminals.  However, the primary component of vulnerability in this area is that the port has lost 
significant container traffic with the loss of major shippers, Hanjin and Hapag-Lloyd, which may 
lead to a lack of employment opportunities for previously employed longshore workers, truck 
  
273 
 
drivers, and warehousemen with significant knowledge of the port and operations.  There is no 
evidence of organization or employee corruption nor a historical criminal presence in port 
operations. 
Logistical 
 The port does not have a high level of cargo throughput, with primarily bulk grain 
shipments, and has a low level of logistical vulnerability. 
Port of Wilmington (Delaware) – 18 
The Port of Wilmington is owned and operated by the Diamond State Port Corporation 
(DSPC), a corporate entity of the State of Delaware (Port of Wilmington).  The port is a 
significant import port for bananas, the largest import port for perishable refrigerated need cargo 
and the primary export port on the East Coast for livestock, and is 19th in overall container 
traffic. The port operates seven deepwater general cargo berths, a tanker berth, and a berth for 
RoRo vessels on the Christina River, as well as an automobile and roro berth on the Delaware 
River (Delaware World Trade Center).  The port has a standalone police department, the Port of 
Wilmington Harbor Police (Port of Wilmington B). 
Physical 
 Primary vulnerabilities at the port include a heightened level of freight forwarders. The 
northeast corridor region, due to the level of cargo transited not only through maritime means but 
also through air and land transportation has high levels of freight forwarders which is reflected 
for high scores in that category for ports in this region.  In addition, the port has a heightened 
level of daily truck traffic vulnerability, though the data is based on truck traffic before rail 
operations re-started at the port and intermodal traffic likely increased (Wilmapco 2009).  
Administrative 
 The primary vulnerability identified at Wilmington (DE) is that it located in a significant 
illicit import export market.  The port is located in a region with significant cargo thefts, 26 
reported between March 2013-2015, and an above average level of NICB identified stolen 
vehicles.  Wilmington is considered part of the consolidated Port of Philadelphia, which consists 
of the waterfront areas of Philadelphia, Camden, and Wilmington (DE) and is a busy multi-port 
complex. Wilmington’s level of cargo traffic is considered sufficient enough for traffickers to 
inset illicit cargo through the port to smuggle illicit drugs into the region (NDIC 2011c) but 
compared to other ports on the eastern seaboard it has a relatively low throughput. 
Logistical 
 The port has 330,000 TEUs yearly which places it in the low range of logistical 
vulnerability. 
Port of Gulfport – 17 
 The Port of Gulfport is managed by the Mississippi State Port Authority which is an 
independent agency of the state of Mississippi and does not receive funding from the state.  
Security functions are maintained at the port through contract with an independent security guard 
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protection service.  The service provides continuous surveillance of all Port facilities, protects 
against unlawful entry and pilferage, enforces fire detection control regulations and performs 
other assigned security duties.  The security functions of the service are coordinated with 
municipal, county, state and federal law enforcement authorities (Mississippi State Port 
Authority at Gulfport 2012).  The Port of Gulfport is a landlord port and rents facilities and 
terminal operations to private companies and in 2013 was the 23rd largest container port in the 
U.S. 
Physical 
 Gulfport is one of the smaller ports in the U.S. serving a regional market and having 
suffered significant devastation during Hurricane Katrina has had difficulty re-establishing 
market share.  The port itself is not large but does have an open structure, with a significant 
presence of freight forwarders, though no CRAVED cargo is housed at the port which primarily 
is an import port for refrigerated cargo (Port of Gulfport).  The port displays a heightened level 
of truck traffic with 47 companies operating in the port, but due to a lack of definitive 
information on daily truck movements the port does not score at the highest level in this 
vulnerability.  
Administrative 
 Hurricane Katrina exposed several interagency coordination issues at the port, nor is 
there any evidence that the port participates in an Area Maritime Security Committee. Following 
Hurricane Katrina, Port of Gulfport and Harrison County Emergency Management officials in 
Mississippi said they had limited contact and coordination regarding emergency recovery. 
Emergency management officials noted that there are difficulties in communicating with the port 
due to the fact that they are required through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency to 
request or provide assistance to the port.  While not a specific port security related concern, the 
lack of interoperability and interagency communication is a significant concern that can lead to 
vulnerability for broader port security issues (U.S. GAO 2007).  The port rate for medium 
vulnerability for an illicit import/export market, as part of an HIDTA county (NDIC 2011; 
ONDCP 2015) does register above average NCIC and NICB hit rates for vehicle exports.  The 
primary administrative vulnerability at the port is that Gulfport contracts its security to a private 
contractor which is not a licensed law enforcement entity (Port of Gulfport). Without a fully 
licensed security agency managing security at the port, there is a lack of jurisdiction in terms of 
arrest authority.  Significantly for a port with its primary business as refrigerated cargo, recently 
one of the primary tenants, Chiquita Brands, pulled out of the port as of late 2014 (Bonney 
2014).  The loss of a tenant means that there will be a fewer employment opportunities for 
previously employed longshore workers, truck drivers, and warehousemen with significant 
knowledge of the port and operations, and which can lead to a heightened level of vulnerability 
to criminal networks that may decide to move cargo through the port. 
Logistical 
Gulfport is a low throughput port, with just over 200,000 TEUs yearly in 2013, though 
this is now likely to be significantly decreased with the departure of Chiquita Brands. 
Port of Mobile – 17 
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 The Port of Mobile is the primary port managed by the Alabama State Port Authority 
(ASPA) and is an operating port.  The Port of Mobile is a significant bulk port, the largest for 
forest products and coal in the United States while 22nd in overall container traffic.  The port has 
41 berths that can provide full services to shippers from intermodal transfer and handling, to 
storage and on dock security, through the ASPA Port Police (Alabama State Port Authority).  
The ASPA also manages 10 terminals further inland along the rivers along the state waterway 
system (Mobile Metropolitan Planning Organization). 
Physical 
The primary vulnerabilities identified at the port are its open set-up, similar to most ports 
in the U.S. with multiple entry/exit points for Mobile terminal along the Mobile River providing 
easy access, port facilities near the I-10 and I-65 interstate highways, and containers stored in 
open yards on-site at the port.  This leads the port to score high on the open structure 
vulnerability components.  The port displays a medium level of vulnerability with medium-level 
of freight forwarders for the amount of container traffic at the port.  The port was scored at a 
medium level for intermodal traffic, because while data to identify truck trips was not available, 
the high level of rail intermodal at the port likely pushes its vehicular presence lower since 25% 
of cargo is transported by rail by five railroad operators (J.R. Wilburn and Associates Inc. 2013). 
Administrative 
No significant administrative vulnerabilities were identified for the port, with no evidence 
in the public record of a historical presence of criminal networks operating in port economic 
sectors, or evidence or organizational or employee corruption.  The port scores low for an illicit 
import/export market with low levels of cargo thefts, negligible export automobile traffic, or 
evidence that Mobile has many seizures of illicit narcotics or other illegal cargo, though Mobile 
is an HIDTA county in the Gulf Coast HIDTA group (NICB 2010b; ONDCP 2015). 
Logistical 
The port does have not a significant throughput load of 224,614 TEUs yearly but carries 
significant levels of coal and forest products. 
Port of Honolulu – 16 
The Port of Honolulu is the 19th largest container port in the United States and is 
managed and operated by the Hawaii Department of Transportation Harbors Division.  The port 
handles all international cargo into or out of Hawaii and the majority of traffic from the mainland 
United States.  The port has one primary facility for international cargo, at Fort Armstrong, with 
a total of 38 piers handling many smaller vessels and barges for inter-island traffic (Hawaii 
Department of Transportation B).  As an operating port the Hawaii Department of Transportation 
Harbor Police is the primary law enforcement agency for the port and all others on the islands 
(Hawaii Department of Transportation).  
Physical 
 Honolulu Harbor is the largest port in the Hawaiian islands and provides the main entry 
point for imported cargo which is then transferred to other islands primarily through barges.  The 
Port of Honolulu has heightened open structure vulnerability, with multiple piers with entry and 
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exits points throughout.  However, the main container terminal at Sand Island that handles the 
bulk of cargo throughput has one only one road linking it to the large island of Hawaii reducing 
access.  While containers are housed in open spaces many are transported by barge immediately 
after arriving and therefore do not stay on site of extended periods of time.  The port does have 
an on-site CES located at Pier 42 increasing its CRAVED goods vulnerability (Islandmovers). 
Administrative 
 The Port of Hawaii is in an HIDTA identified county (ONDCP 2015) and has been 
identified as transshipment point for illicit narcotics bound for the western Pacific, primarily 
Guam (NDIC 2011). While air cargo, through Honolulu International Airport is identified as a 
methamphetamine shipment method, traffickers also use Hawaii as a transshipment point for 
Mexican methamphetamine bound for the Pacific Basin, primarily Guam.  However, the 
maritime transportation of illicit narcotics in transit to and from the continental U.S. is an 
intelligence gap.  The HIDTA identifies both limited information and resources make both 
detecting and interdicting illicit cargo challenging for law enforcement officials (NDIC 2011).  
Furthermore, the Port of Honolulu has a challenging jurisdictional environment with a number of 
inter-operability and interagency communication difficulties highlighted by a Maritime 
Intelligence Sharing Taskforce (Salem et al. 2010).  Participants in the taskforce identified 
several areas where the policies or processes of different agencies were not well coordinated.  
These gaps included a lack of consistency and poor inclusion in emergency operations processes, 
and focused on the lack of coordination with the port and terminal industry that operate port 
sites, an inconsistent approaches to the delivery of sensitive information, a lack of unified 
security plans, inconsistent training programs and a complex regulatory landscape that does not 
adapt well to individual ports.  In addition in recent years, the Hawaii DOT Harbor Police, which 
has jurisdiction over port security at ports in Hawaii, were stripped of their right to use firearms 
in response to a lack of developed regulations and training, though this was reinstated following 
introduction of SOPs for firearms use (Baehr 2011). 
Logistical 
 As the primary cargo port for the Hawaiian Islands, the Port of Honolulu has heightened 
vulnerability in terms of throughput with over one million TEUs yearly. 
Port of Kahului – 16 
 The Port of Kahului is a small port on the island of Maui which is owned and operated by 
the Hawaii Department of Transportation.  It is unique in this analysis because it does not accept 
any foreign container traffic, all of which transits to/from the port through Honolulu.  The 
Hawaii Department of Transportation (HDOT) has a separate police force which provides 
security for all HDOT facilities including Kahului (Hawaii Department of Transportation).  The 
port received a heightened vulnerability score for the level of financial inlays through the PSGP 
due to the level of container throughput at the port.  Kahului had the lowest level of PSGP 
investment of any port in the U.S. at $.27 per 2013 container where average is $56.41 per 2013 
container.   
Physical 
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 As the smallest port in the MVF sample, Kahului has few identified vulnerabilities. The 
primary vulnerability is the open structure of the port, with the port composed of three piers with 
multiple entry/exit points. 
Administrative 
 The port does not have any identified heightened levels of administrative vulnerability.   
Logistical 
 The port has a low level of throughput with just over 80,000 TEUs yearly, the vast 
majority which is for local consumption on the island. 
Port of Wilmington (North Carolina) – 13 
 The Port of Wilmington NC is operated by the North Carolina State Ports Authority 
(NCSPA), governed by an 11 member Board of Directors, partially appointed by the Governor, 
the General Assembly and the North Carolina Department of Transportation (North Carolina 
State Port Authority).  The NCSPA has jurisdiction over two ports, Wilmington and Morehead 
City, with Wilmington rated as the 20th largest in container volume.  The NCSPA has a 
dedicated port police; the North Carolina State Port Police Department includes sworn police 
officers and security officers at both the Port of Morehead City and the Port of Wilmington. 
Physical 
 Primary vulnerability at Wilmington (NC) is for a heightened level of open structure 
vulnerability. Terminal facilities have more than one entry/exit point, containers are housed in 
open yards, but port facilities are not near large public access roads such as interstate highways.  
Wilmington also has a high level of freight forwarders for the level of throughput at the port, in 
addition to proportionally large numbers of truck access. 
Administrative 
 Wilmington does not score for any administrative vulnerability except for a heightened 
level of illicit import/export market vulnerability. The port has been identified in previous years 
as an importation point (National Drug Intelligence Center 2003; DEA 2005), and seizures pre-
2005 indicate that narcotics have transited the port, however most recent data show that the port 
does seem to be utilized at the same levels as in previous years (ONDCP 2015). 
Logistical 
 A low throughput port, Wilmington scores low in this area, with 260,000 TEUs yearly. 
Port of Anchorage – 11 
 The Port of Anchorage is an enterprise department under the Municipality of Anchorage 
and a landlord port. Similar to other municipal enterprise ports, the port generates revenue and 
receives no taxpayer funds, in addition to providing funds to the municipality. The port has 4 
bulk carrier berths and two petroleum berths (Port of Anchorage).  The port does not have a 
standalone police department and instead contracts with Doyon Security Services which provides 
20 armed officers that man CCTV cameras and perform the access control (Port of Anchorage 
  
278 
 
B).  In addition the City of Anchorage Police Department responds to any incidents on the port 
(Alaska Dispatch New 2015).  Due to the oil, gas and fishing industry and that it is Alaska’s 
main port of entry for import/export cargo, Anchorage is a significant throughput port, ranked 
15th in container traffic.  The port received a heightened vulnerability score for the level of 
financial inlays through the PSGP due to the level of container throughput at the port.  
Anchorage had the second lowest level of PSGP investment of any port in the U.S. at $7.73 per 
2013 container where average is $56.41 per 2013 container. 
Physical 
 The port does not have significant physical vulnerabilities. The port is open structure, as 
the port has three terminals, a staging area south of the port where containers are offloaded for 
intermodal transport. The port has at least four entrances that can be identified in addition to 
multiple places without fencing.  It is likely that truck traffic is significant at the port, but there is 
a lack of data to identify the number of daily visits.   
Administrative 
 The primary administrative vulnerability identified for Anchorage is the lack of a 
dedicated port police as security services are contracted out to a private company, Doyen 
Services which is not a law enforcement organization and does not have arrest authority at the 
port.  Instead Anchorage PD has to be called to respond to any incidents and does not maintain a 
full time presence at the port.  There is no evidence of organizational or employee corruption at 
the port nor a history of criminal network use of port facilities or companies. 
Logistical 
 The Port of Anchorage is low-level throughput port with just over 700,000 TEUs. 
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Appendix H: IRB Approval 
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Appendix I: Port of New York and New Jersey Case Study Interview Subjects 
 
 Waterfront Commission employees (10) 
o Police chief (2011-2014) 
o Executive director 
o General Counsel 
o Director of Administration and Auditing 
o Director of Intelligence 
o Director of Law, Licensing and EIC 
o Managing director of Licensing 
o Assistant counsel (2) 
o Law fellow 
 New Jersey State Police (1) 
 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (1) 
 Customs broker (1) 
 U.S. Customs and Border Protection PNYNJ officer (1) 
 American Association of Port Authorities, Director of Government Relations (1) 
 Former court appointed monitor for a waterfront union at the PNYNJ (1) 
 Port of Baltimore Director of Security (1) 
 Maritime lawyer in the PNYNJ region (1) 
 Former Program Manager, Regional Port Programs, Port Commerce Department, Port 
Authority of New York & New Jersey (1) 
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Appendix J: Cargo throughput- mid-Atlantic and Northeast port 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Cargo throughput- mid-Atlantic and Northeast port  (AAPA 2013) 
 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Hampton Roads 2,223,532 2,105,886 1,918,029 1,895,017   1,745,228  2,083,278 2,128,366 2,046,285 1,981,955 
New York/ New Jersey 5,467,345 5,529,913 5,503,485 5,292,025 4,561,528   5,265,058  5,299,105 5,092,806 4,785,318 
 
Philadelphia 367,499 273,190 291,091 272,824 222,900 255,128 253,492 247,211 204,912 
Boston 195,303 187,747 192,705 168,285 187,094      208,626       220,139  200,113 188,869 
Baltimore 705,230 678,262 631,804 610,922      525,296       612,877  610,466 627,947 602,475 
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Appendix K: CRAVED Commodity list 
 
Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau statistics of commodities (U.S. Trade Numbers) found in the 
U.S. comparative port sample, aggregated in alphabetical order and marked per FreightWatch 
International top ten stolen cargo in 2014 (FreightWatch International 2014) 
Table 15: CRAVED commodity list Source  
Commodity 
CRAVED- Food/Drink, Electronics, Home & 
Garden, Building & Industrial, Clothing & 
Shoes, Metals, Autos & Parts, Personal Care, 
Miscellaneous, Alcohol, Pharmaceuticals, 
Tobacco 
Acyclic alcohols   
Aluminum ores and concentrates   
Ammonia   
Ash & Slag   
Bananas   
Beer   
Binders for found molds; chemical products   
Biodiesel fuels   
Bitumen    
Cane, beet sugar   
Cassava   
Chemical woodpulp   
Chromium ores   
Coal, briquettes   
Cocoa Beans   
Coffee   
Commercial vehicles   
Corn   
Cyclic hydrocarbons   
Dates, figs, pineapples   
Dolomite   
Ferroalloys 7202   
Fish fillets, chilled or frozen   
Flat-rolled iron   
Fork-lifts, other   
Fresh apples   
Fruit and vegetables   
Fruit, nuts, preserved   
Furniture, parts   
Gasoline, other fuels   
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Glass containers   
Glazed ceramics   
Granulated Slag   
Grapes, fresh   
Gypsum   
Halogenated derivatives of hydrocarbons   
Hardware for fixtures   
Imports of returned   
Iron and steel   
Lime   
Live crustaceans   
Machinery for rubber, plastic industry, parts   
Melons and papayas   
Men's or boys' suits, knit or crocheted   
Men's or boys suits, not knit   
Men's or boys' underwea   
Misc. aluminumin   
Misc. dead aninmals   
Misc. flat rolled steel   
Misc. fresh vegetables   
Misc. mineral or chemical fertilizers   
Misc. minerals   
Misc. vegetables frozen   
Miscellaneous medical chemical re-agents   
Molasses    
Motor vehicle parts   
Motor vehicles for transporting people   
Mussels, scallops, other mollusks   
Natural Barium   
Natural waters   
Nitrites, nitrates   
Nitrogenous fertilizers   
Oil   
Palm oil   
Paper and paper products   
Paper cartons   
Paper, uncoated   
Peat    
Pebbles, gravel   
Petroleum Gas   
Petroleum products   
Photo-sensitive semi-conductors, parts   
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Pig iron   
Plastic boxes   
Portland, aluminum   
Preparations for animal feeding   
Railway Etc Tracks   
Rice   
Rubber     
Rubber tires   
Rum, gin, vodka, other liquors   
Sands   
Misc. mineral or chemical fertilizers   
Scrap iron, steel   
Screws, nuts   
Seamless iron tubes and pipes   
Seats, excluding dentist and barber chairs   
Self-propelled heavy construction machinery   
Semifinished products of Iron, nonalloy steel   
Spongy ferrous iron   
Steel ingots   
Stone monument   
Sweaters, pullovers   
Sweetened waters   
Titanium Ores   
Tractors   
T-shirts, tank t   
Various forms of salt   
Washing machinces   
Wheat   
Wine   
Women's or girls slips   
Wood, sawed   
Yachts and other   
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